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1
INTRODUCTION

Randolph Bourne was a leading figure in the pre-World War I
rebellion of the twentieth century, a time of political activism, cultural experimentation, and youthful optimism, when, in the words
of the visiting Irish painter John Butler Yeats, "the fiddles were tuning up all over America." As a member of the first generation to
inherit a corporate capitalist order, Bourne became its spokesman
and also one of its deepest critics. He advocated a broad-based cultural renaissance to rescue the "personal point of view," invoked
by William James, and to institute a "culture of feeling," to offset
the growing emphasis on technology, bureaucratic administration,
and social control through the application of reason. He encouraged a youth revolt, generational in consciousness and concerned
with freeing personal relations and social roles. He advanced the
idea of a "trans-national" American culture, a cosmopolitan "federation of cultures" that would include America's newest immigrants as equal partners in the social compact.
He is remembered primarily for his opposition to military intervention in World War I. "War is the health of the state," he warned
in an unfinished essay published after his death. Woodrow Wilson's
war policies had centralized state power, rationalized the economy,
Americanized the schools, and criminalized dissent, permanently
altering the nature of liberal politics. Bourne reserved his harshest
criticism for the "younger intelligentsia" of his own generation who,
like Walter Lippmann, became publicists for the war, working for
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the Creel Committee on Public Information; or who mobilized consensus as journalists and educators in support of the war; or who,
like John Dewey, the nation's leading philosopher, replaced the creative pragmatism of William James with an instrumentalist approach, its "vision" subsumed by "technique."
When he died at the age of thirty-two, six weeks after Armistice,
Bourne was remembered in scores of testimonials and tributes. To
many people, his death signified the end of an era and the martyrdom of a certain spirit of youthful innocence. To others, his was
a voice of singular courage and political independence. Out of his
public opposition to the war, a persistent legend emerged. He was
the haunting figure of Dos Passos's U.S.A.:
This little sparrowlike man,
tiny twisted bit of flesh in a black cape,
always in pain and ailing,
put a pebble in his sling
and hit Goliath in the forehead with it.
War, he wrote, is the health of the state.
A crucial part of the legend fastened on Bourne's radical difference:
If any man has a ghost
Bourne has a ghost,
a tiny twisted unscared ghost in a black cloak
hopping along the grimy old brick and brownstone streets
still left in downtown New York,
crying out in a shrill soundless giggle:
War is the health of the state.1
As with many writers, the corporeal image was an important part
of the myth. Bourne's hunched back and crooked frame, in contrast to his moral rectitude, were recounted in a dozen memoirs,
poetry, and at least two novels that since have become a part of the
cultural fabric of the literary and political left. In the 1920s, legend
had it that Bourne spent the last year in silence and disrepute, his
manuscripts seized by federal agents and refused by publishers. It
was said that he died poor and alone, abandoned by friends and
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persecuted by the government. His writings went unread, and
Bourne himself became a text to be interpreted. 2
In the 1930s, the legend was reinvented, this time by American
Marxists, among them Michael Gold, who searched for indigenous
sources of political radicalism. They heralded Bourne as the "Great
American" literary critic who prized the virtues of proletarian art
and literature. 3 In the 1940s, antifascists interpreted his solitary
opposition to the state and to corporate impersonality as an exemplary resistance to democratic totalitarianism.4 Again in the 1960s,
his writings were reprinted and his ideas reconsidered by a New Left
interested in "personal politics" and by student activists protesting
the "multiversity's" role in state-sponsored research, education, and
administration. 5 Not surprisingly, perhaps, during the 1980s, a time
of reaction, Bourne's writings went out of print,6 and his importance
came to rest primarily on his failures as a "forgotten prophet," the
last of a dying breed of visionaries or rebels whose failed and perhaps impossibilist mission to restore youthful virtues to an aging
America has been relegated to the detritus of history. 7
"The text finally disappeared under the interpretation," Nietzsche wrote of the French Revolution, a fate affecting Bourne's life
and work as well. The legend mediates every reading, even in some
examples of Bourne scholarship, telling us more, perhaps, about
the generation that invented it than about the subject itself.8 Legends are, after all, part of a culture's conversation with itself,
reflecting and refracting its own anxieties about and aspirations
for its common condition. They can reinspire a culture, as Nietzsche maintained. But they can obscure an intimate knowledge of
their subjects or distract (and sometimes depoliticize) their inventors. The Bourne legend has obscured in this double sense. Yet it
has also obscured unexpectedly, ignoring the role Bourne himself
played in creating his own myth. We know Bourne by his shadowy,
ghostlike presence in Dos Passos's text, not by his own words. We
know him as other people have constructed him, not as he constructed himself.
In this book I return to a study of Bourne's life and work by offering an analysis from categories derived immanently, that is, from
within his work itself. I do not try to demystify the Bourne legend
or separate the "man from the myth"; rather, I seek to explore the
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particular role Bourne played in the creation of his own myth or
"epic" (his word) and to evaluate the significance of that effort for
his political thought. Through the epic nature of autobiography, I
suggest, Bourne revealed a Nietzschean disposition to shape his
own fate, to intensify his experience and make more of his being,
in stories that others 0f his generation might read.
The Nietzschean influence I have chosen to highlight is consistent with the terms Bourne used to frame his own role as a radical
critic and to construct the forces he saw as shaping modern culture. According to Nietzsche, every culture can be characterized
by a particular combination of the moral and spiritual impulse of
the apollonian and the physical and emotional energies of the
dionysian. Nietzsche 's apollonianism stood for art and the organizing capacity to create order, illusion, and form. The dionysiac
pertained to the deeper recesses of passion and chaos, which often
gave rise to communal revelry and frenzied bursts of energy but
which could also inform and vitalize an apollonian construct. For
Nietzsche, as for Bourne, it was in the balance between order and
artful creation and the vitalism and energy of the pagan that a culture could regenerate itself.
Bourne theorized American political culture in similar terms.
He found the apollonian will-to-form in Victorian counsels of selfcontrol as well as in the progressives' fascination with scientific
management. He saw the dionysian impulse in the crowds and
lights of the city streets as modern-day carnivals and in the personal
expressivity of neighborhood pageantry and artists' cooperatives.
His attention to both sides of the modern experience-its rationality and irrationality, its order and disorder, the "puritan" and
the "pagan"-and his unwillingness to choose between them or
resolve them into some higher synthesis was unique among the
progressives and radicals of the early century. For him, contradiction was creative, anticipating Herbert Marcuse, and the stance of
"intellectual suspense" was a creative impulse, restlessly moving
between dream and reality, following Nietzsche. It is this perspective-as a confirmed modernist who anticipated the "post-modem"
(his word)-or, as he wrote of himself, as a social reformer with
aesthetic aspirations-that makes him a pivotal figure in the history of American political thought.9
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This book is informed by the recognition that Bourne's thought
is valuable precisely because it offered a new political discourse and
a set of cultural possibilities for American society at the height of the
modern age. 10 Influenced by and responding to the romanticism of
Nietzsche, the irrationalism of Henri Bergson and Georges Sorel,
the idealism ofWaltWhitman, the pragmatism ofJames and Dewey,
and the democratic socialism of Graham Wallas, G. B. Shaw, and
Henry George, his political and cultural criticism kept alive the competing tensions of this contradictory legacy. His writings, amounting
to over 1,500 articles, several volumes of essays, hundreds of letters,
and a dozen unpublished essays, written in only seven years, reveal
a vision that was generous and democratic and a mind that was corrosive and increasingly impatient with liberal politics.
In this book I try to reposition Bourne's thought at the center of
debates about the nature and limits of American liberalism.11 Writing
in what Antonio Gramsci calls the "national-popular" language,
Bourne participated in public debates about war preparedness, immigration, educational reform, and feminism, but, I argue, his analysis
was framed in terms other than those that were ordinarily given. Writing from a position "below the battle," he rejected the political
options offered at the time-that one must be either prowar or antiwar, an American or an immigrant, a poet or critic-as choices constructed within the terms of liberalism itself. This stance, I suggest,
created a contradictory situation for him: in repudiating politics, he
did not repudiate the political. In my view, however, redefining politics and the outlines of political agency, the public space was opened
to outside voices and alternative sites of engagement, creating the
prospects of a more inclusive, more democratic politics.
It was a position that involved risks and limitations. It risked political isolation, as it was clearly oppositional. It was unpalatable to the
intellectual who "craved certainty." It was difficult to sustain as a
form of democratic politics. And, perhaps most significantly, it was
a concession to one's ineffectiveness in shaping current policies.
Nevertheless, when political alternatives were foreclosed, Bourne
argued, his position "below the battle" was the most advantageous
place from which to generate alternatives to liberal consensus.
This interpretation challenges the more familiar one initially
offered by Lewis Mumford and more recently recalled by Casey
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Blake in his formidable study, Bewved Community; that Bourne's politics were a form of romantic defeatism, or even worse, a retreat
into political passivity. 12 It is my contention that Bourne's position
"below the battle" was neither a retreat from politics nor a place
taken outside the line of fire, as the phrase might suggest; rather, it
was another form of political engagement, a way to free oneself
from hegemonic certainties that block genuine debate, preclude
alternatives to politics-as-usual, and prevent democratic change.
Indeed, I argue that it is precisely from this "third space," borrowing Jacques Lacan's term, that Bourne was able to participate in
practical, ongoing, grassroots efforts to reorganize relations among
and between family, work, and community. As alternative forms of
political organizing and education, these activities were practicalnot utopian-expressions of politics, based in the neighborhoods
of modern cities, that effectively reconstructed social relations
among workers, students, writers, and activists that anticipated the
kind of democratic politics Bourne wanted to see instituted in the
nation as a whole.
In historicizing his thought within the debates about American
liberalism, I seek to accomplish several objectives. My first goal is
to uncover the historical roots of American political thought, and
in particular, to locate the roots of twentieth-century radical
thought. My primary focus is on the contradictions of progressive
liberalism, especially with regard to the role of science and expertise in shaping the social and political order, the importance of
nationalism in building a common culture, and the nature and
role of the liberal state in a democratic society. Because Bourne
shared many of the intellectual assumptions of the pragmatic progressives at the New Republic, the aesthetic commitments of the cultural nationalists at the Seven Arts, and the political convictions of
the radical critics at the Masses, his thought can best be understood
as a chronicle and critique of modern twentieth-century American
political thought.
Second, I hope to clarify the relation of intellectuals to institutional politics, or what Norman Birnbaum has termed the "excessive integration of intellect and power," which first emerged during
World War I. The support of progressive intellectuals for an administrative state and a centralized economy, indeed their integration
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with the state, marked a turning point in the political role of intellectuals and revealed a crisis within that class, and within the middle class generally, about the nature of political responsibility and
involvement, which became a legacy of the war. 13
Finally, I seek to offer an understanding of the ideas and experiences of a particular political generation and of the influence of
generationalism on Bourne's thought. I regard his generational
affiliations both as a context for his radical dissent and a vehicle for
its construction. Part of my inquiry addresses the question of
Bourne's representativeness, or his ability to represent the views of
his generation, and by extension the experiences of young moderns. In his view, his experiences of personal struggles to deal with
physical disability and exclusion represented the experiences of
America's outsiders-the immigrant, the activist, the urban poorand his own generation, discontent with Victorianism, politically
powerless, and diffident toward corporate capitalism. In theorizing
the nature of his representativeness, I also hope to explore the relationship between the modern intellectual and the public culture.
The chapters are organized conceptually. In Chapter 2, I provide the theoretical background to Bourne's political thought and
to that of his generation and examine the nature of his representativeness as a young radical and modern intellectual. Chapter 3
analyzes his first autobiographical essay as a conversion narrative,
or the spiritual journey, in Michael Rogin's words, of a "unique,
and therefore, representative" American. Taking the form of an
"auto-American-biography," in the fine phrase of Sacvan Bercovitch, it was offered as the story of a representative individual whose
destiny was understood to be tied to that of his community. 14 In
Chapter 4, I examine the "trans-valuation" of Bourne's (given)
marginality to his (chosen) stance of purposeful discontent, a position that, I argue, was an effort to disembody his radical difference
into a philosophical stance. Ironic criticism combined the poetical
(dionysian) and the analytical (apollonian) approaches to critical
judgment, detached and yet committed simultaneously. 15
In Chapter 5, I analyze Bourne's advocacy of the idea of a youth
rebellion, encompassing feminism, educational reform, and pragmatism, which were constructed as several means of "trans-valuing"
personal relations and, through the artful creation of "personality,"
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preserving the dionysian spirit of youth. His idea of a youth revolt
was a challenge to the twin apollonian impulses of the age: the Victorian emphasis on the building of character and the progressives'
fascination with scientific expertise. I try to make clear the connection between a fading Victorianism and an emergent progressivism by contrasting his idea of a youthful rebellion with Walter
Lippmann's plea for "mastery" to rescue their generation from
"drift," through professionalism and management skills, a move that
Bourne regarded as a sign of premature aging.
Chapter 6 focuses on his wartime critique of the purely instrumental moment in social reform, the deceptions of the progressives' preoccupation with s1ocial control, and the risks of the
integration of intellectuals with the state. Bourne's ambivalent relation to progressivism before the war was crystallized in his critique
of Dewey's wartime pragmatism and led to Bourne's unyielding
antistatist political theory in his essay on the state.
I outline Bourne's search for conditions that would fulfill America's "promise" in Chapter 7, analyzing his support of an ethnic
and national cosmopolitanism as a counternarrative to the dominant discourse of "Americanization" and the melting pot ideal in
the early twentieth century. A transnational American culture was
based on the prefiguration of a more democratic form of politics
and a new conception of national identity, taking account of individuals' cultural, ethnic, and political affiliations in the idea of a
dual citizenship. Although Bourne did not fully work out the relation between political and cultural citizenship, the idea of multiple memberships remains a central issue in debates about the
nature of contemporary democratic theory.
In Chapter 8, I investigate Bourne's literary and cultural theory,
his theory of the role of art in society, and the prospects of a revitalized (dionysian) culture in America, supported in part by
"beloved communities" (using Josiah Royce's phrase) of cultural
workers acting collectively to bring art to all classes. I argue that
his theory of the role of art-as a tool of social reform and as a
means of reinspiring a culture-reflects the progressivist and Nietzschean influences on his thought, respectively. His literary criticism
similarly combined a modern appreciation of the importance of
creating a national literature and a postmodern sensibility in read-
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ing texts, tracing the thread of desire in the novels of Theodore
Dreiser, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Willa Cather.
In the Epilogue I return to the Bourne myth and the significance of his critical theory. Against the scholarship of the last three
decades, I evaluate his work within Nietzsche's three metamorphoses of the spirit, where, it has been said, Bourne was caught in
the role of Nietzsche's lion-the position of always saying nounable to offer an affirmative politics for radical work in the future.
This interpretation, although persuasive in light of the broad
sweep of his dissent, does not take into account his concession to
the limits of dissent against the "inexorables" of war or his prefigurative politics of transnationalism and efforts to free the aesthetic
impulse. In taking a position "below the battle," I suggest, he found
an unmapped space to keep the "intellectual currents" flowing and
pursue creative alternatives to impersonal bureaucratic politics, in
an effort to fulfill America's "promise."

2
A POLITICAL GENEALOGY

The country is .. . dotted with young men
and women, in full possession of their minds,
faculties and virtue, who feel themselves profoundly alien to the work which is going on
around them .... They are genuine pragmatists and they fear any kind of absolute, even
when bearing gifts.
-Randolph S. Bourne, "A War Diary"

In the first decade of the twentieth century, America underwent a
dramatic revolution in all aspects of cultural life: in taste and manners, in morals and philosophy, in institutional arrangements and personal relations. Social conventions regarding gender roles, women's
"nature," workers' rights, immigration policy, internationalism, and
artistic freedom were contested openly in a brief experiment in America's political culture that has come to be known as the "little rebellion." The young progressives, feminists, socialists, and bohemians
who participated tried to break free from prevailing norms in political consensus, sexual conformity, and cultural formalism. They formed
themselves into a highly self-conscious if somewhat disorganized
group, certain of their historical role and their ideas for the future.1
The prewar rebellion was national in scope, but its primary centers of activity were in many of the nation's cities, including New
10

A

POLITICAL GENEALOGY

11

York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, Milwaukee, Madison, and
Portland. In New York City, the "little renaissance" was based in
Greenwich Village, its compressed spatial geography contrasting
sharply with its cultural internationalism. Social reformers and
political revolutionaries, writers and artists, socialists and anarchists, suffragists and settlement workers lived and worked together, often side by side. Their public culture took place in
literary salons, armories, eating clubs, and art galleries where they
displayed their paintings, performed experimental theater, and
held literary readings. They formed political organizations to
secure suffrage rights, educate children of the working class, protest labor conditions, and resist war preparedness. In their private
lives they experimented as well, forming themselves into alternative families, bound together by friendship and shared ideals. And
they made a deliberate effort to bridge the class barriers between
themselves and the new immigrants from southern and eastern
Europe, college students, and the urban poor, often living in the
same neighborhoods.
In 1913 Alfred Stieglitz founded the Photo-Secession Gallery at
291 Fifth Avenue, a gallery-workshop-meetingplace for artists and
their friends. The gallery exhibited the works of a new group of
American artists and photographers-Georgia O'Keeffe, Marsden
Hartley, Max Weber, Arthur Dove, and other modernists-and became an intimate and informally organized community space for
social gatherings and discussions. In the same year Mabel Dodge
formed her famous salon, where the likes of Walter Lippmann,
Max Eastman, Lucy Claire Mitchell, and others convened to discuss current ideas in Freudianism, feminism, imagist poetry, and
labor radicalism. Dodge captured the flavor of those evenings in
her memoirs, describing the crowd that gathered as a mingling of
"Socialists, Trade-Unionists, Anarchists, Suffragists, Poets, Relations,
Lawyers, Murderers, 'Old Friends,' Psychoanalysts, IWWs, Single
Taxers, Birth Controlists, Newspapermen, Artists, Modern-Artists,
Club Women, Woman's-place-is-in-the-home Women, Clergymen,
and just plain men." 2
A number of little theaters sprang up, such as the Provincetown
Players and the Washington Square Players in Greenwich Village,
to perform contemporary material, including one another's work.
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Neighborhood theater companies were formed, companies of nonprofessionals (and neighbors) who participated in the performances. Group pageants were also a popular form of experimental
theater. The famous Paterson Pageant of 1913, re-creating the
Paterson garment workers' strike of 1912, produced a kind of performance art on a massive scale, attracting 15,000 audience members, according to one historian, most of whom were working class
and many of whom walked from New Jersey to Madison Square
Garden in order to participate in the event. The pageant was a success in its own terms: it publicized the strike, drew support for the
strikers, and, in broader cultural terms, broke the barriers between
audience and performers in a staged rally /performance that
spanned two days. In the dance world, Isadora Duncan scandalized
genteel critics with her free-form modern dance. Among immigrant workers, Emma Goldman, among others, held public meetings to advocate free love, birth control, and women's health
education, where she was frequently arrested, often before she
even began to speak. 3
Perhaps the archetypal event of the time was the Armory Show
of 1913. An immense exhibition of 1,600 paintings, prints, drawings, and pieces of sculpture, the show introduced many Americans to the work of the European cubists and futurists. The bold
colors and shapes of Matisse, Kandinsky, Duchamp, Brancusi,
Rouault, Lehmbruck, and other artists shocked members of New
York's art community. After spending "an appalling morning" at
the show, the staid art critic Kenyon Cox wrote that he had witnessed the "total destruction of the art of painting." "To have
looked at it is to have passed through a pathological museum
where the layman has no right to go. One feels that one has seen
not an exhibition, but an exposure." 4
Exposing the pretenses of literary respectability was one of the
objectives of the "little magazines." Based in Chicago, New York, and
Boston, these small-circulation journals, some frankly socialist, others merely rebellious, aimed to break down the boundaries between high culture and popular culture and the modernist divide
between art and politics. Among the little magazines founded in
the prewar years were the irreverent Masses in 1911, edited by Max
Eastman and Floyd Dell, prosecuted in 1918 by the U.S. govern-
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ment for sedition during the war; Harriet Monroe's journal Poetry
in Chicago in 1912, a forum for the avant-garde; and the New
Republic in 1914, edited by Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and
Walter Weyl, progressive intellectuals with an interest in the possibilities of a democratic socialism. Croly's opening editorial suggested the journal's slightly incendiary purpose; its aim, he wrote,
was "less to inform or entertain its readers than to start little insurrections in the realm of their convictions." The lively and sophisticated Seven Arts was founded in 1916 by Waldo Frank, James
Oppenheim, and Floyd Dell as a forum for American art and culture. In its two short years, the Seven Arts managed to publish noteworthy, new American authors, among them, Robert Frost, Amy
Lowell, Sherwood Anderson, Stephen Vincent Benet, Theodore
Dreiser, Max Eastman, Carl Sandburg, Eugene O'Neill, Vachel
Lindsay,John Reed, H. L. Mencken, Harold Stearns, Paul Rosenfeld, and Van Wyck Brooks, some of them reaching fame decades
later. Committed to cultural nationalism, it also welcomed European contributors, including Romaine Rolland, Kahlil Gibran, Bertrand Russell, D. H. Lawrence, John Butler Yeats, and writers
issuing manifestos for a Young India, a Young Ireland, and a Young
Italy, whose efforts were considered a part of a growing spirit of
internationalism in an ever-shrinking world. 5

It is important to understand the genealogy of the little rebellion and to locate Bourne's place in it. According to Nietzsche, a
genealogy is not a chronological tracing of origins but a logical
inquiry into the consequences and practices of a concept or an
idea. It is not interested in the thing-in-itself (the nature or essence
of an idea) but in the conditions of its expression and the ways in
which it is constituted and constrained by institutions and practices.
A genealogy, therefore, reverses conventional historical logic, which,
as Nietzsche showed, imposes an artificial unity on its subject, after
the fact. A genealogy shows, as Judith Butler suggests, what is at
stake in labeling something as a cause rather than as an effect. 6
At stake, therefore, in the genealogy of the little rebellion is
another understanding of the "lost promise" of progressivism
recently studied by Eldon Eisenach. I explore the cultural causes
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of that failure rather than the internal contradictions within progressivism itself. The circumstances that Eisenach understandably
viewed as progressivism's failure as a "political regime"-its failure
to construct a national unity based on nationalism, the idea of a
common American identity, and democracy as a civic religioncan be seen as a success in the creation of a little rebellion, a significant moment of cultural renaissance whose cultural ideals were
often at odds with those of liberal progressivism. Ideas and events
that might be considered a failure from a political perspective can
from a cultural perspective be recovered as a triumph. This genealogy turns our attention to some of the critics of progressivism and
some of its disillusioned followers rather than to the architects of
progressivism itself.7 It offers a framework for understanding the
"lost promise" of progressivism as less of a failure and more of a
brief triumph in the creation of an alternative cultural politics.

To establish a genealogy of the little rebellion, it is necessary to
return to the influences that shaped it and to understand the ways
in which it created its own unity, despite its many internal divisions.
Paradoxically, the movement-perhaps it was an outburst-was
both a revolt against the past and a continuation of a revolution
already under way in the universities and in the public culture generally. Rejecting a fading Victorianism, still influential in the public culture, middle-class progressives and radicals rebelled against
its standards of morality, its Anglophilia in literature and art, and
its romanticism. As a continuation of a "revolt against formalism,"
as Morton White termed it, begun by progressive intellectuals and
activists in the 1880s, it expanded the challenge to the moral, scientific, and epistemological standards of late nineteenth-century
realism and absolutism in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. 8
Among the many significant intellectual developments of this
knowledge revolution was Charles Beard's economic determinism,
which looked into the private interests that shaped public choices;
0. W. Holmes's legal theory, which maintained that law was, in great
measure, "experience," hence pragmatic and inductive and not
deduced from timeless principles or abstract rules; 9 James Harvey
Robinson's history, which offered a pragmatic tool for explaining
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the present and controlling the future; Thorstein Veblen's institutionalism, which studied empirically the connections between economic institutions and other aspects of culture; and WilliamJames's
pragmatism, which maintained that truth "happened to an idea" or
that truth was a process, not residing in pure intellect alone but in
its application, and that the pragmatic truth of an idea could be
judged by the practical difference it made in one's life. These rebel
fathers, as a group, abandoned the nineteenth-century preference
for rationalism and positivism and the distinctions between fact and
value, knowledge and morality. They rejected abstractions such as
history or reason to explain social or historical change and looked
to experience and empirical evidence-of economic interests or
political motivations-to uncover human purposes in history. They
were interested in concentrating on techniques of research, investigation, and experimentation rather than on developing grand theory. Antiformalism toppled the universalizing tendencies of Western
philosophy and social science prevalent during the 1860s to the
1880s in a way that was distinctively modern.
For many children of the prewar generation,James's influence
was especially important. In addition to the anti-Platonism of his
philosophy, denying the idea of an essence residing in persons or
things,James's pragmatism offered an inducement to practical
involvement in the social world. It emphasized action as revealed
meaning, according to John Diggins, which in turn encouraged
young activists and intellectuals to apply their ideas in practical,
political involvement in the real world. 10
Moreover,James was the most sympathetic of contemporary
philosophers to the politics of the subaltern and held the most idealist views among the American pragmatists, taking seriously the
role of subjectivity in creating meaning. The emphasis on subjectivity as a constitutive force in the construction of culture had captivated the European public in the thought of Bergson, Sorel, and
Nietzsche and had inspired French and Italian syndicalists. 11 Young
socialists and pragmatists in America in turn took the ideas of
European idealists, refocused through the lens of James, and
turned their attention to the role of individual creativity and imagination as a stimulus to action and to the idea of authoritative freedom in the individual as a force for social change. Further,James's
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therapeutic philosophy held great attraction for middle-class youth
who, whether caught in spiritual crises, having rejected their Protestant upbringing, or in personal uncertainty over how to contribute
constructively to social change, could resolve personal crisis and
spiritual doubt through a philosophy that looked beyond questions
of ontology or metaphysics to one that emphasized the practical
consequences of one's ideas.
In addition to James, American moderns were enthralled with
Nietzsche. To them, he was arch-rebel and unregenerate. As
Bourne put it, "The pagan, liberating, audacious message of Nietzsche touches the old puritan ideals to the quick." 12 His psychology
of power became a tool for a corrosive critique of the genteel tradition and Protestant moralism in general. According to Alfred
Kazin, Nietzsche had become the philosopher in vogue at the turn
of the century, attracting older writers and public figures, including Theodore Dreiser,Jack London, Frank Norris, and Theodore
Roosevelt, who were fascinated by his analysis of force and his
emphasis on vitality. The new, tough, muscular men of the new
century took Nietzsche as the architect of the vitalist ideal and the
proponent of an ethic of magnetic energy. 13 Socialists in Bourne's
generation, including Max Eastman and John Reed, moreover, saw
no contradiction in combining Nietzsche's rhetoric of the idea of
a super race with plans for a democratic socialism, arguing against
Nietzsche that the idea could be universalized for the majority.
Along with Nietzsche, European socialists such as Graham Wallas,
Bertrand Russell, and G. D. H. Cole, who made the case for guild
socialism, emphasized direct action and social engagement; and
Walt Whitman became the apostle of democratic camaraderie.
Popular culture reinforced the emphasis of progressive intellectuals on action and practical success. Roosevelt's idea of the
"strenuous life" appealed to the young rebels of the 1910s, some
of them prizing the outdoor life, others the rise of the New Woman, and yet others the vitalism and activism of the muscular spirit.
Youth itself became a virtue, an escape from the archaic moralism
of the old century and a release from "drift," in Walter Lippmann's
terms. The New Woman was described as bold and courageous,
qualities formerly ascribed to men. As women became more assertive,John Higham has suggested, men became more martial. As
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progressives sought social influence, they reached for political
power. The link between progressivism and imperialism was common by the end of the nineteenth century. 14
The shift from a producer culture to a consumer culture that
historians have described was experienced by middle-class progressives and radicals, as evident in their writings, as economic dislocation.15The emphasis in the colleges and universities was on the
new scientific disciplines. College students were being trained for
the new professions in economics, political science, and sociology
and for participation in an increasingly corporatized society as
technicians. Bureaucratic institutions required scientific managers
and administrative experts. Accordingly, their discourse reflected
an awareness of the new conceptions of economic rationality and
the importance of scientific expertise and professionalism for working men and women.
Some intellectuals, like Walter Lippmann, were cortvinced that a
new, rationalized order, embodied by the manager, the engineer,
the professional bureaucrat, and the technician, was the welcome
harbinger of the modern age. Science, management, and technology could make the society hum with efficiency and render
scarcity obsolete. Other critics, however, including Bourne, opposed the rationalization of society by either the Puritan fathers or
their technocratic sons, rejecting the impersonality within the corporate enterprise, the routinization of professional employment,
and standardization ( of knowledge and time). The bureaucratic
"Moloch," quoting Bourne, threatened to "swallow" individual personality and creativity, and he and his compeers gravitated toward
the presumably freer forces of irrationality and disorder, following
a Nietzschean or Bergsonian inspiration. 16
Historians have also characterized the "age of transition" as a
shift from a culture that emphasized character and self-control to
one of personality and self-expression. 17 In these terms, the children of the middle classes experienced the clash among cultural
expectations of individual responsibility, social obligation, and personal desire as occurring within the family and often constructed
it in familial terms. Their discourse consequently signified a rejection of the fathers and the rigid, life-denying ethic of a Puritan selfdenial and a pursuit of their own values of youthful spontaneity
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and self-gratification and, alternatively, a pull toward collective
responsibility, social work, or political involvement. As Bourne put
it, "We feel social injustice as our fathers felt personal sin." 18 Their
discourse was remarkably similar, whether as social reformers or
poets, and it emphasized the importance of cultivating a public
personality as its own resource. They rejected the requirements of
the genteel culture, with its expectations of marital fidelity, personal character, and public honor as obsolete and as insufficient
preparation for their participation in an economic order that now
required marketing skills and job adaptability.
The link that joined these different and often competing discourses-the languages of the family and of the market, or in
Michael Rogin's words, the languages of love and of contract,
which are protean in American literature-was the idea of generationalism and generational change. 19 Generationalism marked a
new effort in America and Europe to periodize history and to
acknowledge lines of affiliation outside traditional economic
classes and outside the family. Generations signified political divisions that could bring together like-minded individuals, regardless
of class or educational background, to form new forces for social
change. The idea of a generational revolt represented an important boundary breakdown for American generationalists, among
them Jane Addams, Lippmann, and Bourne, as a way, as Addams
explained, to create a unity between an unprepared middle class
and a displaced working class while at the same time finding common cause with all rebels of the age. The unity of the younger generation was a constructed unity, to borrow Eisenach's phrase about
progressivism's created unity, but it was a unity constitutive of its
political identity. The discourse of generationalism broke down the
divide between the language of the market and that of the family
and created a symbolic unity that crossed class, gender, and ideological divides.
The younger generation shared concretely three sets of attitudes
and goals captured in the idea of youth: a common set of assumptions about past grievances, a common agenda for personal and
social change, and a highly developed consciousness about their
collective destiny and historic role. Thus, despite the many and significant differences between the progressives, anarchists, and other
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radicals in the first decade of the twentieth century, the idea of a
generational revolt captured their doubled-edged rebellion and
the basis of their common cause: a revolt against the rigidity of the
Puritan fathers and a resistance to the impersonality of the new
corporate order. For the younger generation, the enemy was less
the institutions of capitalism or socialism; it was the older people
of the world who stood in the way of change. Social change would
take place in the battle between the old and the young.
Ironically, the younger generation was never so united as when
it abolished itself as a political generation. Its disarray, evident in
the patchwork of clubs and organizations and public activities that
proliferated before the war, was quieted when wartime preparedness began in earnest. Political activities were consolidated, narrowed, and became one-dimensional. Feminist issues and issues
regarding educational reform became secondary. When the United States entered World War I, as Bourne explained, "This motley
crew of ex-socialists, and labor radicals, and liberals, and pragmatist
philosophers ... united for the prosecution of the war."20 As a distinctive political force, the younger generation became invisible by
1918. 21
For Bourne, however, generationalism had a personal meaning
as well. As a disabled child from an old-line Protestant family, his
experiences were in many respects uncharacteristic of his middleclass generation-his physical challenges, a disabled father, six
years of intermittent employment and a few years of factory experience, and an ambivalence toward institutions both as alternative
families and as forces that suppressed the Jamesian "personal point
of view." These differences between himself and his peers he
thought generationalism could elide, given the common identity
of youth. Generationalism became a means of affiliating with others who also had been marginalized or excluded (young and old),
a figurative unity that was instantiated in the generational narratives he wrote. Bourne's identification with America's outsidersits immigrants, public women, and the poor-linked the idea of
difference (from the fathers) and marginalization (from the market) to his own experience of exclusion. It became constitutive of
his public identity as a cultural radical before the war and as an "irreconcilable" during it. His autobiographical essays, in particular,
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were written in terms that were meant to capture the experience
of growing up outside the dominant cultural norms.
To present Bourne's life and work as representative of a particular generation and a particular cultural crisis, therefore, is to present a paradox: he was representative precisely in his difference.
Although generations are always based on their difference (from
other generations), representatives are similar to those groups they
represent. Just what is meant by characterizing Bourne's work as
representative? By that term I mean an individual who has the
capacity to organize meaning in such a way as to make sense of a
cultural moment and its contradictions. A representative figure
therefore "speaks" for him- or herself, but also for others. A representative 's personal journey is linked to the struggles of his or
her community. A representative is, or can be, an exemplary individual, as Emerson would have it, but the elitist implications of the
Emersonian conception are undercut, in my view, when a representative speaks to the "common sense" of a culture. Representatives in this sense are thus constitutive of the conditions they seek
to explain or signify in their work. They represent, not by mirroring that common experience, but in translating it into terms that
are shared and instantiating it in their narratives. 22
This signifying function of the representative is meant to contrast with political theories of representation that locate representation in relations with a subject already presumed to exist. Political
theorists have identified three types of representatives-the formal
representative (Hobbes), the descriptive representative (Burke),
and the symbolic representative-each of which infers a certain
relationship with constituents and a corresponding obligation of
accountability. None of these conceptions, however, acknowledges
the constitutive capacity of representatives. In Hannah Pitkin's pivotal study of theories of representation, for instance, the authority
of the representative is derivative; it follows from his relation with
his constituents.23 A representative that creates a constituency, by
contrast, acts as a political agent, constructing a public, or the idea
of a public, where there was none. It is in this sense, I suggest, that
Bourne's representativeness can best be understood.

3
ISHMAEL

I can almost see now that my path in life will
be on the outside of things, poking holes in
the holy, criticizing the established, satirizing
the self-respecting and contented. Never being competent to direct and manage any of
the affairs of the world myself, I will be forced
to sit off by myself in the wilderness, howling
like a coyote that everything is being run
wrong. I think I have a real genius for making trouble, for getting under people's skin .
. . . Between an Ezekiel and an Ishmael, it is
a little hard to draw the line; I mean, one can
start out to be the first, and end only by
becoming the latter.
-Randolph S. Bourne to Prudence Winterrowd,
March 2, 1913

At the improbable age of thirty-two, Bourne wrote an autobiography. It was the story of an education, a self-education of a culture
critic, who, having been raised on the literary classics, spent the better part of his youth overthrowing them. If initially he found inspiration in the "dead classics" as a welcome relief from reading the
Bible and popular adventure stories in his childhood home, he
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wrote in "History of a Literary Radical," his "apostacy" really began
when he encountered the "cultural 'Modernists,'" who "vandalized
the Church from within." Even these American naturalists and realists began to pale, however, in contrast to the imagists and psychological novelists, like Dostoyevsky, and America's literary giants,
Twain, Thoreau, and Whitman. He felt in 1918 as ifhe were "standing at the end of an era,'' beginning to emerge as a "new classicist,"
mining the past for voices that could regenerate American culture. 1
The essay, a synecdoche of the transition to modernism at the
turn of the century, was also a commentary on the generational
divide, a constant theme in Bourne's writing. In autobiographical
form, he disclosed what he considered to be the failure of middleclass institutions-the patriarchal family, the Protestant church,
the schools-to educate its youth. Underscoring the sentiments of
Jane Addams and Walter Lippmann, among others, he maintained
that his generation had "practically to bring itself up." In a move
typical for him, however, he turned disadvantage into advantage.
The neglect of these institutions, he maintained, gave him a
chance to educate himself.2
The essay also combined thematically the personal and the social in a narrative about spiritual (and cultural) rebirth and renewal familiar to his predominantly middle-class readers. In the
tradition of Christian conversion narratives, his essay traced the
journey of a searching soul through its progressive stages to salvation: from the initial stage of ignorance and false consciousness,
to a confrontation with the truth, to a period of crisis and confusion culminating in a moment of liberatory revelation. In a deliberately modernist variant, however, Bourne presented his
conversion as culminating in uncertainty rather than certainty, his
encounters with an international literature opening up a new
search for new tastes, texts, and standards. In the version he told,
he was saved, not in obedience or submission to a former truth,
but in restless searching for the new literature for a "young world." 3
The story of his literary education was not his first autobiography.
Like others of his generation, including Waldo Frank, Van Wyck
Brooks, and Addams, Bourne wrote his first autobiography while he
was in his twenties. In "The Handicapped: By One of Them," written when he was twenty-five, he recounted another conversion story,
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this time of a young Ishmael, physically disabled, born to a long line
of chosen Protestant gentry, who was misunderstood by his family
and shunned in public. Convinced he was a "misfit" and a failure,
this child of multiple disabilities rejected middle-class norms and
institutions, preferring to remain outside, unassimilated and unrepentant. In the language of religious faith , he chose to remain cast
out as Abraham 's child of nature and unregenerate , at least in
Calvinist terms. This Ishmael aspired to become an Ezekiel, the
prophet of exiles, prophesying a "new religion" for other outsiders. 4
In terms of both structure and function, however, his autobiographies were remarkably similar. Both essays recapitulated, however strictly, the journeys of the Puritan settlers and their
Emersonian inheritors to create a new self in a chosen land. In particular, like their Puritan models, his autobiographies ("auto-bios,"
or self-life) taught by example, providing a practical, working guide
to living out spiritual commitment. Like them as well, they functioned as a form of historiography, a literary form of factual allegory, tracing the path of one soul who had a vocation in the social
world. Within that tradition, Bourne's autobiographies offered a
guide to reformulating one's internal moral system by its encounter
with the Word and an acceptance of responsibility for sin.
Moreover, as comparisons with other autobiographies of the prewar generation show, Bourne represented his personal dilemmas
as one aspect of a larger social crisis affecting his generation at a
time when, in Henry May's words, the "cracks in the surface" of the
genteel culture had begun to show. In this sense his essays functioned as life stories of a particular generation of Americans coming of age. The generational subtext of his autobiographies suggests
that they belong to the tradition of "auto-American-biography," in
Sacvan Bercovitch's fine phrase, a discursive tradition that recreated the experience of a "representative" individual whose life
stood for an American experience and a personality that expressed
an American character. 5 Such life stories become collective histories, as the personal journey of one individual was linked to that of
the community (or generation), a people, or a nation. In this sense,
they were as much about his own past as about America's.
Yet parallels with the Puritan and Emersonian past can be taken
only so far, for Bourne clearly elected to remain outside the
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Protestant community and often in opposition to its expectations
for social and personal conduct. Instead he offered a redefinition
of the relation between the self and the social. He located sin in
the world, not in the individual soul or one's character. He placed
responsibility for social injustice onto a collective agent rather
than in individual conscience or obedience to established norms.
Unlike traditional Christian conversion narratives, his spiritual
journey-his self-education-did not require submission as a necessary part of agency. Thus, despite his reliance on the language
of religious fervor, a discourse common to American autobiographies from the seventeenth century to the present day, Bourne's
work was disruptive of that tradition. The aspiring "preacher" of
"stern new truths" offered a new religion distinctly subversive of
middle-class norms. Using the dominant discourse of religious
faith and spiritual uplift, he turned it back on itself, writing what
might be seen as the confessions of an ex-convert.
His efforts, on another level, can be seen to be inspired from a
Nietzschean standpoint as an effort not to re-create his own experiences but to reinvent them for his generation. The task of the moral
man, Nietzsche wrote, was not to rediscover another's myth but to
create his own. His ability to discharge (dionysian) insight into (apollonian) images revealed his capacity to outstrip himself, to act rather
than merely contemplate, to become rather than merely be. From a
Nietzschean perspective, Bourne's autobiographies thus can be seen
as different instantiations of his own myth or epic, the variations as
different performances of a self-in-becoming. Self-creation was an
ongoing process, a pathos, in Nietzsche's terms, or an effort that was
"not a being (Sei,n), not a becoming," but a process always happening. The particular state of the self at any given time was epiphenomena!. Self-invention constantly gave form to the self. 6 In the
process of inventing and reinventing his story, Bourne can be seen
as reinventing himself, creating not a different self for every occasion
(as the therapeutic culture required), but a self that was constantly
becoming, a social process in formation. If the different versions of
his life-time autobiography seem inconsistent, as they frequently do,
it may be that we as readers have misunderstood the pathos.
I interpret Bourne's work as (a part of) the product of the creative intelligence actively engaged in reinventing the self. "Every
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man should realize that his life is an epic," Bourne wrote. "We
should oftener read our own epics-and write them. The world is
in need of true autobiographies, told in terms of the adventure that
life is." Autobiography was a form of self-invention through story.
The best autobiographers are still the masters of fiction, those
wizards of imaginative sympathy, who create souls and then
write their spiritual history, as those souls themselves, were
they alive, could perhaps never write them. 7
These mythmakers relied on artistic imagination and self-detachment, an ironic stance of introspection and self-distancing. "Look
at yourself as an interesting stranger to be interpreted."8 They
turned their lives into works of art, following Nietzsche, a move
Bourne often invoked as a guide for his own work. Following him,
I have interpreted his autobiographies and his work in general as
works of art, grounded in experience but not as literally "factual."
They are inventions meant to be of pedagogical value for his own
generation and for Americans, generally. Autobiography was an
act of the apollonian, a form of self-invention for himself and for
others, redeeming a culture divided against itself by class privileges
and by generational values. In this sense, it was all myth, that is, as
Nietzsche meant it, as a means of healing a culture by restoring to
it an act of creativity. 9
In this chapter I return to the work as an aspect of his life.
Bourne's life and work are understood as texts to be interpreted
within the political economy and psychosocial history of their time.
The value of these texts lies in their interaction, not in their correspondence with experience. Autobiography, social history, and myth
are intermingled in this perspective as part of a dialogue about creating a "personality," re/forming a culture of the self in the way that
self-invention might take place. His canvas was his personality, an
imaginary terrain for the artistic will to form an epic story. 10

"The Philosophy of Handicap" was written at the suggestion of Ellery
Sedgwick, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, after Bourne's essay on the
generational revolt, "The Two Generations," received considerable
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response. Sedgwick proposed it as a form of therapy for Bournealthough perhaps it was more so for Sedgwick, who was preoccupied
with Bourne's deformity and with his radical politics. He suggested it
as an opportunity for Bourne to write about the relation between his
physical disability and his political philosophy. (He also thought it
would cure Bourne of his socialism.) As therapy it failed; Bourne
wrote a manifesto for other "unpresentables" in a transvalued politics of marginality. As a conversion narrative it also failed; Bourne
did not counsel recovery from the abyss through spiritual rebirth
but a reaffirmation of the divided self and its philosophy of multiple
truths, caught between two worlds.
As a traditional Christian conversion story, it dealt little with his
family, suggesting by their absence from the text that he had been
exiled almost from the start. Born on May 30, 1886, in Bloomfield,
New Jersey, to a family of solid bourgeois credentials, he was the
first son of Sarah Barrett and Charles Rogers Bourne. His mother's
lineage was "relentlessly aristocratic," tracing back to the arrival in
1628 of Edward Fitz-Randolph and Elizabeth Blossom in America. 11
His father's ancestors came from upstate New York, of predominantly Protestant clergymen and teachers. His paternal grandfather was the longtime pastor of Sleepy Hollow Congregational
Church and his great-grandfather an abolitionist and acquaintance
of Ralph Waldo Emerson and William Lloyd Garrison. Despite its
pedigree, the family's status was precarious, as Charles Bourne had
no clear prospects for employment when his first son was born and
for a decade seemed to subsist on his debonair charm. 12
Randolph managed to survive his birth, but just barely. The
elderly attending physician ineptly used forceps during the delivery, twisting and scarring the baby's face and mangling one ear.
Bourne was reported to have commented, in considerable understatement, it was a "terribly messy birth." The "second blast" came
four years later when he contracted spinal tuberculosis,15 leaving
him permanently stunted in size, hunchbacked, and barrelchested.14At his full adult height, he was no more than five feet tall,
according to his passport. 15 His friend.James Oppenheim, editor
of the Seven Arts, wrote of "the humped back, the longish almost
medieval face, with a sewed up mouth, an ear gone awry." Theodore Dreiser decided that on first meeting Bourne he had just laid
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eyes on "as frightening a dwarf as I had ever seen ... the legs thin,
the chest large, the arms long, the head sunk deep between the
bony shoulders." Sedgwick himself concluded that Bourne's appearance was "without a redeeming feature." To friends and
acquaintances, his disabilities signified disorder, a condition reflecting the fragmentation of the modern age. 16
In his autobiography Bourne wrote of his marked difference in
biblical terms. "Bearing simply a crooked back and an unsightly
face," he wrote without elaboration, he carried his disabilities as "a
real, even though usually dim, background of consciousness." In
this repositioning of the sign of the body to the plane of subjectivity, he disembodied his original sin, a strategic move within the
grammar of a conversion narrative that enabled him to identify
with all other marginals living in "darkness" or "ignorance" or outside the community. Nevertheless, his body was marked with a sign,
a sign of nativity, like the dark-skinned Ishmael of the Bible, that
signified to his predominantly Protestant neighbors God's disfavor
and his unchosen status as an Ishmael.
As he described it, people responded to his difference in two
ways: either they treated him as if he did not exist, or they treated
him as a child. In respectable circles, he was often pushed aside.
When he ventured to Sedgwick's club in Manhattan, for instance,
he was ushered to the servants' entrance; when he became involved
in a discussion at a library with another patron in a wheelchair, they
were both asked to leave. Relatives and friends, on the other hand,
patronized him. He recalled one humiliating incident where an
aunt "inspected" him before going to a concert. His mother, Sarah,
in contrast to the biblical Sarah, and his sisters "coddled" him and
catered to his wishes. 17 He was not a full member of the community,
either of the family or of the larger society. His outsider status was
an effect, as he described it, of a culture that defined him as other.
"The deformed man is always conscious that the world does not
expect very much from him ... he is discounted from the start... .
as a result, he does not expect very much of himself."
In the discourse of a Christian conversion experience, his selfdoubt moved him to the second stage of his journey, a readiness
to come to terms with his unregeneracy. As a Calvinist, he was certain of his own weakness but uncertain of where the truth (his
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responsibility) lay. If as a child he openly rebelled against the "inevitable," by adolescence he had become increasingly resigned and
had internalized his failures. The transition from childhood ignorance and false consciousness to a confrontation with truth was told
in strict adherence to the conventions of the Christian narrative.
He reported that he "grew up with a deepening sense of failure,
and a lack of pride in what I really excelled at." Individual responsibility was instilled in him as a necessary path toward grace. He
became his own worst critic. "It never used to occur to me that my
failures and lack of skill were due to circumstances beyond my control, but I would always impute them, in consequence of my rigid
Calvinist bringing-up, to some moral weakness of my own." 18 This
self-doubt, which extended also to his successes-musical talents,
high grades-was appropriate to a guilt culture, according to Philip
Slater, that reinforced the development of internalized restraints
and required "almost permanently" postponed gratification. 19
In these terms he described childhood as "the worst time of all,"
because he felt like "a strange creature in a strange world." In adolescence, though attracted to "the world of admiration and gayety
and smiles and favors and quick interest and companionship," he
was m~de to feel an outsider by the "silent, unconscious, gentle
oblivion" of his peers, "as if a ragged urchin had been asked to
come and look through the window at the light and warmth of the
glittering party." 20 He felt his isolation most profoundly in his adult
relationships with women. Writing to a friend after college, he
confessed:
You make me feel suddenly very old and bitterly handicapped
and foolish to have any dream left of the perfect comrade
who is, I suppose, the deepest craving of my soul. It is her I
write to, meet casually in strange faces on the street, touch in
novels, feel beside me in serene landscapes and city vistas,
grasp in my dream. She wears a thousand different masks, and
eludes me ever. 2 1
Even though he was a frequent guest at Patchin Place, a feminist
eating club in New York's Greenwich Village, he feared he was for
them merely an amusement or a "dull vaudeville act." 22 In the
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Lutheran phrase of marginality, he confirmed, "I was truly in but
not of the world." 23
The text is again silent about the decline of his family's fortune,
a silence appropriate for a culture of privatized guilt. When Randolph was about nine years old, his father's absence became more
literal when Charles was disabled himself, struck by a passing trolley car in New York City, which caught his coat and dragged him
down the street. Thereafter, he walked with crutches or two canes.
Work, always difficult to obtain, became even more so. Whether
drink led to failure or failure to drink is unclear, but as Charles's
health deteriorated, the family's fragile unity dissolved. They
moved into Sarah's mother's house on Belleville Street, but within
a few months Charles was asked to leave by the Barrett family.
Halsey Barrett, Sarah's brother, agreed to support her and the four
children on the condition that Charles never return. 24
Having lost his father to drink, Bourne almost lost his mother
to religion. Retreating into the great house, she suffered silently,
"dominated by Puritanism." In their "semi-fatherless" state, the
great house grew "doleful," and the family's attendance at Old First
Presbyterian Church became more regular. Bourne himself was
"united" with the church at the age of fifteen, despite his grandmother's misgivings about his readiness to receive grace. She may
have been right, because "left alone to follow his own desires," he
underwent a conversion experience that affirmed rather than renounced the standpoint of the (Protestant) sinner.2-5
Outwardly, however, he had become Abraham's chosen son,
Isaac: editor of the school newspaper, a debater, senior class president, valedictorian-a success in worldly affairs. He was admitted
to Princeton in 1903, the college for sons of Presbyterian elites. Yet
Sarah's brother told Bourne he would not finance his education.
Halsey Barrett, a Morristown lawyer, informed him it was inappropriate for someone "like you," with obvious physical disabilities in
an age of marketing and appearance, to think of attending university or to hope to succeed as a middle-class professional. He
made it clear that Bourne should earn a living in a trade or industry and support his mother. 26
Bourne spent the next six years in frustrating and mostly futile
efforts to find employment. For two years, he found no work at all.
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He then worked for two years as a "factory hand," as he described
it, in a relative 's office in Morristown. He next worked in a factory
in New Jersey, turning out music rolls for player pianos, until his
wages were cut by the employer, Frederick Hoschke, in an effort at
labor intensification. Bourne quit, writing of it later in "What Is
Exploitation?" 27 Drifting from one factory to another for another
year or more, his situation began to resemble his father 's all too
clearly. He decided to fall back on his musical talents and began
playing piano for minstrel shows and vaudeville acts and accompanying silent movies with a live sound track from a theater piano.
He also gave music lessons in his grandmother's home in Bloomfield and worked as an accompanist in the Carnegie Hall rehearsal
halls. Of these dispiriting years, Bourne later wrote,
There is the poignant mental torture that comes with such an
experience-the urgent need, the repeated failure, or rather
the repeated failure even to obtain a chance to fail, the realization that those at home can ill afford to have you idle, the
growing dread of encountering people. 28
Bourne's descriptions of the requirements ofa corporate liberal
world provide a clue to the degree of its success in standardizing
work, time, and profit margins. In the corporate world, he wrote,
one must be "all things to all men," and he was unable to "counteract that fatal first impression." Often turned away at the reception desk, his experience confirmed to him that "the hasty and
superficial impression is everything." Like his father, he was coded
as "unfitted for any kind of work." "The attitude toward me ranged
from 'You can't expect us to create a place for you,' to 'How could
it enter your head that we should find any use for a man like
you?'" He was told, "It is not business to make allowances for anybody." Large corporate bureaucracies required employees who
were readily exchangeable. "All this talk of natural talents or bents
or interests ... have no commercial value in themselves." Individuals were tailored to the requirements of the job, not the job to the
individual. 29
He claimed his "Calvinism began to crack" when its tenets of
individual responsibility, good character, and hard work did not
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produce the promised dividend of success. Both he and his father
had tried to provide for their family, and they both failed. He may
have had his father in mind, the family's first rebel and its first failure, when he wrote:
It makes me wince to hear a man spoken of as a failure , or to
have it said of one that "he doesn't amount to much ." Instantly I want to know why he has not succeeded, and what
have been the forces working against him.
In the name of the many who had "failed," he began to rebel
against the doctrine of the elect.
I ... experienced a revulsion against the rigid Presbyterianism in which I had been brought up . . . a sort of disgust at the
arrogance of damning so great a proportion of the human
race. For some time there was considerable bitterness in my
heart at the narrowness of the people who could still find
comfort in the old faith. 30
Turning to other philosophies, principally those of Henry George
(after reading his Progress and Poverty) , Thomas Buckle, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Bourne found a new skepticism toward convention and explanations for "why men were miserable and overworked, and why there was on the whole so little joy and gladness
among us-and which fixed the blame" that allowed him to abandon Puritan counsels ofjudging individual worth. Yet even George's
more promising philosophy, in Bourne's view, merely shifted the
blame from the individual to society, arguing that an injection of
upper-class philanthropy could improve the lot of the poor and
uneducated. George's response was still fundamentally Christian,
Bourne thought, simplifying it considerably, personifying good and
evil rather than locating it systemically "by throwing the burden for
the misery of the world on these same good neighbors. "31 It did not
appease his hunger, and his crisis of faith found no solution. "My
sensitiveness to social misery . . . a sense of social guilt quite analogous to my Puritan ancestors ' personal guilt .. . cannot be wiped
out by the simple operation of being personally 'saved.' " Moreover,
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spiritual conversion was too high a price to pay. "The cure for this
spiritual dyspepsia is called conversion, but it is a question of whether the cure is not often worse than the disease." He preferred to
have no morals at all rather than to be "forced to digest ... by spiritual operation" the morals of a former generation. "Obviously, the
thing is then to renounce salvation. "32
His decision to reject Calvinist patriarchy and its cartography of
regeneration represented Bourne's unwillingness to abandon his
own past and former (unregenerate) self. From WilliamJames's
Varieties of Religi,ous Experience and his own personal experience with
revivalism, Bourne understood that a traditional Christian conversion required a killing off of one's past. In other words, the
twice-born "sick soul" required two births to make it whole, but that
unity came at the expense of a former self. 33 He did not want to
"digest" his former self but to retain it, and so he became a "divided self," injames's terms, caught between two worlds: the anhedonia of the sick soul and the mind-cure of the twice born. He
understood that the price of remaining a divided self would be to
be caught in a certain soul sickness or exaggerated sensitivity to
social misery and injustice that prevented pleasure. Yet, as James
had found, the sick soul came closer to the center of religious
insight than the "healthy-minded," because in its deepest distress,
it had a deeper understanding of the nature of man's conflicted
existence.34
In Bourne's words, "This widening, which has meant the possibility of living the contemplative and imaginative life on an infinitely higher plane ... has meant also a soul-sickness to the more
sensitive ... . It has ... opened a nerve the pain of which no opiate has been able to soothe. "35 To renounce that pain, the anhedonia of which James wrote, would be to cut himself off from the
single most important source of understanding others.
When he has been through the neglect and struggles of a
handicapped and ill-favored man himself, he will begin to
understand the feelings of all the horde of the unpresentable
and the unemployable, the incompetent and the ugly, the
queer and crotchety people who make up so large a proportion of human folk. 36
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Bourne's decision to remain a divided self and to reject spiritual
conversion meant that he would struggle against anhedonia and
evil in the world.
I can almost see now that my path in life will be on the outside of things, poking holes in the holy, criticizing the established, satirizing the self-respecting and contented. Never
being competent to direct and manage any of the affairs of
the world myself, I will be forced to sit off by myself in the
wilderness, howling like a coyote that everything is being run
wrong. I think I have a real genius for making trouble, for getting under people's skin .... Between an Ezekiel and an Ishmael, it is a little hard to draw the line; I mean, one can start
out to be the first, and end only by becoming the latter. 37
The biblical Ezekiel had promised "a new heart and a new spirit"
if the exiles set aside their old ways. 38 Bourne, adopting the prophetic
role, suggested that a collective renewal could come through an
audacious paganism for other exiles. His new religion clearly
inverted the Protestant ethic of individual grace into one of soul-sickness and psychic fragmentation. It subverted the doctrine of original sin, locating sin in social arrangements rather than in human
nature. It was an ambiguous position he was negotiating: not precisely the status of an outsider (an Ishmael) but of one who inhabits both worlds (also an Ezekiel). It described an alienation that
would not resolve itself, unlike the Hegelian split-consciousness or
the Rousseauean version of internal self-division. Where Rousseau
tried to heal the split, Bourne's theory affirmed it. Its contradiction
was an asset, the basis of his unregenerate, unre/ (de)formed personality, a modern response to dislocation in contemporary society.
As a divided self, Bourne reapplied to college in 1909 and was
admitted to Columbia University on full academic scholarship.
Columbia was a burgeoning cosmopolitan university with a young,
insurgent faculty and an international student body, where Bourne
claimed he found his first taste of "beloved community." Its revisionist scholarship was headed by Charles Beard,John Dewey,
Franz Boas, Edward Thorndike, Brander Matthews, and other
scholars, who provided a more appropriate climate for him than
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either Princeton or Harvard to push beyond studies of classical literature to the "new disciplines" of political science, history, and
anthropology. "We are all instrumentalists here at Columbia," he
wrote in 1913, a position he considered fully consistent with his socialist and his syndicalist sentiments.
By all accounts he was a brilliant student, or, as he put it, his selfesteem began to "grow like a weed." By his second year, he had become something of a "minor celebrity on campus," due to the
publication of his article, "The Two Generations" in the Atlantic
Monthly and his editorship of the Columbia Monthly. 39 He was a vocal
and active leader in university activities, a member of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS), the Boar's Head and Philolexian
(student literary societies) , and a campus radical, protesting, in
one instance, the administration's policy of underpaying its "scrubwomen" who daily cleaned the lecture halls and student dormitories. His editorial, excerpted in the New York Times, engendered
considerable red-baiting in the college newspaper. By the time he
had graduated, in a four-year master's program in political science,
he had written a prizewinning essay on Thomas Paine, several
reviews for scholarly journals, including a new journal of pragmatist philosophy, and seven articles for the Atlantic Monthly. His master's thesis, written under John Dewey's direction, was a study of
the economic and cultural changes of suburbanization in the
northeastern corridor, later excerpted for Atlantic Monthly. 40
The first conversion narrative ended here. His spiritual conversion was complete; his political transformation would occur later.
After being graduated from Columbia University, he went to Western Europe on a traveling fellowship in 1913--1914, where he spent
an extended time in London and Paris. He came to love French
imagism, developed a respect for German city planning, and
admired Italian labor radicalism. In France, he saw that the intellectual's role in modem society could be integral to the public culture. As a delegate to the international conference of the ISS,
however, he had to leave Europe in haste; the conference was canceled abruptly when war broke out in August 1914.
Back in New York, with the help of his former teacher Charles
Beard, he secured a position at the New Republic as a contributing
editor, reporting on educational reform and the youth culture. 4 1
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Under the arrangement, Bourne produced approximately 30,000
words in less than two years for the new journal of opinion, writing more than half his essays on John Dewey's new educationism.
He began to frequent New York's radical, bohemian, and feminist
clubs and associations,joining the then-bohemian Liberal Club,
the Heretics, a radical feminist group, and the Civil Club, among
others. During debates over preparedness, he joined the influential American Union Against Militarism, and along with Winthrop
Jordan, Amos Pinchot, Roger Baldwin, and Crystal and Max Eastman, formed the Committee for Democratic Control, to call for a
referendum on the war, a group that collaborated with the New
York chapter of the Women's Peace Party.
When President Woodrow Wilson asked for a declaration of war
from Congress in April 1917, the New Republic came out unequivocably for intervention. Bourne objected to it from the start, during
preparedness talks in 1915. He was able to get a few articles published by the journal in that year, but his status there became increasingly precarious. He turned to the Masses, the Dial, the Seven
Arts, and, his "good angel," the Atlantic Monthly, which continued
to publish his articles. But he became increasingly preoccupied with
the war and wrote about it whenever he could. Indeed, it was his
antiwar writings that made his reputation, and for some readers, his
notoriety. He was a "venomous German viper," according to one, a
resolute pacifist to others, and an annoyance to his editors.
His suite of antiwar articles published in the Seven Arts in 19171918 are among the great essays of American dissent, in my view,
showing Bourne's critical powers at their best. Yet at a time when
charges of sedition were used to close editorial offices and suspend
mailing privileges, when writers were put under surveillance, and
public support for the war was "advertised" from Washington by
George Creel's Committee on Public Information, there were real
consequences to political dissent.
Bourne was himself put under surveillance by the U.S. Navy Department in 1918. The Office of Naval Intelligence listed him as a
named "suspect" on a Confidential List of Aliens and Suspects: List
A, which included the names and addresses, when available, of
"persons and firms in the United States and abroad suspected of
pro-German sympathy and activity." A copy of his essay "War and
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the Intellectuals," reprinted in Emma Goldman's Mother Earth, was
included in a Bureau of Investigation file concerning the political
activities of Goldman and Alexander Berkman.
Moreover, Bourne and his fiancee, the actress Esther Cornell, of
the New York family, reported that in summer 1918 they were followed by a young naval officer while they were walking along the
beach in Cos Cob, Connecticut. Apparently it was Cornell's "rhythm
dancing" on the edge of the shore that caught the attention of the
officer who, Bourne warned her, might think she was signaling to a
gunboat waiting offshore. A week later, they were approached in
Martha's Vineyard by an officer who inquired about their reasons
for being there and inspected Bourne's notebook of vacation
expenses. Over Bourne 's objections, Cornell invited the officer to
join them for coffee. He later phoned his superiors to report that
they were just "a coupla nuts."42
The war had militarized all aspects of American culture. The
wealthy sponsor of the Seven Arts, anxious about reactions to
Bourne's articles and government reprisals, withdrew her funding
from the journal, forcing it, in Robert Frost's words, to "die aBourneing." In 1918, at Dewey's insistence, the Dialfired Bourne as
an editor, a notorious episode in the history of intellectual responsibility. The New Republic continued to close him out, although it still
published his book reviews. During the last two years of his life, however, he managed to publish two books on education, including one
on the Gary school system; edited a volume on international cooperation; translated a French novel, Vagabonds at Sea by Maurice Lauroy; began an ambitious essay on the state, left unfinished at his
death ("Fragment on the State"); and started an autobiographical
novel, also left incomplete. He became engaged to Cornell, but he
died before the war became memory, six weeks after armistice, a victim of the influenza epidemic of 1918. The young pastor Norman
Thomas presided at his funeral, attended by fifty or more friends
and admirers on a rainy day in December in New York. 43
He was immediately martyred to America's involvement in the
Great War. "We may rejoice that as England had her Bertrand Russell, France her Barbusse and Rolland, Germany her Liebknecht
[sic] and Nicolai, so America had her Randolph Bourne."44 The
personality Bourne had worked to create-the young Ishmael and
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aspiring Ezekiel of other exiles-was rewritten and the particularly
American nature of his dissent forgotten. Oppenheim's tribute suggested that Bourne's sacrifice had become universal, the fate of
every innocent in a wicked world. But Bourne's self-invention was
distinctively American, tied to its liberal past but designed for a
modern, pagan America emerging from the confines of an established, old-line liberal Protestantism.

To recover that personality from historical memory, it is necessary
to return to the original impulse behind its creation. The importance of creating a personality had been for Bourne, typically, more
than a personal concern. Warren Susman has traced the development of the "culture of personality" that Bourne preached as the
"new idealism" in 1913. As a cultural ideal, it replaced the earlier
conception of "character" in the opening decades of the twentieth
century in popular culture, self-help literature, and mass-circulation
journals. Each cultural conception was a product of a particular era,
an ideal of the self that was responsive to changing social needs and
conditions. 45 The nineteenth-century notion of character prescribed
a moral and spiritual ideal to which a man (and its application was
exclusively male) might aspire to achieve his "highest" self. Character was conceived in terms of spirituality and moral perfection,
through which the baser parts of man's nature were bred out of him.
Over the course of a man's life, a certain respectability and breeding of the soul could be attained, often corresponding to his material and social status. Character was often a man's very salvation from
the degradations and democratization of an imperfect society. Paradoxically, character was also the product of civilization, an artificial
self, created rather than given. Thus, in order to become a self, one
must sacrifice personal needs and desires to a higher duty or law.
Character came by denying one's "nature," through self-denial and
self-control. In short, self-mastery was the means of building character; it was also the means of denying the self.
By contrast, personality was a conception proposed by popular
therapists and members of the progressive literary elite of an alternative idea of self, no more "natural" than the older ideal but
one that emphasized man's ability to stand out from the crowd and
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display his uniqueness and individuality. Personality was achieved
in self-expressiveness, self-assertion, in admirable magnetism and
vitality. It was therefore possible to assert that a man did not "have a
personality," in the private, possessive sense of ownership of certain
qualities or skills. But the notion of personality also entailed its own
contradiction, for one could not be well-liked and admired while
expressing one's needs fully and achieving personal satisfaction.
"Personality is the quality of being Somebody," a popular advice
manual declared in 1915. Associated with its usage were terms evoking dynamism and charisma, such as "fascinating, stunning, attractive, magnetic, glowing, masterful, creative, dominant, forceful."
These qualities signified a marked change from those associated
with character, which was associated with qualities of nobility, wisdom, duty, honor, golden deeds, integrity, manliness, citizenship.
One volume devoted to the subject of character explained "How to
Strengthen It"; another, on personality, described "How to Build
It." Character, this author implied, was something to be preserved;
a personality, by contrast, could be created. 46
Moreover, the original meaning of personality, with its roots in
persona, was maintained in the modern version of the term, in that
the mask used by a player or character in a play became part of
what it meant to be a human being in the modern world. The individual who performed life's many social roles-that of producer
and consumer, of man, woman, and citizen-required a persona or
mask for every social encounter he or she undertook. As Erving
Goffman and other scholars have shown, the self as performer
reached its apotheosis in the latter half of the twentieth century.
The formation of personality then was a modern response to the
alienation brought by the new era. In the shift from a class to a
mass society, the question for individuals was how to distinguish
oneself from others. A personality was a bulwark against the leveling forces of society, a form of power in its own right. Thus, Bourne
saw it as a political obligation of his generation. "Let personality
be the chief value in life ... let us be ends in ourselves." To social
radicals in particular, he advised, "Self cultivation becomes almost
a duty, if one wants to be effective towards the great end." Armed
with a "vital" and "glowing" personality, a self-confidence and pride
in one's self, one could not help but be effective in one's vocation,
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whether in the law, or in journalism, or in social work, or in the
university. "By allowing our free personality to develop, do we contribute most to the common good." One's own personality was a
tool to help transform an individualist and competitive society into
a progressive and cooperative one. 47
The "younger generation" of the prewar years knew the value of
self-cultivation. "We have come with a rush to the realization that
personality and values, are, after all, the important things in a living
world." 48 Traditional definitions would give way to the new. "We classify people by new categories. We look for personality, for sincerity,
for social sympathy, for democratic feeling, for social productiveness,
and we interpret success in terms of these attainments." 49 Personality was such an important concept that Bourne used it as the yardstick to measure social progress and as a criterion to evaluate social
institutions and organizations. Their value rested on the degree to
which they encouraged diversity and individuality.
The aim of the group must be to cultivate personality, leaving
open the road for each to follow his own. The bond of cohesion will be the common direction in which those roads point,
but this is far from saying that all the travelers must be alike. It
is enough that there be a common aim and a common ideal. 50
Personality was as much a product of its environment as an inner
quality. Thus, in contrast to the older ideal of individual character,
it was a psychosocial entity, not strictly spiritual. A personality in
Bourne's understanding was a quality displayed or expressed, realized fully only in association, not possessed privately or understood
subjectively. In view of this conception of personality as a social
product, one's personality was essentially a relationship both subjective and objective, reconciled neither with "nature" nor with
"society" but with the self.
It is exactly the discovery of this younger generation that ...
the intelligent, veritably humanistic, personal plane can only
be reached by transcending both the animal and the institutional. In other words, personality was a struggle against both
raw "Nature," and ... organized society. 5 1
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Personality was a practical myth, as Nietzsche might suggest, that
is, a myth that had effects. A personality was the means whereby
one acquired the authority of a creator, a text created in the midst
of a contextual frame.
Sharing oneself was the first step toward broadening one's world
and the first chance to see the world from outside the prison of
one's own inner subjectivity. "There are adventures of personality
in studying and delighting in the ideas and folkways of people that
hold much in store for those who will only seek them. " Bourne
urged other radicals to encourage the same freedom for others.
"Let us live so as to stimulate others, so that we call out the best
powers and traits in them, and make them better than they are,
because of our comprehension and inspiration." Through cooperative social relations, everyone would benefit, and much more
so than if locked into a liberal ethic of competitive individualism.
"It is not true that by examining ourselves and coming to an understanding of the way we behave we understand other people, but ...
by .. . our friends we learn to interpret ourselves." 52
The key to freeing personality, in short, lay in cultivating a
breadth of experience beginning with one 's earliest educational
encounters. "The earlier the education is begun, the higher will
be the type of personality achieved and the greater the development of individualities." One need only look at other societies to
demonstrate the importance of a "variety of stimuli." "Men are
most alike in illiterate societies, or in groups such as the separate
professions,-in groups where there is no culture at all, or in
groups where each member received the same training." The distinction was not between primitive and advanced cultures; it was
between those that were varied and heterogeneous and those that
were conformist and homogeneous. The solution was obvious.
"The greater the variety of stimuli present, and the more constant
their play, the richer, both in quality and quantity, will be the personality achieved."
It was surely an American personality Bourne intended to create,
dependent more on routes rather than on roots in Paul Gilroy's artful distinction,53 or shaped by the variety of one's experience rather
than by one's origins. With it, one could live in multiple worlds, constructed by different cultures, ideologies, and faiths, as the Amer-
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ica of increased immigration and accelerated urban growth, of the
power of the New Woman and the religious zeal of the progressive
reformer required. In the autobiographical essay written during
summer 1918, the summer in which Bourne decided to turn his
attention to the "values of which the war has no part," he joined the
debate on the relevance of the canon in the university. His position
suggested that the education of a young cosmopolitan would
depend less on where one came from than where one had been. If
proponents of a literary education took seriously the idea of multiculturalism, he argued, they would contribute to the building of
that modern personality who was at home with all literature, a literary radical of cosmopolitan tastes and standards interested in classical and contemporary literature, different national literatures, and
different regional literatures in America. Thus he was anticipating
"the revolutionary world is coming into the classic."
The metaphors of sin and conversion in "The History of a Literary Radical" were familiar. He argued he had undergone two
conversions-a rebirth from the "orthodoxies" of dusty Anglophilia to the "propaganda" of Socialist realism-literary conversions that, in a genealogy inspired by Nietzsche, were beyond good
and evil. The aspiring "man ofletters" had become a "cultural revolutionist." He did not want to become another "cultural vandal."
He urged other "devout and progressing pagans" to stand ready
for another conversion. In his last autobiography, he would reinvent himself again. The self-in-becoming anticipated America's selfbecoming, its pathos, a process always in formation. 54

4
IRONY AND RADICALISM

The world is no stage, with the ironist as audience . ... He is as much part and parcel of
the human show as any of the people he
studies .. . . If the ironist is destructive, it is his
own world he is destroying; if he is critical, it
is his own world that he is criticizing. And his
irony is his critique of life.
-Randolph S. Bourne, "The Life ofIrony"

"The real trouble with middleclass radicalism in this country today,"
Bourne wrote before the war, "is that it is too easy." His concern
was with the romantic anticapitalism of middle-class intellectuals,
which often seemed to turn American radicalism into a spectator
sport. Progressive and socialist intellectuals spent their energies in
easy sympathy with fashionable causes-in support for the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) or anarchist groups-as their
members were deported or their strikes were broken by the government or corporate security forces, instead of doing the hard
work of formulating a theory of radical democracy on which to
form an alliance of the middle classes and the labor movement.
Ignoring the struggles of "the oppressed masses and excluded
races at home," they waited to see what the Russians would "do for
the world."
42
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Yet there was work to be done in formulating a radical philosophy that linked democratic strivings at home with those abroad,
for the war had revealed that class allegiances cut across national
boundaries. "The real arena lies in the international class-struggle,
rather than in the competition of artificial national units."' An
American radicalism that had conformed to a narrowly conceived
nationalism would miss the opportunity to build a radical philosophy for an international alliance. Bourne called the young radicals back to the social movement and back to their origins as
intellectuals. "The only way middle-class radicalism can serve is by
being fiercely and concentratedly intellectual." They must resist
the temptation to "put aside their university knowledge" and "disguise" their intellectualism; they must not be reluctant to debate
ideas or to risk offending the labor movement. "The young radical today is not asked to be a martyr, but he is asked to be a thinker,
an intellectual leader." 2
If the idea of intellectual leadership still had appeal for Bourne
in 1916 it was because it spoke to the sense of possibility that he and
other progressive, pragmatist, and socialist intellectuals shared
about the role of ideas in effecting social change. In those years they
believed that the application of intelligence to social problems
could remove the social ills of poverty and illiteracy. Some progressives argued that a philosophy of social democracy would restore a sense of individualism to counter the corrupt influence of
large corporations and trusts. The culture critics of the Masses and
the Seven Arts, including Bourne, were convinced that discourse,
specifically cultural criticism, would revitalize cultural sensibilities
and invigorate political knowledge. These middle-class intellectuals held stock in the power of discourse to shape consciousness and
to influence social practices. The purpose of the intellectual vocation was to make a practical difference in social struggle.
In particular, the new class of culture critics, according to Alan
Trachtenberg, carved out a new social role for themselves as nonacademic, generalist intellectuals whose point of view was shaped
by the role they created.' They lived and worked as William James
had predicted American intellectuals would in the twentieth century, that is, most of them gave up comfortable middle-class
careers, separated themselves from universities, and opted for the
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public culture of cafes and literary societies. James had welcomed
the shift of the center of power from the university to the cosmopolitan collective because, he argued, it would free the individual to express the "personal point ofview." 4
Bourne's own antiorganizational sentiments mirroredjames's.
Fearful of the conformist influence of organized groups and institutions on individual expression, he encouraged the idea of leadership as a form of engagement or political commitment working
outside the "centripetal" force of institutions. Calling young intellectuals to a "restless, controversial criticism of current ideas," he
used the concept of the intellectual as a counterweight to the
"martyr-complex" of the middle-class radical. For him intellectual
vanguardism was explicitly a Sorelian myth to inspire political involvement. "Most of us have given up looking on ourselves as heroes
and martyrs," he wrote to dispel the romanticism in the idea of the
radical as social outlaw. The idea of intellectual leadership was at
best a "vital myth," an impossibility that could point to no tangible
results. It was a symbol to discourage delusions of independence
(detachment) and the martyrdom ofa misunderstood truth-bearer.5
Despite his effort to discourage a modernist romance around
the idea of intellectual leadership, Bourne's wartime writings about
the role of an "irreconcilable" critic carried some of the symbolic
weight of the individual speaking truth to power. Even so, in examining his writings both before and during the war, it is clear that
he understood not only the limits of criticism but also that every
theory of intellectual leadership privileged the voices of intellectuals over those of the majority. In this sense, it was an ironic stance
that he proposed for the radical intellectual: to be at once inside
the society of which he was, at the same time, a critic.
In another sense, his conception of the role of the intellectual
can be seen to stand at the cusp between modernity and postmodemity. As Ross Posnock has argued, Bourne's conception was
cast in terms that went beyond the antinomies of the role of intellectuals as either degage or engage, detached or committed, involved concretely in the material world or retreating to the high
abstraction of political philosophy. He wrote as Theodor Adorno
has suggested of the immanent critic, "in and through contradiction," coming from a divided society (between the Brahmin elite
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and a new transnational majority), unwilling to resolve contradictions in a transcendentalist philosophy. 6
Bourne himself came from a fractured genealogy that had an
enduring effect, in the double-sided pressure to be both insider
and outsider. As a radical critic, I argue, he developed a doublesided sensibility, comfortable with "intellectual suspense" that not
only worked its way into his political imagination but also became
an integral part of his radicalism, distinctive for its doubled meanings, anticipating what M. M. Bakhtin calls internal dialogization.
Bourne's ironic radicalism was a political strategy for dealing with
opposition and contradiction in modern consciousness.7
The title of this chapter, borrowing from the final chapter of
Thomas Mann's Reflections of a Non-Political Man, ironically inverts
Mann's prescription for the apolitical intellectual and scholar. The
stance Bourne assumed was the opposite of Mann's: a stance of
political engagement, skepticism, and commitment to radical dissent. Irony was a basis for critical judgment based in contradiction
that allowed both detachment and commitment for the radical
critic. Put simply, Bourne developed a discursive response-within
language itself and as part of particular genres (critical philosophy,
autobiography, political polemic)-that complemented his personal marginality. As an unregenerate or "irreconcilable" critic, he
engaged in the free play of genres and discursive strategies, strategies anticipating Bakhtin's conception of carnivalization-with radical content. The strategic use of irony, in particular, reflected
Bourne's unwillingness to resolve contradictions that were unresolvable and his preference that they remain in a doubled-over relation to the other. 8

In a college essay examining classical irony, Bourne admired it as
the "science of comparison," a philosophical method used by Plato
that contrasted the "is and the ought" in order to generate an ideal
of justice that was complex, individuated, and grounded in contemporary reality. The Platonic "gift of living analogy" used examples from daily life persuasively to illustrate and make more relevant
the more abstract ideal. Bourne particularly admired the dialogic
use of divergent perspectives to give The Republic, in his reading, a
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pluralist and ironically a relativist perspective, combining the aesthetic sensibility of the "poet" with the "critical realism" of the
"economist," "educator," "historian," and "psychologist," "welded
together in one living tissue of thought." In contrast to the "matter
of fact ... materialis[m]" of the time, Plato's idealism showed that
"all is not what it appears to be" and that real disagreements over
meaning could be traceable to a lived subjectivity; yet his idealism
was also tempered and informed by those various and contentious
points of view representing the multiple nature of experience. The
dialogue looked at experience(s) from many sides, the apparent as
well as the latent, and expressed Plato's own perceptions in alternating voices-scientific, aesthetic, metaphysical. 9
Clearly a revisionist, almostJamesian reading of classical Platonism, Bourne's interpretation moved away from the dialogue's
central distinction between theory and practice to one between the
is and the ought, a move James would have endorsed to release
American philosophy from debates over metaphysics and determinism. Bourne's interpretation of Socratic irony was equally revisionist and equally Jamesian, appreciating the artful deception
used as an investigative tool to uncover hidden meanings and to
draw out the inner, unrealized knowledge of his interlocutors,
which could be tested in dialogue and interaction. From this interpretive interchange, social truths were constructed. Socratic irony,
likejames's radical empiricism, helped create truth in the intersubjective exchange of perceptions and observations to be weighed,
evaluated, and judged by a community of interpreters. 10 Moreover,
the Socratic veil, a charade to demystify and destroy false idols,
became a kind of second nature to Socrates; in Bourne's words, it
was not simply a "method" but a "life," a way of seeing and making
sense of experience in practice. Socrates' irony was "no mere byproduct but the very root and soul of his character," an inseparable feature of his "autobiography."
As he did in his own autobiography, Bourne focused on the interaction between personality and social structure. Irony was realized in social interaction, not in the solitary remove of the contemplative scholar. "The daily fabric of the life of irony is woven
out of our critical communing with ourselves and the personalities
of our friends, and the people with whom we come in contact." 11
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It used the benefits of both science and art in its judgments: as the
science of comparison, it measured contemporary realities against
one's ideals; as the art of analogy it tapped the human capacity to
create, through the apollonian art of interpretation and imagination, restoring consciousness to its proper role as the stimulus to
action. It also suggested a philosophical independence, in form as
well as content. Somewhere between the passionate commitment
of an ideologue and the dispassionate stance of the scientist, the
ironic critic might combine both virtues. Socratic irony showed
how irony could be both radical and engaged. In Bourne's construction, Socrates was not Nietzsche's disinterested scholar, the
theoretical man and archdemystifier, the enemy of enchantment.
He was a partisan who brought values to bear. He spoke not from
logic only, or from tradition, but from the inspiration of discovery
and invention, creating a "city of words." Bourne's reading of Socratic irony was, thus, more ironical than Mann's, and even Nietzsche's at times, resting on the belief in the imaginative potential of
the very intellectual act of demystification. In his view irony was
creative, but so was radicalism.
"The Life of Irony," published in 1913, counterbalanced the intimate, intensely personal "philosophy of handicap" of his 1911 essay
with its abstraction and theorization of political agency, distancing
Bourne from his personal genealogy to an intellectual one that
could be useful for other young radicals of the middle class. Daniel
Aaron recognized the importance of the essay to Bourne's work as
a whole. "Much of Bourne's philosophy of life is contained in 'The
Life of Irony' -the detached probings of the ironist, the search for
the measurable stuff of personality, the agile putting on and off of
masks and characters. " 12 The essay theorized the self-masking
Bourne employed in his writing and the unstable position he occupied as a critic "who cannot yet crystallize, who does not dread suspense. "1 3 The shifting identities and roles-first as author, then as
friend of protagonist, then as narrator and interlocutor-signified
the disembodiment of his corporeal marginality, a way of "making
over the body," in Bourne's phrase, by taking on the personality of
another and making it his own. As a form of self-distancing, irony
was also a means of joining that democratic community of interpreters, following Charles Peirce, creating democratic truths.
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Bourne's central argument in the essay was that irony was best understood not as a trope but as a lived experience that comes in accepting contradiction. "Things as they are, thrown against the
background of things as they ought to be,-this is the ironist's
vision." The ability to endure contradiction, to live in the gap between the is and the ought, resulted from living a doubled existence,
the common condition in modern society. Early modern theorists
had sought to heal the split-that is, to restore a unity to the alienated self (Rousseau), or to reaffirm a species essence to class-identified individuals (Marx), or to transcend it in a universalist state
(Hegel). Bourne, however, saw the contradictions of modernity as
important to sustain. The gap between the is and the ought opened
a space for a regulative ideal to guide social transformation. 14 Anticipating Marcuse's critical theory, Bourne's embrace of absurdity and
contradiction in the modern experience was an acknowledgment
that negation had creative value in that the competition between
opposites was understood as the agent of change and of individual
release. On these grounds Bourne argued for the retention of contradictions in society and in the self.
"The ironist is born and not made," an ironic claim for a student
of pragmatism who understood the natural as a product of one's
experience. One's nature, in this sense, was created, not acquired.
Yet his naturalizing of irony underscored his thesis that the ironic
disposition was "not a pose or an amusement" but an integral part
of one's life. Because "a life cannot be taken off and put on again
at will ... as if it were some portable commodity, or some exchangeable garment," the life of irony was more than a guise or a mask; it
was experiential and thus, on one level, constitutive of the self. The
ironist understood the appearance/ reality opposition and would
play with the signifiers. Yet if irony were not a cloak to be taken on
and off but a part of oneself, the ironist could step outside the selfcould take the self on and off, as it were-first as an observer, then
as a participant, then to step in the shoes of another, in an expression of amour de soi. In this sense irony was superior to introspection
because it has "no [fixed] perspective or contrast" so that the ironist could get outside himself and "view himself objectively." The
self-distancing and deliberate alienation maximized the critical
sense. It unsettled one's certainty; it challenged one's complacency.
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Most important for his political philosophy, irony was the basis
of solidarity with others. "It is not true that by examining ourselves
and coming to an understanding of how we behave we understand
other people, but that by the contrasts and little revelations of our
friends we learn to interpret ourselves." The presumed detachment
of an ironic observer was its opposite: a means of getting out of
oneself ( amour propre) to bond with others. "Many of our cherished
ideals would lose half their validity were they put bodily in the
mouths of the less fortunate." By "putting himself in another's
place" and adopting "another's point of view," he "lost his egotism
completely." Irony was a vehicle for democratic camaraderie, a
political tool of personal affiliation.
The most illuminating experience that we can have is a sudden realization that had we been in the other person's place
we should have acted precisely as he did. To the ironist this is
no mere intellectual conviction that, after all, none of us are
perfect, but a vivid emotional experience which has knit him
with that other person in one moment in a bond of sympathy
that could have been acquired in no other way. 15
Therefore, ironic detachment, often misunderstood as a barrier,
was not destructive to identity; it affirmed one's humanity. "Irony is
... the truest sympathy," drawing one into sympathetic understanding of the experiences of others. Its skepticism did not deaden one's
sensitivity; it leavened it. It became "a necessary relief from the tension of too much caring. It is his salvation from unutterable despair."
Here Bourne drew on his personal genealogy, the anhedonia of the
sick soul and the uncertainty of his unresolved status as a divided
self. Through a shift in perspective, an inclusivity of points of view,
and a "sense of proportion," irony permitted one to lose one's selfabsorption. "He acquires a more tolerant, half-amused, half-earnest
attitude towards himself." Irony's "critical attitude" gave one a "temporary escape, a slight momentary reconciliation, a chance to draw
a deep breath of resolve before plunging into the fight. It is not a
palliative so much as a perspective." 16
With the ironic sensibility as a political stance, Bourne found the
discursive stance from which he could gain some distance from his
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own position of being "in but not of the world." It meant he could
understand himself, his society, and the role he might play in it as
an "unintegrated self," using irony as the alternative to both "bad
conscience" (guilt) and ressentiment (rancor), responses of the selfdefeated in Nietzsche's terms. The ironic mind recognized contradiction in personal and social experience and mirrored it.
"Absurdity is such an intrinsic part of the nature of things that the
ironist has only to touch it to reveal it." If modern social life were
fundamentally contradictory, the absurdity of the ironic mind was
part of it.
"To the ironist it seems that irony is in the things themselves, not
in the speaking," 17 in the doubled meaning in the gaps between
signifiers. In recognizing the distinction between the represented
and its representation, Bourne also problematized it, anticipating
the postmodern understanding but in a way that did not collapse
the boundaries between "things" and their "speaking." The world
maintained its own boundaries, but under an ironic gaze, it
became a text. His analysis opened up the possibility of blurring
conventional boundaries-between the normal and the deviant,
the sane and the insane-but without destroying them. From the
perspective of the radical critic, the deviant-the discontented
voices of the "forgotten masses and excluded races at home"became the norm. As Olaf Hansen notes, "Truth is thus established
in the process of gradually eliminating the balance between the
normal and the exception, shifting it around until we look at the
normal as the exception." 18
The political premise of the argument was made more apparent
through the aesthetic analogy of modern photographic technology
that Bourne used to illustrate irony's critical, demystifying technique. "The ironical method might be compared to the acid that
develops a photographic plate," highlighting what is already there.
It did not "distort the image but merely brings to light all that was
implicit in the plate before." Similarly irony, "the photography of
the soul," revealed elements of the subject that would be otherwise
overlooked in a literal (representational) reading. "The picture
goes through certain changes in the hands of the ironist, but without these changes the truth would be simply a blank, unmeaning
surface." As the crystals on the plate revealed various "values and
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beauty" when light fell upon it at different angles, so irony exposed
the aspects of its subject to different light. While the photographic
plate presented a reverse image of its subject, irony, in presenting
the "photographic negative of the truth," reversed and inverted
traditional valuations. "Irony revel[s] in a paradox ... truth with
the values reversed." Irony transvalued values and tested them
against the standard of contemporary "social validity" and democratic interchangeability. 19
Democratic truth, the political ground of Bourne's conception
of modern irony, emerged in discourse. "The deadliest way to annihilate the unoriginal or the insincere is to let it speak for itself.
Irony is this letting things speak for themselves and hang themselves by their own rope. Only it repeats the words after the speaker
and adjusts the rope." The ironical outlook tested opinions by
"transplanting" them to the "lips of another."
If an idea is absurd, the slightest change of environment will
show that absurdity. The mere transference of an idea to
another's mouth will bring to light all its hidden meanings . . .. If a point of view cannot bear being adopted by
another person, if it is not hardy enough to be transplanted, it
has little right to exist at all. 20

The modern ironist was thus "the great intellectual democrat in
whose presence and before whose law all ideas and attitudes stand
equal." His democracy extended to the final selection of truth. "If
irony destroys some ideals, it builds up others .... Those it does
leave standing are imperishably founded in the democratic experience of all men." In this sense the ironist was a pragmatist; he
tested ideas "by their social validity, by their general interchangeability among all sorts of people and the world." Deriving his ideals
from experience, he tested them against the same experience. He
"compares things not with a fixed standard but with each other,
and the values that slowly emerge from the process ... are constantly revised, corrected, and refined by that same sense of contrast." If politics privileged speech, irony undercut the orthodox
and the parochial, initiating a counternarrative to challenge the
culture of the last Puritan.2 1
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In several respects then, an ironic critique is similar to a dialectical one. Like the dialectic, it understood appearance as deceptive
and contradiction to be in the "nature of things." Unlike the
dialectic, however, it did not see contradiction as the dynamic by
which men could be lifted to ever higher levels and eventual fulfillment. It did not rely on a transcendent telos to redeem humankind. It left contradiction alone, untranscended, expressing
different possibilities and different experiences of social truth. The
ironic for Bourne can be seen as similar to that of Bakhtin's conception of the parodic. Both irony and parody, unlike the dialectic, do not offer a new synthesis but remain in a doubled relation
to the original. Thus Bourne was able to accept the fact that a belief and its opposite were both true, and both were possible to hold
at the same time ("man is born free, but everywhere he is in
chains"). Irony made it possible to endure contradictions critically,
to acknowledge that contradictory truths could be held simultaneously, without resolving them. Irony allowed him to accept and
even welcome "contradictory situations" and impossible results.
An ironic perspective was therefore not synonymous with cynicism or with satire. Mencken's cynicism, for instance, in Bourne's
view, revealed a contempt for democracy without at the same time
suggesting alternatives. Mencken found it easier to poke fun at the
"booboisie" than to take a stand with the "demos" and work to improve society from within. Moreover, for the purely philosophic or
literary applications of irony, Bourne had no use. "The kind of aesthetic irony that Pater and Omar display is a paralyzed, half-seeing,
half-caring reflection on life-a tame, domesticated irony with its
wings cut ... the result not of exquisitely refined feelings, but of
social anesthesia." Yet the political limitations of irony were equally
clear. If the critic's role was to generate standards ofjudgment that
could stimulate action, irony is not enough on its own. Coupled
with radical convictions, however, it defended against mindlessness,
lazy generalizations, and apathy. An ironic sensibility that was not at
the same time political had no pragmatic value in the modern century. It was an indulgence that was unaffordable, an abdication of
one's membership in the larger social community. The question
was not whether the social movement could afford irony, but
whether it could get along without it.

IRONY AND RADICALISM

53
In 1914 Georg Lukacs described irony as the quintessential
stance of the modern novelist, critical at the same time it was
descriptive, the vehicle most appropriate for modern literature, a
literary disjuncture between bourgeois man and his society. The
unity, now lost, between classical man and his world, reflected in
the classical art form of the epic, was revealed in the life of the
modern protagonist, who is shown to be an estranged seeker of the
meaning of existence, retreating "into subjectivity as interiority and
[who] strives to imprint the contents of [his] longing upon the
alien world." For Lukacs, irony was "the modern method of formgiving," a constituent part of the modern world and the novelist's
own awareness of the subjective and objective alienation of his protagonist. It was "the highest freedom that can be achieved in a world
without a god," Lukacs wrote, showing men the best they could do,
in a world out of joint. It signified a "self-correction of the world's
fragility," both critical ("realist") and descriptive ("naturalist"). Irony
attempted to transform inadequate relations even as it forced men
to confront them. 22
In a review of Dreiser's work, Bourne described his realism in
terms that suggested substantial agreement with early Lukacsian
aesthetics. Dreiser's technique illustrated a modern aesthetic that
captured the alienation experienced by ordinary Americans and a
variety of perspectives to describe their efforts to find meaning and
attain self-determination in the chaos of the modern city. On the
one hand, according to Bourne, Dreiser distanced himself from
his characters, presenting them as "rather vacuous people, a little
pathetic in their innocence of the possibilities of life and their optimistic truthfulness," "unconscious of their serfdom" to the "great
barons of industry." The disjuncture between his awareness of the
chaotic interplay of wills-to-power and their unconscious innocence
buffeted about in the great cities of America illustrated the kind
of ironic contrast Lukacs had described. Further, Dreiser distanced
himself from his characters without at the same time "convicting"
them, in Bourne's words. He took their experiences of modern
life's cruelty and beauty as a given, "neither praising nor blaming"
his characters for their weaknesses and misfortunes but recognizing "how much more terrible and beautiful and incalculable life is
than any of us are willing to admit." Although literary brokers
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found Dreiser's ethical standards shockingly nihilist or libertarian,
Bourne saw them as refreshingly realistic and compassionate, the
judgments of a "moral democrat." 23
The role of the critic and intellectual suggested in Mann's Reflections of a Non-Political Man can be seen as the theoretical antithesis
to Bourne's understanding of the political use of irony. The differences between Mann's conception of the political responsibility of intellectuals and Bourne's illustrate the fundamentally
conservative and the profoundly radical interpretations of the role
of the intellectual and the ironic mind in a modern, fragmenting
society. Mann's Reflections, written five years after Bourne's essay,
inveighed against the tendency of contemporary intellectuals to
become involved in political controversies. The modern intellectual must choose art, not politics, as the only appropriate place for
his creativity. Mann warned fellow intellectuals (including his politically active brother) and artists that they must choose between
irony (as expressed in art) or radicalism (as evidenced in democratic activism and abstract intellectualism). Irony and radicalism,
Mann held, are antitheses-an "Either-Or"-in sharp contrast to
Bourne's fundamental integration of irony and radicalism, whether
in art or in criticism. 24
Mann, of course, like Nietzsche before him, wanted to rescue
men from the recesses of science, religion, and philosophy and
from the excessive intellectualism of the apollonian will. Irony returned man to the innocence of the dionysian, sustaining life and
eros. Only irony was creative, Mann insisted, evoking the sublime
and the spiritual from the abyss of tradition. But his reading of
Nietzsche was also deeply conservative, associated with all that was
sublime in the German character, nation, and tradition and distinctly not the tool of the new socialist or of democratic politics.
His retranslation of Nietzsche ignored the fact that Nietzsche
wanted to combine art and politics in a "gay science," to enable
men to live an aesthetic life that had political consequences as well,
as suggested in the idea of an "artistic Socrates." The question for
the scholar, as for the poet, Nietzsche suggested, was not whether
one was conservative or radical but whether one's activities were
"life-affirming" or "life-denying." Life-affirming intellectual activity gave men (and women) standards for judgment and thereby
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helped them avoid nihilism. Although intellectuals could not create forms, they could generate values that gave meaning to forms
created by artists and poets. The "hardest test of independence"
for the intellectual was "not to remain stuck in one's own detachment, to that voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird
who flies ever higher to see ever more below him" but to learn to
"conserve oneself' and remain connected to the stream of human
experience. 25
The dangers of excessive detachment and abstractness were
clear to Bourne as well, even before the war, when political contingency dominated public discourse. "If irony is the virtue of
philosophers, abstractness . . . is their vice." Specifically he meant
to warn against becoming a "lonely Zarathustra," withdrawing to
the "mountain top," avoiding human contact. With detachment,
his vision would be lifeless. "Without people and opinions for his
mind to play on, his irony withers and faints." His feet must be
firmly planted in the empirical world. "Like the modern city, he is
totally dependent on a steady flow of supplies from the outside
world ... . This world is his nourishment." 26 Using a feminine signified of the early twentieth century (the New Woman as associated with the chaos and disorder of the modern city), Bourne
showed irony to be a part of the dionysian.
But Bourne's view of the role of the radical critic was also
an implicit admission of the limits of criticism. In a 1912 letter,
he acknowledged the embattled and often impossible premises
of the critic's project, particularly in a society ambivalent about
intellectualism.
Criticism . .. constantly conscious ... of its limitations ...
struggle[s] heroically and resolutely up a path to a goal that
it knows it will never achieve. And yet somehow that march,
predestined as it is to failure, aids countless wayfarers, whose
eyes would be otherwise fixed stonily on the ground, to see
the vision at the goal and be glad. 27
The futility of criticism was ironically its raison d'etre, the role of
the critic possible only because it was an impossible one. The myth
of intellectual leadership was even more necessary to inspire a
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"relentless criticism of everything existing." The combina6on of
irony and radicalism began to suggest a political solution to
Bourne's choice of vocation at the same time that it gave him a
point of view that was shaped by that social role. Along with the
other culture critics of his generation, he would go without institutional affiliation and without access to power but would try to
create a new role, with new power, in which public criticism could
contribute to what they called the "American promise."
Only war presented a unique situation, Bourne argued, because
discourse became one-dimensional and political debate became
polarized into either/ or propositions: one must be prowar or antiwar; there was no in-between. The choice proved unacceptable to
those intellectuals who "cannot yet crystallize" or to those who did
not dread "intellectual suspense." During wartime and in times
when a war economy was operating, the ironic critic became an
outlaw, a radical by virtue of his "irreconcilability" to the positions
offered. Writing "below the battle," he could retain his irony-and
his radicalism. He could, inverting Mann's meaning, be both creative and radical.

5
YOUTH

Youth's attitude is really the scientific attitude. Do not be afraid to make experiments,
it says. You cannot tell anything will work
until you have tried it.
-Randolph S. Bourne, "Youth"
We no longer make careful distinctions
between the fit and the unfit, the successful
and the unsuccessful, the effective and the
ineffective, the presentable and the unpresentable. We are more interested in the influences that have produced these seeming
differences than in the fact of the differences
themselves. We classify people by new categories. We look for personality, for sincerity,
for social sympathy, for democratic feeling,
for social productiveness, and we interpret
success in terms of these attainments.
-Randolph S. Bourne, ''For Radicals"

While in Europe in 1914, Bourne wrote his suffragist friend, Alyse
Gregory:
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You cannot think how I envy you, with all your hustle and
adventure of work, your crowds of interesting friends, your
ostensibly ... so easy command of life .... It would be so glorious to be "in" something, making something go, or at least
connected up with something or somebody to whom you were
important and even necessary.'
They agreed that "life was primarily action," but she had managed
to "count for something in the world," he wrote, turning her beliefs into a "motive of action, a basis of behavior, a program rather
than a creed." Yet if Bourne's admiration was personal, it was also
political, for Gregory was "learning life by action," taking up the
Jamesian challenge to experience life rather than merely to contemplate it. 2 She was the New Woman, and the suffragists in England and America signaled the end of a declining patriarchal
order in Europe and America to his mind and the radical leadership of the modern generation. He decided Gregory exemplified
youth itself, that spirit of adventure and experimentation that he
offered to his own historical generation, what C. Wright Mills has
called a moral optic, or a countersymbol to itself. The idea of youth
was his means of appealing to a particular modern generation to
fulfill its promise to humanize the scientific spirit, welcome the
power of the New Woman, and move beyond moralism to pragmatism in politics.
By the time Bourne wrote Gregory, he had already formulated
a philosophy of youth in Youth and Life, a collection of essays that
had earned him a considerable audience for a writer of twenty-five
and a position at the New Republic as a contributing editor on issues
of education and the culture of youth. His ideas on the politics and
experiences of youth were often phrased in terms of optimism and
uplift. He praised the young adults he knew (and imagined) for
their idealism, their involvement in political causes, and particularly their willingness to experiment in social relations. "The whole
philosophy of youth is summed up in the word, Dare! Take
chances and you will attain!" 3 Given their appetite for experimentation, he anticipated a disruption of the influence of the bourgeois family, its ethos of individualism, and the middle-class career
patterns expected for his generation.
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But the prewar generation in America was internally divided about
itself and its collective mission. If opposition to the Victorian order
gave them a collective grievance and a common identity to mark out
its members as a generation, they differed in their diagnoses of the
new order and in the remedies they proposed to deal with social and
economic crises, including the growth of poverty, the centralization
of public and private authority, the rapid rise of immigration, and the
possibility of building a common culture in America.
The politics of the prewar generation and its internal divisions
are seen in the writings of Bourne and Walter Lippmann, two of
its prominent spokespersons, who represented two sides of the divided generational mind of the modern century. I have chosen
them to illustrate this divide, not because they represent the extremes of political debate in prewar America but because their
views highlight the multivocality of the political climate and within
the progressivist coalition itself, which ruptured only a short time
later when war preparedness became the salient public issue in
1915. Their differences, often papered over in the language ofgenerationalism, were sometimes elusive even to the generationalists
themselves, including Bourne and Lippmann, as they concentrated
on their desire to break with the past. My emphasis is designed to
illustrate what was at stake even before the war about the idea of
progress, the nature and limits of liberal reform, and the kind of
civic society they wanted to build.
I have isolated two historical narratives to clarify the complicated
nature of the prewar debate. The first is centered on the role of
science, technology, and professional expertise to shape social reform (and save souls). Lippmann's initial attraction to Bergsonian
vitalism was supplanted by 1914 in Drift and Mastery with an unqualified endorsement of the leadership of the new technocrat, trained
in the modern social sciences of economics, political science, and
communications, who, he maintained, knew more about the public interest than the public itself. Bourne's similarly enthusiastic
embrace of instrumentalism at college, as he studied under John
Dewey, was replaced by the plea for more experimentation, his attempt to rescue the pragmatism ofJames from the instrumentalism of social bureaucrats and to restore personal authority or "the
personal point of view" to decisions about social reconstruction.
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Even in his instrumentalist days at college ("we are all instrumentalists here at Columbia"), Bourne tried to temper the fascination
with science and expertise as a basis for political authority by arguing that it would lead to rigid thinking (the apollonian mind) if
wrenched from its Jamesian roots. "Science brings us only to 'an
area of our dwelling,' Whitman says," he frequently reminded his
readers. 4 It could not address the meaning(s) of experience or
offer principles of social philosophy. It could not deal with what it
could not quantify or measure. The disagreement between Bourne
and Lippmann over the limits of the "scientific attitude" therefore
went beyond the question of the role (social) scientific expertise
should take in modern reform; it extended to the very meaning of
science and scientific knowledge itself.
The second narrative revealed in their writings is a related one
about the gendered nature of public authority and its effect on personal liberties. Although the language of science and the language
of gender did not overlap one another exactly, as templates lining
up on every point, they revealed a common attention to the gendered implications of a society that was run by experts. To overstate
their differences only slightly, Lippmann's feminism looked to the
liberation of women within the home or as consumers and secondarily as individuals competing in the market, welcoming the advances that modem technology would bring to (middle-class)
women to make their domestic labor more efficient. Bourne's feminism, by contrast, looked to the freedom of public women, acting
outside the home, to "feminize" professionalism as well as to redistribute the responsibilities of domestic labor. He believed in the
idea of a women's culture that contained a certain sensibility beneficial for society as a whole. He therefore expected professional
women-the reformers, lawyers, teachers, and social workers he
knew in New York-to live outside conventional roles and resist the
norms of bourgeois professionalism. He castigated them when they
turned him out after late evenings of talk so they could get a full
night's sleep, and he implored them not to turn their circles of
friends into tight little communities that did not tolerate difference.
Through his romantic feminism he wanted, in short, the New
Woman to "feminize" society and public authority or to "soften the
crudities of this hard, hierarchal, over-organized, anarchic" society. 5
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Within these two narratives, I trace the politics of the generational mind before the war. My interpretation differs from those
offered by other scholars, however, by characterizing the debate
primarily in cultural terms rather than in purely political terms. I
have chosen to interpret these two sensibilities in Nietzschean
terms, that is, as a debate between the emphasis on the apollonian
mind, or the desire to order society through social reform and expertise, and the faith in the dionysian spirit, to inform political action and encourage experimentation through critical inquiry and
cultural adventure. Bourne proposed to combine these two subjectivities in a "post-scientific" philosophy, a remarkably postmodern alternative to scientism and ideology, which would restore to
the scientific spirit the creativity of the poetic imagination.
My interpretation also differs from that of other scholars in that
I consider Bourne's social criticism as an alternative to progressivism rather than as within its terms. Reading his essays closely,
one finds that Bourne's support of progressive social reform was
consistently qualified and ambiguous. He supported the idea of
social reform when it was democratic, rather than as a program
run by experts; he supported educational reform when it tried to
break down class barriers rather than serve social utility; he supported the use of science and expertise when it was experimental,
preserving the spirit of James. But he did not share the progressivist faith in progress, the idea of social reform as a means of social
control, or its reliance on an activist state.
Moreover, Bourne was unambiguously critical of social reform
experiments that created artificial environments that isolated their
clients from the disorder of the larger society, such as Jane Addams 's Hull House. 6 He was hostile to schools that educated with
an eye to making students useful to society and corporate needs,
such as the vocational technology education in New York public
schools.' He split openly with his own university over its labor policies toward the "scrubwomen" who daily cleaned the steps and halls
of the dormitories and classrooms and over its educational policy
of teaching the English canon at the expense of contemporary
American literature.8 His support and criticism of progressive educational reform, the rise of social science and management expertise, or the development of progressive social programs were part
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and parcel of his broader cultural criticism in this sense. Thus in
deference to his own insistence that education was inseparable from
life, I have chosen not to analyze his educational theory separately
but as part of his political and cultural criticism, to see it as encouraging youthful experimentation and the interplay between pragmatics and the imagination in cultural renewal. 9

Before examining Bourne's and Lippmann's diagnoses of the modern generational crisis in America and Europe, it is worth noting
that generational analysis first developed at the end of the nineteenth century, promoting-and reflecting-new categories of political agency and identity. Generational theorists writing at the turn
of the century, such as Karl Mannheim, Antonio Gramsci, andjose
Ortega y Gasset, conceptualized generations as distinctive social
groupings, similar to social classes but crossing over national, class,
and even gender lines. If they agreed that generations were a workable sociological category and a potent political phenomenon, however, they differed in defining the exact nature of the generation
that was the object of their study. Mannheim 's examination, the
"Problem of Generations," associated generations and the rise of
generational consciousness with the formation of a dissident intelligentsia that, as a result of certain destabilizing experiences, begins
to feel, articulate, and defend a core set of values and ideals against
a society they perceived to be indifferent or hostile. For Mannheim,
and for Francois Mentre as well, the character of a generation was
therefore not marked by a common or majoritarian experience of
individuals in an age-cohort group but by the experiences of its
more distinctive and atypical members. Other generational theorists agreed that generational identity was fundamentally an elite
phenomenon, with a clear separation of experiences between the
mass and the elite that the concept did not reflect. Some scholars
even argued that generationalism was a phenomenon unique to no
one but the generationalists themselves. 10
Though it may be accurate historically to associate the idea of
generational identity and generational conflict with the rise of an
independent literary intelligentsia, there is a question as to whether such an identifiable elite can be found in prewar America. Nev-
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ertheless, generational identity and generational consciousness was
a common frame of reference for young socialists and progressives
in the first decades of the twentieth century, as well as for Bourne
and Lippmann, despite their ideological differences. Indeed, the
prevalence of generationalism suggests that as a framework of
analysis and a form of social consciousness, it had developed as a
way to foster collective consciousness in a society in which class was
often ignored. Thus generationalists, in positing a generational
identity, actually helped create the phenomenon, despite forces
that might have undermined it, adding a new twist to Mannheim's
otherwise fruitful analysis.
The significance of generational thinking, particularly as it developed in the early twentieth century, lay in its political potential as
an organizing concept and a source of identity. Generational theorists commonly agreed that generations as a social category referred to more than an age-cohort group of individuals coexisting
at the same period of time. Rather, the term was used as an organizational concept and a frame of reference to conceptualize society and as a means of transforming it. Generationalists thus
structured the world in terms of generational categories, using an
approach in much the same fashion as did social-class analysts, as
a form of collectivism and determinism. Unlike the concept of
class, however, the idea of generation emphasized the temporal
rather than the socioeconomic location of its members. According
to Mannheim, _what bound together members of a generation was
not community and physical proximity but location in society or
the objective facts of their existence. For him, therefore, generations were much like classes in their objective determination.
American generationalists, specifically Bourne, Lippmann, and
Addams, perceived themselves to be part of an entity that was facing for the first time problems of a decidedly modern nature.
In his study of the prewar generation in Europe, Robert Wohl
argues that all generations believe themselves to be special, but the
"generation of 1914" came to signify a particular "unity of experience, feeling, and fate," which led to a significant shift in the meaning of the idea of generation itself. All generational theorists
agreed, among them Ortega and Mannheim, that membership in
a generation implied, above all, the sharing of a common destiny. 11
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Peerage was neither a necessary nor sufficient characteristic of generational identity or of the sense of shared destiny, which explains
why Bourne frequently pointed out that "pioneers" among the
older generation-e.g., William James, Walt Whitman, and Henri
Bergson-had managed to articulate the values and agenda of his
own generation even before a majority of them had signed on. Put
differently, generations are an argument, Sherman Paul has suggested, that nicely established the synthetic nature of their identity.
They stand for certain ideas or hopes and against others, by way of
constituting themselves. More than the factor of age, generational
consciousness, and by implication generational identity, constitutes
a necessary ingredient in the formation of a generation. 12
The idea of generations in its modern form was tied frequently
to that of generational conflict so that by the end of the nineteenth
century, the idea of "youth in revolt" had emerged as a byproduct
of generational theory in the association made between the world
of the fathers and all that was corrupt and decadent, against which
the younger generation stood in opposition. 13 Generational consciousness and the associated idea of generational conflict signified a discontinuity with the past and an opportunity to make the
world over again. It stressed a similarity of perspective among members of a generation as well as a radical break with the thought and
experiences of others and with the past itself. 14
The theory of generational revolt produced a cluster of attitudes
that has been termed "the ideology of youth," which reached its
apotheosis in the 1920s, emphasizing in particular the sense that
one's youth was a superior stage of life, marked by its purity and
innocence. 15 As Laura Nash has pointed out, the association
between the idea of generation and one's chronological youth
became so automatic by the end of the nineteenth century that the
idea of generation "came to mean not so much men who shared
the same age, as men who shared youth," undercutting, to some
extent, the emphasis on the importance of voluntary membership.16 In identifying generation with youth, however, a generation
in this sense offered its own unique lifestyle, in this instance the
bohemian experience appropriate to an interclass group and its
own form of political association, the youth movement based on
the segregation of age and consciousness. 17 It became possible to

YOUTH

65

refer to "youth" as a significant social group so that the generational tag was often dropped altogether, implying in the concept
of "youth" the notion of the "younger generation." 18
A key element of a generation's common frame of reference, in
sum, was the identification of a certain event or set of experiences
that constituted a definite rupture from the past. That rupture usually took the form of a great historical event or crisis, a famine, a
war, a revolution, or the like. The generation of 1914 in Europe,
according to Wohl, was subject to several dislocating experiences.
Among them was a marked decline in parental authority that produced in them a rejection of the "fiercely competitive capitalist
society" of their "stern" fathers as a locus of "unbearable tyranny,"
a deterioration of traditional forms of social identification, and at
the same time, a challenge to the bourgeois ethic of competitive
individualism, the latter two presenting them with the opportunity
to create alternate forms of collective association that crossed class
and geographical lines. The separation between the adult world of
labor and marriage and the experiences of adolescence, a separation marked by increasing numbers of youth spending extended
periods of time in universities and military service, according to
Annie Kriegel, prolonged the dependency and increased the restlessness of young men and women. As their participation in activities of productive labor and the attainment of economic stability
were postponed, the links that traditionally were forged in families
and social classes began to break down even further, setting individuals free to redefine their social roles. 19
The disaffection of people born between 1880 and 1910 in
Europe was expressed in a quiet rage against a world that was seen
to be relativistic, chaotic, and morally bankrupt. For European
youth, World War I thus presented an invitation (that few resisted)
to restore the world to a more spiritually pure, more orderly condition. Their historical mission, they believed, was to purify and
renew their world, and many of them became feverishly nationalistic and even militarist, ultimately aligning against groups on the
political left. 20 In America the chief source of generational grievance was against the society that they referred to collectively as the
Puritan order: the pietistic, disciplinary culture of the middle
class. They saw themselves uniting against the determinism and
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moralism of a staid Protestantism, even if they divided along the
lines of science (order) among the reformers or the New Woman
(disorder) among the radicals.
The fragmentation and alienation that were products of this historical rupture were paralleled not coincidentally in the "discovery"
of adolescence, a unique stage between the child's identity and the
adult's, which, according to G. Stanley Hall's 1904 treatise on adolescence, was a product of a rapidly industrializing world that
delayed adulthood (primarily, for young men). Hall determined
that adolescence (and by implication the younger generation) was
characterized by an awareness of a radical alienation (separation)
between one's self and the world around one, which, according to
more recent literature, leads to an urgent need to develop an independent and autonomous identity, using ideals, rebellion, asociability, commitment to transient groups and identities, and
ambivalence toward oneself and one's own power. Bourne, having
read Hall, was confirmed in his conclusion that the adolescent
experience of sensitivity to and estrangement from the perceptions
of the external world was generational, that is, was peculiar to his
generation, the one that was in fact studied by Hall. 21

In "The Two Generations," his first published essay in the Atlantic
Monthly, Bourne defended his generation against charges of laziness and self-indulgence. The "rising generation," especially the
young men of good families, according to Cornelia Comer, a contributor to the Atlantic Monthly, had abandoned the ways of the
fathers by celebrating the will (Shaw) and relying on "Whitmanesque Personality." Their lack of social accomplishment
showed them to be "soft" and deformed by "mental rickets and curvature of the soul." 22 Bourne may have found the metaphor too
much to go uncontested. The "older generation," he wrote, turning the criticism on its head, had failed its children. "I doubt if
any generation was thrown quite so completely on its own
resources as ours is." Left to "bring itself up," the younger generation developed its own standards and contested the old divisions
of the fathers:
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We no longer make careful distinctions between the fit and
the unfit, the successful and the unsuccessful, the effective
and the ineffective, the presentable and the unpresentable.
We are more interested in the influences that have produced
these seeming differences than in the fact of the differences
themselves. We classify people by new categories. We look for
personality, for sincerity, for social sympathy, for democratic
feeling, for social productiveness, and we interpret success in
terms of these attainments. 23
It was their openness to experiences and ideas, their commitment to "the wildest radicalisms," their "thirst" for varied and new
experiences that represented a reformulated will to power, a fluid
and malleable concept rather than a rigid and domineering one.
Their power lay in their dionysian exuberance and energy, as an
antidote to the apollonian drive for control. With youthful ardor
and a firm set of revitalizing goals, they would bypass the problem
of acquiring mastery altogether.24 Bourne therefore insisted that
youth "must be not simply contemporaneous, but a generation
ahead of its time." As ruling ideas were "always a generation behind
our actual social conditions," it was necessary for youth to be "not
less radical but even more radical than it would naturally" so that
when the time came to take positions of power, it would be able to
break the cycle of power and resistance that supported cultural
consensus. In a shrewd understanding of the dialectic of consent
and coercion that underlay the crust of hegemony, he looked to
youth to redefine the nature of authority itself. 25
Many historians have concluded understandably that Bourne
eventually resorted "to a full-fledged cult of youth" 26 and an ideology of generational revolt led by an international band of insurgents or "league of youth." As James Hoopes has written, "Bourne
staked his hopes on a league of youth so radical that it would live
socialistically in the present and help to create thereby the 'communal life of the future."' 27 In light of the criticisms of his own generation in America and the reservations he expressed over the
feverish fanaticism of European youth, however, this conclusion
seems untenable.28 More often Bourne argued that the "constant
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guerilla warfare" between generations could be contained by solutions permitting cooperation and mutual understanding.
I want to see independent, self-reliant, progressive generations, not eating each others' hearts out, but complementing
each other and assuming a spiritual division of labor. I want
the father and mother besides raising the children to lead
independent lives of their own, to add their own life-works of
art to the great picture gallery of personality of the past. 29
He suggested an alliance-of status, on the one hand, and sensuality, on the other-an unlikely combination that could "conserve"
the spirit of youth for society as a whole, coupled with the power
of age. "Middle age has the prestige and the power," and "youth
has the isolation, the independence, the disinterestedness so that
it may attack any foe." 30
Though his own generation was the exemplar of youth, privately
he wrote its members were not so independent or certain of their
goals as he declared in Youth and Life. He knew too many prematurely old young men, following their fathers into business or settling down into families. 31 Others seemed to be stuck in what he
and his circle of friends at Columbia University referred to as Hamlet's "destiny," the paralysis of the apollonian mind, incapable of
taking creative or heroic action. "Of course, we are all Hamlets,"
he wrote in 1913. "Our decadence is hateful to us; we struggle
against it, and in so doing live to a far greater intensity than does
the one who sits down and contemplates it." 32 Hamlet's dilemma,
of course, was the dilemma of the brooding and introspective intellectual; his need was to find ways of acting in the face of (horrible)
truth ( or meaninglessness).
In several ways, the dilemma of middle-class youth mirrored that
of the late nineteenth century, the paralysis facing the rebel fathers
among the late Victorians as they confronted with terror both directions of the modern century, symbolized by Henry Adams's Dynamo and the Virgin. For Hamlet, the solution (to inaction) was
in illusion; through self-enchantment he could act. Some of the
rebel fathers, according to Michael Rogin, overcame their paralysis
in an embrace of the irrational to salve the anxiety of seeming dis-
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order (Sorel, Nietzsche, Bergson); others found the "personal
point of view" as a way of recovering the self from excessive patriarchal control (WilliamJames); and still others moved to direct
action itself, ultimately in war, to rescue themselves from anhedonia (melancholia), leading to suicide (Woodrow Wilson). In some
sense, all who faced terrible truths used the veil and relied on therapeutic philosophies to free them. 33
Through the enabling philosophies of James and Nietzsche,
among others, the prewar generation in America relieved its anxiety over its social role through experiments in social and cultural
renovation, as Jane Addams aptly prescribed. 34 Max Eastman,James
Oppenheim, Waldo Frank, and Floyd Dell, for instance, wrote
poetry and short stories for the little magazines and formed new,
experimental publications in Greenwich Village or the Lower East
Side. Some artists established galleries, such as Alfred Stieglitz's
Gallery 291, displaying works of American and European modern
art and photography, and some directed and produced new drama
in "little theaters" or in group pageants. 35 Other individuals, such
as Addams, Henrietta Rodman, Crystal Eastman, and Carl Zigrosser, were active in settlement houses, social welfare agencies, and
the judicial system, working for improved public services to alleviate the desperate conditions of the poor and for better working
conditions for labor. Some activists established experimental
schools in Greenwich Village, such as the Ferrer Center for adults
and the Little School House for children. 36 Others worked directly
within the state-as did Walter Lippmann, then a socialist, securing the election of the first socialist mayor in the United States in
Schenectady, New York, in 1912, or fighting city machines in local
and state governments, or, by 1917, working for the Wilson administration's public information office. 37
It was this group of politically involved and culturally active
artists and writers who formed a generation and became the subject of Bourne's political philosophy. In a Foucaultian sense, they
became an effect of his linguistic and political attempt to represent them in the abstract symbol of youth. But with all representation, a gap exists between the representation and the represented,
rendering, to some extent, according to Anne Norton, the crucial
political concept of representation a fiction-that which stands for
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that which is not.38 The prewar generation outstripped its representation in Bourne's youth symbol and reinscribed its own cultural norms in Lippmann's idea of mastery, resignifying them. In
Lippmann's symbolic order, in other words, aspirations to Promethean mastery and control were neither elusive nor undesirable
to this particular historical generation, proving him to be an important counterweight to Bourne's more romantic notion of youthful experimentation.

One of the most articulate spokesmen of the young progressives
was Walter Lippmann. In Drift and Mastery, subtitled "An Attempt
to Diagnose the Current Unrest," he characterized the discontent
of his generation. "All of us are immigrants spiritually," he wrote.
They were dislocated and restless in the wake of rapid changes in
social and personal roles and relations.
We are unsettled to the very roots of our being. There isn't a
human relation, whether of parent and child, husband and
wife, worker and employer, that doesn't move in a strange situation .... There are no precedents to guide us, no wisdom
that wasn't made for a simpler age.
Traditions had been demolished, the old shibboleths exposed.
"The sanctity of property, the patriarchal family, the heredity caste,
the dogma of sin, obedience to authority,-the rock of ages, in
brief, has been blasted for us." The great problem of the age, Lippmann announced, was not securing individual freedom; it was
deciding what to do with it. In assuming that Americans had been
liberated, he turned to the rather perverse dilemma ( of the middle class) of having too little direction and no clear vision of what
they would like to become. 39
This bold claim, which ignored the material unfreedom of many
Americans, was startling, but it was even more so because it directly
contradicted his own political philosophy outlined only two years
earlier in Preface to Politics. In it Lippmann had argued that the
problem of the modern age was the influence of too much tradition, which stifled imagination and quelled spontaneity. He drew
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upon the ideas of the European thinkers-Bergson, Nietzsche,
Sorel, and also Freud-to challenge the rationalism of the nineteenth century, of which he was skeptical, and to encourage the
freeing of the "will" as a force for change. Yet in Drift and Mastery, it
seemed that the problem was too much "drift" and the elusiveness
of "mastery." People were living passive lives, unrooted and directionless, uncontrolled either by principle, scientific rationality, or
even, ironically, tradition. Their ineffectuality allowed industrial
exploitation and corporate inefficiency to go unchecked, lingering on by "default" rather than from utility. It was a critique of the
progressive reform movement as well as of the impasse in American public culture. "Reform produces its Don Quixotes who never
deal with reality; it produces its Brands who are single-minded to
the brink of ruin; and it produces its Hamlets and its Rudins who
can never make up their minds." 40
In place of routine, he proposed that "purpose" be substituted:
"We can no longer treat life as something that is trickled down to
us. We have to deal with it deliberately, devise its social organization, alter its tools, formulate its method, educate and control it."
In practical terms, the solution was that the younger generation
would need to forge new instruments of management and manipulation, placing the future in the hands of the "industrial statesmen," a new class of professionals, schooled in the science of
business administration and expert in the rational organization
of industrial production. ''You have in a very literal sense to educate the industrial situation, to draw out its promise, to discipline
and strengthen it." 41 The sort of education he had in mind, as evident in the discourse, emphasized discipline and control to shape
social behavior, following the assumptions of the educator E. A.
Ross, who argued that the conscious manipulation of behavior
would produce a consequent alteration in moral character. 42 Lippmann and Addams, among others, viewed the expert as the policeman and redeemer of society in general, capable of producing
that change in character. The results, Lippmann went so far as to
add, would civilize the whole social conflict. With the new professional business administrators in charge of streamlining production and rationalizing employment practices, revolution would be
unnecessary. 43
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If the shift in his position was not explicitly acknowledged, there
was no doubt that Drift and Mastery urged a reassertion of control
and discipline through scientific administration and technocratic
expertise. Experts in the "art of society" could create the future consciously through the application of reason and science, designed to
maximize efficiency. To be fair, it was not a call for scientism, for his
notion of scientific management contained a sense that creativity,
cooperation, and democracy were components of mastering one's
environment. He appealed specifically to Jamesian pragmatism as
the source of that collaborative effort among a community of peers.
Nevertheless, the clear faith he and other progressive intellectuals
placed in professional expertise and technocratic solutions illustrated strikingly their decision to subject free creativity to the tests
of rationalism and efficiency. Lippmann's greatest fear, it seems, was
of the "waste" that would come from the profit motive and the disorder that would result from too much rebellion. Science, in addition to denoting invention, fellowship, and creative experimentation,
implied the discipline that was necessary to impose on capitalism in
order to prevent social unrest. 44
Bourne greatly admired Drift and Mastery, recommending it as
"a book one would have given one's soul to have written." 45 It
offered a diagnosis similar to his own, as outlined in his essays on
the generational crisis in Youth and Life and in his articles on educational reform for the New Republic. Yet it is surprising that Bourne
did not realize that their conceptions of mastery through science
were ultimately incompatible or that the training of a new generation of experts would violate his own commitments to the idea of
democratic education. Ifhe were troubled by Lippmann's preoccupation with mastery, which he had decided to be an (unliberating)
illusion, he did not say. These differences and their implications
can be seen in the distinctive diagnosis Bourne offered of the
nature of the economic and family crises his generation faced and
of the kind of scientific spirit he recommended for the schools and
(social welfare) institutions.
In Bourne's analysis, the unprecedented condition of his generation's freedom was primarily a consequence of the changing
rules of the marketplace. "The economic situation in which we find
ourselves, and to which not only the free ... but the unfree of the ris-
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ing generation are obliged to react, is perhaps the biggest factor
in explaining our character." Whether working class or middle
class, the choice seemed to be between immersing oneself in the
"routine of a mammoth impersonal corporation ... or ... living
by one's wits within the pale of honesty." Members of his generation were skeptical of all forms of discipline and control, he
argued, and so they looked with ambivalence on the professions
of public relations and business management that Lippmann outlined for the modern saint. 46 Though they wanted to "count for
something in life," in looking at "the men who 'count' in the world
today," they decided, as Bourne put it, that they "did not want to
count in just that way." 47 His language suggested that their fears
were of a physical threat to their very existence. Corporate domination appeared in menacing images of organic and corporeal
consumption. The bureaucratic "Moloch" "devoured" its young; it
"swallowed" or "consumed" or "smothered" or enveloped the new
recruits, invoking images of maternal power.
By contrast, family discipline appeared in images of mechanical
destruction. The family could "distort," "warp," and "mutilate" the
child's individuality; it could "shrink" the soul and "stunt" one's
personality. Its methods were direct, blunt, and clinical. It used
ridicule and censure. Both the middle and working classes were
threatened by the "sect-pressures" of hierarchical organizations
that would (literally?) consume or destroy them.

In Bourne's analysis, the crisis of the family and of the new corporate economy became a crisis of education. The centrality of education to his political thought places him in the company of other
democratic theorists, including Rousseau and Kant, as Joseph
Featherstone points out, as well as James and Dewey. 48 The "helplessness of the modem parent" caused mothers and fathers to tum
to "experts" in childrearing, a move that paralleled the turn by
owners of corporations to experts in industrial engineering and
scientific management. 49 Many of the responsibilities formerly left
to the family and the community were charged to the schools, as
the state was sometimes seen as unduly corrupted or partisan.
Increasingly schools were regarded as the institution to eliminate
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abuse and injustice caused by larger social, economic, and political forces. "The school already overshadows the church . . .. [It]
constantly encroaches on the home. It provides play and work
opportunities that even well-to-do homes cannot provide." It was a
change Bourne and many progressives welcomed. But he warned
that educational reformers ought not to concentrate solely on
reforming administration and professionalization, or they would
risk creating "capable administrators faster than we create imaginative educators." 50
The progressives' response was again divided over the kind of
mastery that was desirable to shape the economic and social order.
The more political of the educational reformers wanted to modernize and centralize the public education system, believing that
schools could be run as efficiently as business corporations. They
focused on improving administration and cultivating expertise,
arguing that specialists must replace politicians and that teachers
be trained as professionals and promoted on the basis of merit
rather than through political cronyism. The social reformers, on
the other hand, favored a change in curriculum and pedagogy, a
more costly set of programs designed to meet the varying needs of
children in different classes with diverse language skills and abilities. They stressed the need for schools to socialize children and
to improve the living conditions of the city's immigrants and the
poor, filling the gap left by the family and community. Their
agenda was modeled along the lines of the social work idea that
schools must take charge of children in all aspects of life, taking
them off the streets and devising programs that would give them
the incentive to remain in school and that would train them for
productive work in society.
Both sectors of the education reform movement came together
over the issue of pedagogy. They agreed that the traditional method of teaching through memorization must be replaced with a scientific pedagogy, based on an understanding of the nature of
children and stressing psychology and ethics rather than the arbitrary authority of the teacher. As Diane Ravitch has noted, however,
in New York City, there was a wide gap between the intellectual ferment of progressive educators and the practices of the schoolroom. Education remained traditional, with virtually a military dis-
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cipline prevailing in the classroom, and teacher-centered, with the
teacher demanding obedience and attention from students. 5 1
Indeed, during the first decades of the century in New York, educational reform amounted to little more than a temporary routing
of Tammanist ward trustees, a standardization of curricula, a centralization of personnel decisions, and a streamlining of expenses
in the quest for efficiency by rotating students in shifts day and
night, actually reducing the educational budget per capita, despite
the overcrowding and dilapidated physical plants. 52
Dewey's proposal to turn the schools into "workshops" in democracy, teaching citizenship as well as practical skills for the world of
work, seemed to Bourne to be a promising set of propositions to
remove the factorylike environment of the traditional classroom
and to attend to the real class differences in educational preparation. 53 As laboratories for practical experiments in a cooperative,
intergenerational democracy, the schools could integrate "workstudy-play," allowing students' interests to determine their studies. 54
But Bourne also read in Dewey's theories an encouragement of
democratic socialism because of his emphasis on broadening the
domain of culture to include the practical and industrial arts and
on abolishing the distinction between people who worked with
their hands and people who worked with their heads. 55 Dewey's
form of education would turn children into little socialists, in
Bourne's view, because it would be classless, rejecting the classbased divisions in education that serviced those divisions in society. "Democratic education does not ... fasten class education
upon us." 56 Anticipating the pedagogy of the Brazilian educator,
Paolo Friere, Bourne's idea of democratic education involved
preparation for a future society rather than a reflection and reinforcement of status quo hierarchies. Education as "preparation for
life" involved preparation for a future life rather than for the life
of the moment. If it were "self-conscious," it would determine the
nature of society itself. "To decide what kind of a school we want
is almost to decide what kind of a society we want." 57
The new education held the promise of a new society because it
would prepare the child to live as an integrated "worker-citizenparent," possible only in a society that had abandoned bourgeois
individualism. At the same time it would bring that new society into
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effect as it prepared children for the future : it would restructure
the culture of public institutions, its authority structure, and its governing philosophy, as well as re-order social relations, constructing
programs around children/ citizens rather than children/ citizens
around programs; it would refrain from treating children as adults
or from forcing them to conform to the needs of adult society; and
it would remove invidious distinctions between kinds of learning.
Put simply, democratic schools represented the theory and the
practice of radical change in Bourne's view. They could actualize
a pragmatist tenet that purposive action could shape one's environment and would bring into effect the new society. In this construction of the role of educational reform, Bourne was perhaps
more pragmatist than Dewey himself.
More important perhaps in terms of his own political thought,
Bourne's reliance on the schools suggested his belief that they
were the mechanism of change to deal with social and economic
dislocation. In contrast to his much more frequently voiced antiinstitutionalism, his educationism revealed a willing and conscious reliance on practical, institutional responses to effect
change. This openness to institutionalism as politics is a significant concession, for he often stood outside the state and outside
the institutions of mass society in his radical criticism, which frequently left him with no place to stand and no basis on which to
build a constructive political philosophy or practice. Despite his
reservations about piecemeal reform, the schools were at the center of his theory of social transformation, understood as both prefigurative and practical sites for experiments in a cooperative
learning experience.
Because the Gary schools emphasized "learning by doing" and
student activities grew out of real-life situations and because the
schools contributed to the local community, both Bourne and
Dewey thought they were workshops in democracy and, to some
extent, were inseparable from the public culture. 58 The universityextension aspect of the Gary schools made it literally a "people's
university," in Bourne's phrase.59
When the Gary plan was imported to the New York City schools
in 1916-1917, however, it became another means for progressivist
administrators to streamline costs and turn overburdened class-
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rooms into factories for education. A coalition of immigrant parents, Tammanists, and traditional teachers and principals routed
the progressive reformers in 1917, rejecting "platoon schools" and
the caste-education that immigrant parents feared would result. 60
For the first time, Bourne and Dewey disagreed over the direction
of educational reform and the issue of the appropriateness of
adopting the Gary-Wirt plan for the more heterogeneous New York
City. Dewey supported the adoption of the plan on a trial basis;
Bourne resisted it, recognizing the costs to working-class and immigrant students of tracking and part-time education. 61
With this disagreement, Bourne's educational theory became
less of an unreflective adoption of Dewey's educationism. Bourne's
lack of critical distance is evident in many of the articles he wrote
for the New Republic as education editor, reprinted in Education as
Living. Dewey's own ambiguity over the ends of education may
have contributed to Bourne's failure to appreciate the degree to
which the new educationism could induce conformism. Though
Dewey urged educators to be "guideposts" for students' interests
by shaping children to be useful to society, as Richard Hofstadter
indicated, he "had no criteria for discriminating where, when, and
toward what" children ought to be guided. 62 Bourne assumed on
the other hand that democratic education would thoroughly resocialize children rather than reinscribe and reinforce gender and
class roles. The child-as-redeemer-of-society seemed to capture
Bourne's own emphasis on releasing the forces of youth in society
at large, prefiguring a modern, democratic society.
As a result, he simultaneously expected too much of educational
reform (the breakdown of social classes) and not enough (schools
could not teach morality and should not try). Moreover, his views
were often inconsistent. Privately he regarded his own university as
an environment that nourished "beloved community," but publicly
he denounced it as an institution that reinforced the "sect-pressures" of organized institutions he tried to escape, most notably the
bourgeois family and the corporation. "The issues of the modern
university are not those of private property but of public welfare."
His profiles of Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of Columbia
University, and his sketch of a retired professor, an itinerant intellectual, reflected disillusionment with the professionalization of the
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academy and the modern university's inhospitality to thinkers. 63 In
these conflicting expectations and reservations about the power of
educational reform, Bourne's ambivalence about the power of institutionalized politics remained.

His solution to the drift of which Lippmann wrote in 1914 therefore was not mastery and not science, but freedom itself.
The youth of to-day cannot rest on their liberation; they must
see their freedom as simply the setting free of forces within
themselves for ... radical work in society. The road is cut out
before them by pioneers; they have but to let themselves grow
in that direction. 64
The very circumstances that produced youthful drift and indecision were, in Bourne's analysis, those that held the greatest opportunity for a "trans-valuation of values." "It is the glory of the present
age that one can be young. Our times give no check to the radical
tendencies of youth." The experience of bringing themselves up
reaffirmed the importance of staying young. "We believe in ourselves; and this fact, we think, is prophetic for the future." What
was needed was not new instruments of control and domination
but a further release of youthful energy. "The secret oflife is ...
the spirit of perpetual youth." 65
A scientific approach was a youthful attitude because it was
experimental and flexible. ''Youth's attitude is really the scientific
attitude. Do not be afraid to make experiments, it says. You cannot
tell anything will work until you have tried it." 66 In welcoming the
scientific attitude, he put in a plea for science in its place. "The scientific philosophy"-by which he meant "dusty positivism" modeling itself on the natural sciences, the empirical social sciences, and
the new sciences of business administration and social welfarewas no more than a substitute religion, "as much a matter of metaphysics, of theoretical conjecture, as the worst fanaticisms of
religion." Where faith had served to give people a sense of place
well into the nineteenth century, science provided the same for
people at the turn of the century. As ideology, (social) science
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replaced the Victorian emphasis on moral perfection with a secular belief in the idea of human progress. Both science and religion
were expressions of the will to power, under the guise of service to
others and the disciplining of society. "We must resist the stern
arrogances of science as vigorously as the scientist has resisted the
allurements of religion." 67
In short, his critique was not of science but of scientism as a mystical force assumed to solve problems of meaning, metaphysics,
and social utility. Science had a role to play, one that was "relegated
strictly to the practical sphere," 68 used for the "tools" it provided
"to control our environment." Its laws were "not visions of eternal
truth, so much as rough-and-ready statements of the practical
nature of things, in so far as they are useful to us for our grappling
with our environment and somehow changing it." 69 Science and
social science provided "a description simply of the machinery, the
behavior of the world, not of its palpitating life." Science was "in
no sense valid as an interpretation oflife and life's meaning." 70 Different kinds of cognition were at stake between the rational and
the experiential and differentjudgments. "The interpretation of
the world lies not in its mechanism but in its meanings, and those
meanings we find in our values and ideals." For these values, "we
must trust our own feelings rather than any rational proof." 71 Even
if practiced rigorously, science as a basis for understanding experience as it was lived was insufficient. "We must somehow comprehend a world where both the cold, mechanical facts of the physical
plane exist and the warm emotional and conscious life of desires
and ideals and hopes." Science, to be truly scientific, should be
flexible, critical, and interested in human purposes as much as
material accomplishments. "Relativity is thoroughly scientific; it is
the absolutist way of thinking that is theological." 72
Clearly Bourne's critique of science was a critique of ideology and
reification rather than a rejection of science per se. He was skeptical
of the promises of scientific rationalism and positivism because,
ironically, they were not scientific enough. "In spite of his lip-service to science," the rationalist was "fundamentally unscientific." "By
constantly attempting to disprove ... the other world," he managed
to keep it alive. 73 Bourne's critique of scientism and plea for the
modesty of the scientific enterprise marked the beginnings of his
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critique of intellectuals who were invested in reproducing power/
knowlege interests, connections that became more clear to him
through the war's reliance on intellectual participation.
In place of the "Anglo-Saxon" emphasis on Promethean mastery
and domination, exhibited in the fascination with science and
technology, he proposed a "post-scientific ideology," 14 combining
the "wonder" and "imagination" in Whitman's poetry, Maurice
Maeterlinck's mysticism,James's pragmatism, and the capacity for
objectivity and abstraction found in the "new science" of primitive
psychology. This ideology integrated instinct and intellect, D. H.
Lawrence's blood and judgment, the "personal vibrations" of the
artistic life with the "quiet sea of impersonality" of the scientific
mind. 75 As Sherman Paul has suggested, it amounted to a "new idealism, scientific in method but mystical in scope." 76

The solution Bourne proposed differed markedly from Lippmann's conclusion that Bergson's elan vital would fritter itself away
unless it came under the control of scientific discipline. Unlike his
Preface to Politics, in which he looked to intuition or creative myth
as an escape from drift, in Drift and Mastery Lippmann aligned himself with the growth of the bureaucratic corporation, the centralized state, and the hegemony of professionals and managers
promoting the "scientific spirit." Bourne, unmasking scientific expertise and the idea of rational control to remove social conflict as
ideology, argued that the current fascination was a theological fascination with faith itself. 77 Although the scientific manager might
exude charm and kindness, he warned, "his object in life is to
make men efficient [and] to make them purr while doing it." 78
Again he recommended giving up on mastery altogether: "This
belief in the power and the desirability of controlling things is illusion. Life works in a series of surprises. One's powers are given in
order that one may be alert and ready, resourceful and keen." 79
Rather, he turned to the feminist movement for the kind of "postscientific philosophy" that he hoped would transform the AngloSaxon preoccupation with mastery and control. The frank rejection
of masculine hierarchy and institutions exhibited by English and
American feminists impressed him, as he wrote from Paris:
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The feminist movement is so inspiring, for it is going, I hope,
to assert the feminine point of view,-the more personal, the
social, emotional attitude towards things, and so soften the
crudities of this hard, hierarchical, over-organized, anarchicin the sense of split-up into uncomprehending groups-civilization, which masculine domination has created in
Anglo-Saxondom. 80
The identification of the feminine with the "unofficial" and "naturally human and sensitive" has been understood to reflect Bourne's
appreciation of a women's culture. 8 1 That appreciation is also suggested by his frequent association with the feminist community in
New York, the friends such as Elizabeth Irwin, Elizabeth Westwood,
Mary Alden Hopkins, and Alyse Gregory and acquaintances such
as Frances Perkins, Katherine Anthony, Crystal Eastman, and Helen
Boardman. His admiration of their cultural politics is worth noting
at some length:
There is a most delightful group of young women here who constitute a real "salon." ... They are decidedly emancipated and
advanced, and so thoroughly healthy and zestful, or at least it
seems so to my unsophisticated masculine sense. They shock you
constantly.... They have an amazing combination of wisdom
and youthfulness, or humor and ability, and innocence and selfreliance, which absolutely belies everything you will read in the
story-books or any other descriptions of womankind. They are
of course all self-supporting and independent, and they enjoy
the adventure of life; the full, reliant, audacious way in which
they go about makes you wonder if the new woman isn't to be a
very splendid sort of person .... They talk much about the
"Human Sex," which they claim to have invented, and which is
simply a generic name for those whose masculine brutalities and
egotisms and feminine pettinesses and stupidities have been
purged away so that there is left stuff for a genuine comradeship
and healthy frank regard and understanding. 82
More than any other, this group of feminists symbolized to him the
great hope of the modem revolution. Not only would a feminized/ isl
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culture "soften" the "crudities" of masculine civilization, but it also
would place personal relations on a different plane, more cooperative, more egalitarian, and more responsive to personal needs and
differences. ''Whether we could work the feminine into our spirit and
life ... the personal, the nonofficial, the naturally human and sensitive" was his mark of that revolution's success. 83 Accepting women as
"an equally valid personality" would disrupt America's "chivalric attitude towards life," a "dread fear of life, sex, despair, and the depths
of experience."84 Since American culture associated the feminine with
"effeminacy," it placed women in a "highly artificial position, adored
and-despised, at once" 85 and "transform[ed] every feminine human
being into a lady and then ma[de] her uncomfortable or illegitimately flattered by reverencing her." To the hardened masculine
mind, a feminist revolution meant reformulating "too many codes,
too many relations." To Bourne's mind, however, "it would make life
an adventure rather than a ride in a suburban train." 86
Although he welcomed the "feminine" qualities of the New Woman, he also admired the public involvement, activism, and autonomy of feminists and suffragists, qualities associated traditionally
with masculinity. Their political activity was not cooperative but
confrontational. They put themselves on the line; they risked
arrest, went on hunger strikes, and endangered their personal
safety. The British suffragists had developed "a model for all revolutionary parties the world over." 87 In addition to his admiration of
a women's culture, then, it is clear that he was impressed by the
direct political activism of the suffragists, probably because they
reshaped political discourse and altered the exercise of power,
despite fears of the (real and perceived) powers of (public) women. His feminism was therefore complicated, associating on the
one hand femininity and the feminization of culture and consciousness with traditional female attributes, and on the other,
conceiving of feminism more broadly, in terms of activism, independence, self-reliance, and energy, qualities that ranked among
the highest cultural ideals he held. If these cultural values were traditionally associated with masculinity, he associated them with the
dionysiac-that is, with youth itself.
Indeed, the association of feminists and youth and the dionysian
was made from the start. ''Youth" was "really more typical of the
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feminines I have known than the youths," he wrote in 1911 with
reference to the feminists and suffragists he knew. 88 Feminist rebellion was a youth revolt because it frankly rejected traditional power
relations and was thoroughly anticonventional. Like the youth of
his generation-the activists, writers, radicals, and bohemiansfeminists had little power or status and certainly no class privilege,
but they were energetic, committed, cooperative, and courageous,
terms of power and dionysian vitalism. 89 Suffragists also were
demonstrating that power was not inimical to femininity; they
offered "stunning proof that even the most constant participation
in the me lee of public life doesn't necessarily make women
unwomanly. I think it rather tends to make them great." 9° Female
power, associated with chaos and disorder, was feared with the
appearance of the New Woman. Bourne may have agreed, but he
welcomed it as he welcomed the dionysiac in an excessively apollonian culture.
Although he did not fully unmoor the traditional cultural understandings of gender and gender difference, he subverted the easy
association of certain characteristics with certain gendered subjects. Citing the differences between men and women as erotic differences, he showed the importance of freeing individuals from
the regulative fictions of sexual difference.
So much of the cruelty in human relations seems to me to
spring from the unequal endowment of desire and appreciation in men and women, and this arises largely from the
inequalities of position and social milieu. 91

If he positioned women conventionally, on the side of sensitivity
and cultivation, he saw that difference as a contingent one, subject
to an economic order that prized independence and autonomy. In
offering a view of gender difference as a difference in desire, however, he anticipated the return to the theoretical exploration of the
semiotic, the jouissance of the presymbolic order, to which feminist poststructuralists have turned in the latter part of this century.
Nothing may more clearly distinguish Bourne's social radicalism
from Lippmann's progressivism than their views on the feminist
movement, women's economic power, and the treatment of
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women's "roles" or "natures." Lippmann revealed a fundamental
ambivalence to "the woman's movement" and the idea of women
as politically active and an open hostility to the idea of women as
full participants in the economic substructure.
The first impulse of emancipation seems to be in the main
that woman should model her career on man's. But she cannot do that for the simple reason that she is a woman .... She
cannot taboo her own character in order to become suddenly
an amateur male.
There were "plenty of men on this earth," he continued, setting to
rest the thought of welcoming women into industry or the professions. "I, for one, should say that the presence of women in the
labor market is an evil to be combatted by every means at our command."92 For women to achieve mastery, they must learn to integrate
the discipline of science into the home. By rationalizing marketing
chores and organizing childcare, they could take advantage of scientific advances and alleviate some of the burdens of homemaking.
Women could, and should, exercise their powers as consumers,
Lippmann insisted, and in that capacity they might strengthen the
consumer influence overall in politics. But mastery for women
emphatically did not mean extending to them political rights or
agency as producers, much less economic resources, other than
those that pertained to their primary roles as housekeepers. 9~
Lippmann used mastery as the measure of social progress;
Bourne used the liberation of women because women were more
subject to institutional controls than even he, an outsider freed
from many Protestant expectations. For women it was much more
difficult to reject gendered conventions. In the final analysis,
Bourne's youth revolution was conceived as much in terms of a sexual revolution as a generational rebellion. By feminizing culture,
members of his generation would socialize it; by feminizing consciousness, they would restore the personal point of view into
human relations. By feminizing politics, they would make it more
active and confrontational. In short, in backing the feminist revolution, he was also reasserting the dionysian virtues of the younger
generation.
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The shift from youth to young intellectual began increasingly to
carry the weight of his social agenda, and by 1915, he began referring to young intellectuals rather than to the more abstract youth
as his historical agent, particularly as the youth of Europe and
America began to turn toward nationalism and militarism during
the course of the war. His reference to young intellectuals, as the
vanguard not only of their generation but of intellectuals as a
whole, implied that there were individuals of a certain age and type
who could carry the cultural and social agenda forward. His attention to their role and responsibilities constituted his response to
the increasing importance of intellectuals in the war effort. The
progressives in particular saw the war as the "great integrative
enterprise" they were looking for to turn their talents to practical
effect. Bourne's criticism of their rush to war brought him to break
openly with the pragmatic-progressive wing of the liberal intelligentsia. His most trenchant critique was the culmination of his
effort to battle for the allegiance of his own generation.

6
INTELLECTUALS AT WAR

The war has revealed a younger intelligentsia
trained up in the pragmatic dispensation,
immensely ready for the executive ordering
of events, pitifully unprepared for the intellectual interpretation or the idealistic
focussing of ends .... Practically all this element, one would say, is lined up in service of
the war-technique. There seems to have been
a peculiar congeniality between the war and
these men. It is as if the war and they have
been waiting for each other.
-Randolph S. Bourne, "Twilight ofIdols"
What is the matter with the philosophy? One
has the sense of having come to a sudden,
short stop at the end of an intellectual era. In
the crisis, this philosophy of intelligent control just does not measure up to our needs.
What is the root of this inadequacy that is felt
so keenly by our restless minds? Van Wyck
Brooks has pointed out searchingly the lack
of poetic vision in our pragmatist awakeners.
Is there something in these realistic attitudes
that works actually against poetic vision,
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against the concern for the quality of life as
above machinery of life? Apparently there is.
-Randolph S. Bourne, "Twilight of Idols "

During America's brief but traumatic involvement in World War I,
Bourne's growing political reputation became linked inextricably
to issues of war and nonintervention. By 1915 his name was associated in the public's mind with the voice of America's conscience,
the war's most uncompromising enemy, and, ultimately, its martyr. 1
His opposition to the war was not based on pacifism or on principles of conscientious objection. 2 Rather, as Thomas Bender rightly
notes, Bourne was concerned with the relation of war and culture;3
in that sense, his position effectively redefined the terms of the
debate over war and peace.
No other writer at the time offered a principled defense of academic freedom when Charles Dana and William Cattell were fired
by Columbia University for "aiding and abetting the enemy." 4 No
other critic linked American liberal politics to military absolutism.
And no other writer recognized that something new had happened
in the technical organization and management of modem war that
made the collaboration of intellectuals crucial to its success. Modern war, Bourne determined, finding its apotheosis in the liberal
state, had made patriotism obsolete and democratic support irrelevant. Depending, above all, on advanced technology, intensified
industrialization, and the centralization of political and military
authority, it was run by a cadre of bureaucrats, scientific experts,
and policy advisers who managed and administered the militarization of society. "War is the health of the state," he wrote, appropriating Heinrich von Treitschke's phrase but rejecting his
conclusions. 5 War was not a moral obligation but the state's raison
d'etre. Thus opposition to war and the policies of the modem warfare state entailed, at the same time, opposition to the profit and
privilege of the intellectuals whose cooperation was essential to its
success. By laying bare the relation between the modem liberal state
and war and between elite support for war and a militant nationalism, Bourne challenged not only the hegemony of that association
but also the ascendancy of his own class of young intellectuals.
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The failure of America's intellectuals to stand outside the growing support for war was, in part, a failure of pragmatism, the philosophical form of progressive liberalism at the time. As originally
formulated, pragmatism, according to John Diggins, was a theory
of knowledge to Dewey,James, and Peirce; to James, it was also a
theory of meaning. As a theory of knowledge, it maintained that the
propositions of philosophy, history, morality, and politics could be
validated by testing their operations and thus consequences in the
daily world of experience. As a theory of meaning, it validated the
subjective experience, restoring what James called the "personal
point of view." James, Dewey, and Jane Addams turned to pragmatism rather than to closed systems of thought to create meaningful,
personal connections to public life. To the young progressives who
followed James and Dewey, pragmatism offered a way of healing the
affliction Addams had diagnosed as the subjective alienation of middle-class youth overwhelmed by social forces and provided a means
of relieving the objective misery of the urban poor. For its young
proponents, pragmatism offered a way out of bureaucratic rationality and a way into a more personally fulfilled life. 6
Yet in its first crucial test, pragmatism failed on both counts. As
a theory of knowledge, it failed to test ideas and their consequences
adequately (the idea of whether intervention was necessary-for
peace?) or to generate alternatives (should economic production
be centralized or the schools be militarized-for democracy?).
More important, perhaps, it failed to restore the personal connection to public life that gave it such appeal to the children of the
middle class in the first place. With preparation for war, personal
connections were sacrificed for bureaucratic service. Social experimentation was replaced by instrumentalism, personal and political
values by process. The desire of young progressives and pragmatists
to become involved and to be effective-to have mastery, in Lippmann 's terms-led them to serve the state and ignore other alternatives of engagement. In Bourne's analysis, war thus became more
than a practical avenue to realize personal ambition and class
power. It became a fantasy into which the intellectual class escaped
to resolve the infantilization the state produced by denying them
an authoritative role to play as citizen-rulers. The psychic damage
that resulted from a nation at total war, he suggested, was just the
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kind of consequence that should be part of a pragmatic evaluation
of the merits of intervention.
The identification of pragmatism with militarism is not a historical distortion.John Dewey made the connection repeatedly in the
pages of the New Republic in 1917-1918 in an influential series of articles advocating and supporting U.S. entry into the war and justifying intervention in the name of pragmatism. The thrust of his
argument was to show the compatibility of pragmatism and the war,
offering pragmatism as the means that could turn the war into a
great social experiment in democratic reconstruction. Unconvinced,
Bourne called him to account. Invoking "the spirit of William
James," Dewey's former student wrote his own series of essays in the
Seven Arts, protesting the bureaucratic version of pragmatism as
abandoning the emphasis on creative experimentation and contingent truths. His challenge addressed both sides of pragmatism 's
promise: it tried to rescue pragmatism's theory of truth (Dewey's
reliance on science or "creative intelligence") and to recover James's
attention to the "personal point of view" (and "creative desire"). In
his Seven Arts articles, Bourne concluded that Dewey and other
prowar liberals had "moved out their philosophy, bag and baggage
from education to war," by abandoning "vision" for the fascination
with "technique." 7
Dewey never responded publicly to Bourne's charges. Instead he
arranged to have him removed as editor of the Dial, one of the few
journals willing to publish his antiwar essays by 1917-1918.8 By then
Bourne had become quite isolated, as the U.S.Justice Department
had prosecuted the Masses, for which Bourne also wrote, under the
Sedition Act of 1918, closing its offices and sending its editors to
trial twice for sedition;9 the prowar New Republic had stopped publishing all but his education articles by 1917; and the funding for
the Seven Arts was withdrawn abruptly in 1917 as a direct consequence of its backer's fears of reprisals caused by Bourne's articles.
"The magazines I write for die violent deaths, and all my thoughts
seem unprintable," Bourne wrote a friend in 1918. 10 Within a few
weeks after his removal from the Dial, Bourne was dead, a victim of
the influenza epidemic of 1918 at the age of thirty-two. 11
The conflict between Dewey and Bourne remains, on one level,
a minor episode in American cultural history. On another, it
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represents a decisive turning point in the integration of intellectuals and power, a collaboration that is of interest to all intellectuals and activists who must grapple with questions of intellectual
honesty, political accommodation, and the relation of theory and
practice. The historic integration of liberal, progressive, and socialist intellectuals and power during World War I and the consequences for democratic politics is addressed here. If Bourne is
right-that total war can be waged without democratic support,
but only with the support of intellectuals, administrators, and
experts-then the need for political theorists to reformulate the
notion of human agency and examine the sites in which it can be
effective becomes a crucial issue to confront.
In this chapter I also analyze the historic relation between pragmatism and war, and by extension, the relation between liberalism
and war. It is important to be clear about what I wish to interrogate
in this analysis. Although I do not mean to suggest that there is a
necessary relation between pragmatism and war because of the historical alliance between pragmatism and militarism and pragmatism and liberalism in the early twentieth century, the still-pertinent
question arises: what are the conditions under which a philosophy,
grounded in a stance of flexibility, inquiry, and practical critique,
can become accommodationist and support dominant or hegemonic political values or politics? In other words, it is clear that in
light of the many significant revisions to pragmatism in the last two
decades, ranging from Jurgen Habermas's analysis of the importance of attending to an interest-based knowledge in Knowkdge and
Human Interests to Richard Rorty's embrace of the free play of political commitments in Irony, Solidarity and Commitment, pragmatism(s)
may be critical of dominant political values (as is often the case
with the work of Habermas) or supportive of them (as is often the
case with Rorty's). The question I wish to raise is under what conditions in which knowledge is produced and represented today can
pragmatic inquiry be both flexible and critical? This issue is both
political and pragmatic and remains pertinent today.
In Bourne's analysis, I suggest, pragmatism became associated
with war as a result of two historical calamities: the unpragmatic distortion of a pragmatism divorced from guiding principles or "poetic vision," and the war itself, which created its own "inexorables"
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against which, ultimately, any pragmatism could not stand. His
argument about the relation of war and pragmatism was thus a
complex one. It combined an immanent critique, that is, a pragmatic challenge to the instrumentalism practiced during the war,
and an external critique, outside the discourse of pragmatism, that
investigated the nature of the modern state in which a pragmatic
philosophy functioned . Although historians have suggested that
the controversy between Dewey and Bourne was essentially a family affair, that is, one taking place between pragmatists and on
"Deweyan terms," 12 it was also by extension about the nature of liberalism and its political values, a relation that was central to C.
Wright Mills's critique of Dewey's pragmatism. 13
Although disillusioned with the wartime pragmatism in the face
of the inexorables of total war, Bourne recommended that a reconstructed pragmatism be formulated to keep "intellectual suspense"
alive and to prevent the "premature crystallization" of ideas. 14 It
resembled his "post-scientific ideology," in many respects, in that
social experimentation, like the old pragmatism, would be central
to the testing of ideas. Unlike the old pragmatism, however, its theory of truth would recognize that values and interests were embedded in one's knowledge and that knowledge was shaped by one's
socioeconomic position and relation to power. It was a stance that
also recalled his earlier conception of irony, requiring both political engagement and intellectual skepticism but stubbornly refusing
political oppositions: passive/ active, prowar/ antiwar. Encouraging
"malcontents" to take a position "below the battle," a position of
apparent powerlessness, Bourne argued that they could generate
alternatives more freely, more critically, even if they had no effect
on the course of military strategy or foreign policy. This difficult
position, admittedly a stance only for the most radical of social critics, was not a position of acquiescence or political passivity, as many
scholars have argued, but a stance of active undecideability, as Ross
Posnock persuasively argues.
In Posnock's analysis, Bourne's "legacy'' of flexible critique was continued in Dewey's postwar pragmatism in the idea of a "cultivated
naivete," Max Horkheimer's "immanent critique," and the restless
stance of Michel Foucault's "specific intellectual," who sought to avoid
totalizing, closed systems of thought while remaining politically
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engaged. This unusual lineage, Posnock suggests, shows Bourne to
be part of a "style of cultural and political inquiry, whose guiding
value is nonidentity and whose philosophical orientation is a pragmatic emphasis on creative, experimental action produced by historically embedded subjects." 15 The pragmatism of the sort Bourne
expounded, operating "below the battle," was not shielded from the
realities of power but rooted in it. The "malcontented" intellectual
did not transcend into the realm of ideas or retreat into paralysis,
Bourne insisted, but remained embedded in the practical. "This does
not mean any smug retreat from the world, with the belief that the
truth is in us and can only be contaminated by contact.''16 It meant
that the nature and terrain of political agency was redefined to
account for the situated nature of knowledge and identity. Understood in this way, Bourne's construction of pragmatism and his critique of it can offer significant contributions to the continuing debate
over pragmatism as critical theory and to the "politics of nonidentity."

From its beginning, World War I was a war of ideas in America. No
physical territory was threatened, no diplomatic alliances were
abridged, and none of the traditional indices of military interventionism was at stake. Accordingly, the war involved the mobilization of minds. It was advertised by the Wilson administration,
debated in liberal journals, and promulgated in the schools as a
"war to end all wars," a struggle between the forces of "light" and
"darkness," democracy and "autocracy" and "civilization" and "barbarism," whose ultimate objective in order to "make the world safe
for democracy" was "peace without victory." 17 This highly inflated
rhetoric and abstract level of debate, according to one historian,
was particularly congenial to the progressives and liberals of the
New Republic, 18 who believed, as Croly explained, that "a certain
amount of conscious patriotism in our critical standards is necessary in order to enable us to have the effect which we should like
to have." 19 Although he later had doubts about continuing involvement in the war, as Edward Stettner shows, 20 at the outset Croly
hoped that he and the other editors, Walter Weyl and Lippmann,
as conscious patriots, could have an influence beyond New York's
intellectual community; they hoped to shape the practical politics
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of Washington elites. As their opening editorial stated in 1914,
their aim was to "bring sufficient enlightenment to the problems
of the nation" in a way that was both "popular" and "serious." 2 1
But more was at stake than high-minded rhetoric. Real economic
benefits were an integral part of the foreign policies of the Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations, each designed to enhance
and consolidate corporate wealth by stabilizing the social orders
that supported it. As William Leuchtenberg shows, the link between
progressivism and imperialism had been clearly established by 1912
with the Progressive party supporting imperialist ambitions in Cuba,
Mexico, Santo Domingo, and the Far East. 22 Roosevelt's New Nationalism was based explicitly on Croly's synthesis of domestic
reform and imperialism, as mutually compatible endeavors, outlined in Promise of American Life (1909). Moreover, when Croly, the
foremost intellectual architect of liberal progressivism in the early
twentieth century, undertook the editorship of the New Republic in
summer 1914, it was on the understanding of its sponsor, Willard
D. Straight, that the journal would be a platform "to explore and
develop and apply the ideas of Theodore Roosevelt when he was
the leader of the Progressive Party."
According to Leuchtenberg, it was Croly more than any other
spokesperson who integrated rhetorical excess with the interest in
practical politics. 23 In vague and often evangelical terms, Croly's
Promise called for a national revival, including a new ascendancy for
the American state imposing order domestically and internationally. In the area of international relations, Croly advised that to
achieve a "more definite and a more responsible place in the international system," the '"old-fashioned democratic' scruples and prejudices" must not be permitted to stand in the way of developing a
"stable American international system." The recent "pacification of
Cuba" and "the attempt to introduce a little order into the affairs
of the turbulent Central American republic" were necessary to put
down "revolutionary upheavals" and to make South American countries "more stable and more wholesome." The national revival he
advanced required a "policy of extra-territorial expansion" to give
a "tremendous impulse to the world of national reform." Domestic
reform and international expansion mutually reinforced each other
in a single, sustained national program and philosophy. 24
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The belief that linked imperialism and progressivism and made
possible the support of progressives and liberals for an American
involvement in a European war was based on the underlying and
shared conviction that action was valuable in itselfand that the only
legitimate test of a course of action was in its consequences or practical effects. The faith in action for its own sake was so strong among
American liberals that at times it overshadowed a second, and
equally strong, article of progressive faith, the belief that the American form of democracy was the only legitimate form of government
for free nations. Many progressives and pragmatic liberals assumed
that democratic results would be achieved regardless of the means
employed-the logic being that, as the Spanish-American War had
proved, not only were people freed from tyranny because of the war,
but "since the United States was the land of free institutions, any
extension of its domain was per se an extension of freedom and
democracy." 25 But frequently there was no examination of the necessary link between means and ends, a cardinal tenet of pragmatism as James and Dewey had initially formulated it. The
appreciation that means were a requisite determinant of ends was
lost in the modified pragmatism of the preparedness debate.
In the first months of the war, the New Republic editors attempted
to evaluate national policy options pragmatically, that is, in terms
of their practical consequences or probable results. When the
European war still seemed remote to American interests in 1914,
their editorials inquired into the consequences of a policy of American neutrality as advocated by fellow progressives and President
Wilson when he first assumed office. Especially concerned to deal
with the arguments of the pacifists, with whom Wilson and many
progressives had allied themselves before the war ( on the shared
belief that negotiation and arbitration were key in attaining world
harmony and universal prosperity), the editors also questioned the
results of the pacifists' urging of a peaceful negotiation of differences through international arbitration and treaties. In both cases,
the editors asked if neutrality or arbitration would contribute to
( total) victory. Indeed they might have asked if neutrality or arbitration would contribute to a swift cessation of hostilities. The argument for intervention, in other words, was virtually preselected on
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the basis of a shared consensus on ends, and the defense of U.S.
involvement was made possible on the "pragmatic" grounds that it
would speed along victory (rather than peace). Thus defined, it
took little time before the editors advanced, on a pragmatic basis,
the argument that intervention would also spread the cause of
democracy.
Readers of the self-defined 'Journal of opinion" expressed concern with its vacillating editorial stands, which seemed to change
with each turn in contemporary events. 26 The noted historian
James Harvey Robinson blamed the editors for failing to define
their governing philosophy or underlying principles. The New
Republic, he wrote:
appears to have no set convictions, no clearly defined political, religious, social, economic, or artistic principles, ancient
or modern; it espouses no current issue. Nevertheless it seems
to have no end in view. May it not be that the chief public distinction and importance of the New Republic consists precisely
in not standing for anything. 27
Amos Pinchot, the pacifist, complained that they were far too
coy about which ac~ion(s) they endorsed, remaining safely in the
realm of"clever academic controversy."28 To Bourne, who had been
sidelined as a sometime-contributor to the magazine because of
his antiwar views, it seemed that the editors cared more about commitment and action for its own sake than for any particular policy
or set of programmatic objectives (a view that Dewey came to share
a decade later). 29 Thus the editors, from a position of "pragmatic
realism," excoriated the pacifists' neutrality as being ineffectual3°
while at the same time they condemned Wilson for advocating neutrality in word as well as deed. 31 The problem seemed to be that
neither position allowed the United States a decisive role in shaping international events, and the "new republicans" were chafing
under the prospects of being ineffective, or worse, irrelevant, in
world affairs. 32 Dewey, however, the nation's preeminent philosopher, defended his New Republic colleagues' ambivalence until May
1917, arguing that "our national hesitation" was justified so long
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as it could not be shown decisively and assuredly that American
involvement in the war would advance American notions of democracy and civilization. 33
Two months later, he changed his mind and began explicitly to
defend U.S. entry into hostilities on the novel grounds that war
provided an opportunity for socialization and the art of social engineering that would facilitate democratic restructuring. Dewey was
not alone in this argument, as even W. E. B. DuBois, among others, was eventually persuaded of its merits. The war, Dewey wrote,
provided the opportunity for a "more conscious and extensive use
of science of communal purposes" and for "the creation of instrumentalities for enforcing the public interest in all the agencies of
modern production and exchange." 34 In other words, the new
experts, trained in the art of modern administration and scientific
management, could use the opportunity of war to shape public
institutions and their policies toward one common objective: the
communal, democratic republic that lay at the heart of Dewey's
political pragmatism.
Clearly, Dewey was attempting to rescue from war what was valuable in it, namely, the economic well-being of the nation. Private
capital would enjoy the increased support and control from a state
run by managerial elites, to save it from its own excesses, and the
sense of fellowship and solidarity that it could engender, a collectivism that was missing from the public experience. He became so
convinced of the orderly and cooperative results that would come
from an efficiently run national community mobilized around war
and a wartime economy, however, that it took only a small step for
him to come out for full-scale intellectual support of the war as an
instrument of international progressivism. Intellectuals, he argued,
could shape the war to their own ends, turning it into the national
enterprise of integration that they craved. 35
Writing against pacifists rather than antiwar liberals, Dewey condemned them for their "failure to recognize the immense impetus
to reorganization afforded by this war; failure to recognize the
closeness and extent of true international combination which it
necessitates." 36 Their opposition, he seemed to say, had greater
stakes than they realized. Their pacifism undermined their anti-
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militarism, in his logic, for the war could be an agent of prosperity and peace.
To antiwar dissidents in general, he argued that war could
become an efficient means of placing private production under
public control. "We shall have a better organized world internally
as well as externally, a more integrated, less anarchic system" if the
war were permitted to facilitate the design of a "federation of selfgoverning industries with the government acting as an adjustor
and arbiter rather than direct owner and manager." Science could
be put to work in wartime, in the production and distribution of
war materiel, supplies, and information, and in the administration
of personnel in a centralized state. Finally, urging intellectuals to
take hold of the "social possibilities of war" and shape them in
accordance with social-democratic values, he insisted,
The pacifists [have] wasted rather than invested their potentialities when they turned so vigorously to opposing entrance
in to a war which was already all but universal, instead of using
their energies to form, at a plastic juncture, the conditions
and objects of our entrance. 37
A more effective strategy would have been to join the movement
of the possible and thus gain effective power.
These arguments reveal two tensions in Dewey's thought. First,
although Dewey believed that the war would bring an expansion
of democracy, that is, an expansion of democratic ends, there was
no clear sense in his writings of what democratic control of war
meant. Moreover, the scientific control of war, or economic production, or even public education involved little or no democratic
participation but the control of technocratic elites. A war to save
the world for democracy was relying on the professionals, consultants, public-opinion specialists. Means and ends, therefore, were
not equilibrated. Second, Dewey believed in the "plasticity" of the
course of the war, permitting intervention by intellectuals to steer
its course. At the same time, there was a conviction in his thought
that the direction of the war was virtually determined, with or without the support of liberals. These contradictions may reflect his
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fundamental ambivalence over the issue of war and intervention,
but they also reveal a surprising lack of flexibility, or lack of conviction in traditional pragmatic thought, such that the disinterested
testing of ideas in the real world was foreclosed.
In his ambivalence, Dewey became ironically more accommodationist. In "Conscience and Compulsion," concerning domestic
nativist violence and the suppression of civil liberties, he hardened
his position. He urged other uncertain intellectuals to "connect
conscience with the forces that were moving in another direction,"
that is, temporarily to support a national security state, including
its control of the mails, the prosecution of sedition, and injunctions of dissent, despite their distaste for suppressing civil liberties
and the undemocratic nature of that policy. The rationale behind
his recommendation was that by joining "conscience" to the
"forces" that were violating it, one gained familiarity with what one
was fighting for (or against). This option, however, was a little like
suggesting that intellectuals get "inside the whale," in George
Orwell's phrase, for without leverage to combat those forces and
without an understanding of cause or effect, the liberal pragmatist, the problem-solver, did not have the capacity to get beyond.
Dewey seemed to recognize this, and by summer 1917 acceded to
what was predetermined. "The appeal is no longer to reason; it is
to the event." Reason, or what Dewey often called "critical intelligence," had become useless in war. In war, force was all. 38
Dewey's defense of military involvement was thus multivalent
and contradictory. He seemed to argue that democratic ends
(social reform) could come out of undemocratic means (war and
the suppression of civil liberties) if critical intelligence were used
and democratic concessions were temporary. Yet, the more events
progressed, the less pragmatic his arguments became and the more
he accepted the path of least resistance. By November 1917, Dewey
seemed not only to accept the inevitability of war (an unpragmatic
concession) but also to conclude that the best way to comprehend
it was to identify with it.
Dewey's adjustment came gradually, but the affinity between the
war and the young liberal pragmatists was more immediate. In
Bourne's analysis, their "congeniality" was the result of several factors, including the uncritical adoption of an instrumentalist phi-
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losophy, a certain social psychology specific to this class, and the
nature of total war itself. These arguments are interwoven in a
wide-ranging critique that, in the last months of his life, included
an examination of the nature of the modern state, but in the interests of clarity, I will treat each strand of his critique separately.
Lippmann initially proffered the social reconstructionist argument in April 1917, the same month that Wilson requested and
received from Congress a declaration of war, contending that military mobilization promised more than purely political benefits and
ought to be viewed in terms of its broader social consequences.
The war could usher in the "national integration" that could keep
America from drift. It promised even more a means for advancing
individual careers, offering possibilities
to the inventive civilians, to those very reformers and pioneers who all along have preached the very gospel which is
now transformed from an amiable hobby into a world necessity. It is a war of engineers, inventors, organisers, social
experts, a war of co-operation, technique, productivity and
sacrifice. 39
Here was the great opportunity Croly's "exceptional individuals"
and Lippmann's generation of "restless" idealists had been waiting
for, a chance to redefine national priorities and affirmatively set
the course for social and moral regeneration at home and abroad.
The war could be a laboratory in which to experiment with ideas
about social order, its great, bold adventure giving direction to
their drift and a rationale for putting into practical use their talents and expertise of mastery they had acquired under the tutelage of progressive social scientists. Service to the war became the
higher ideal a philosophy of instrumentalism had been looking for,
a chance to see its ideas implemented directly in the aid of a common national purpose.
In an unsigned editorial (written probably by Lippmann) in the
same month, the editors of the New Republic claimed authorship of
the war. "Credit" for the war, and presumably for its benefits,
should be given to the class that had taken America into it, that is,
not the "bankers or capitalists" but the intellectuals themselves.
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The effective and decisive work on behalf of war has been
accomplished by an entirely different class-a class which may
be comprehensively described as "intellectuals." ... The
American nation is entering the war under the influence of a
moral verdict reached after the utmost deliberation of the
more thoughtful members of the community. 10
Even at a time when intellectuals were beginning to assert a
sense of class identity and social importance, the claim was audacious. Bourne replied in "The War and the Intellectuals":
A war made deliberately by intellectuals! A calm moral verdict, arrived at after penetrating study of the inexorable facts!
. .. An intellectual class, gently guiding ideas into what other
nations had entered only through predatory craft or popular
hysteria or military madness.

It was a polemical response, but the essay voiced an American intellectual's skepticism over the myth of the (political) independence
of intellectuals. "The American intellectuals, in their preoccupation with reality have forgotten that the real enemy is War rather
than imperial Germany. There is work to be done to prevent this
war of ours from passing into popular mythology as a holy crusade." Had they wanted to mold public opinion, they might have
"spent the time in endeavoring to clear the public mind of the cant
of war, to get rid of old mystical notions that clog our thinking. We
might have used the time for a great wave of education, for setting
our house in spiritual order." If they wanted to "lead the administration, they might conceivably have tried to find some way of
securing peace by making neutrality effective .... They might have
failed. The point is that they scarcely tried." 41 Throwing off the difficult task of pragmatically preparing the nation for peace, they
formed an alliance with "the least democratic forces" in society,
those "primitive" interests that advanced the notions of a national
state and the doctrines of economic privilege. Rather than take
credit for the war, he recommended that they ask how "intelligent
service" had replaced critical intelligence.
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He blamed their education, the new progressivist education, for
their inattention to political ends or values worthy of pursuit.
Their education has not given them a system of large ideas,
or a feeling for democratic goals .... They are vague as to
what kind of society they want, or what kind of society America needs. But they are equipped with all the administrative
attitudes and talents necessary to attain them.
They were "liberal, enlightened, aware," but their thought had become "little more than a description and a justification of what is
going on." They threw their energies into implementation, and the
"admirable adaption of means to ends" replaced experimentation.
Turning the boast back on itself, he argued that the war had, in
effect, created them.
The war has revealed a younger intelligentsia trained up in
the pragmatic dispensation, immensely ready for the executive ordering of events, pitifully unprepared for the intellectual interpretation or the idealistic focussing of ends ....
Practically all of this element is lined up in service of the wartechnique. There seems to be a peculiar congeniality between
the war and these men. It is as if the war and they have been
waiting for each other. 42
The idea that the intellectuals had been, in effect, created by the
war recalls Foucault's genealogy of the discourses of modern
power/knowledge, where the discourse (practices) of the disciplines ( the social sciences, administration, advertisement, intelligence, and surveillance expertise) not only manage, medicalize,
and discipline subjects as objects-patients, criminals, soldiers, and
so on-but also the experts themselves. 43 For Foucault, however,
the idea of human agency as a force moving history was an illusion;
for Bourne, it became an illusion in modern times.
Part of Bourne's effort, of course, was to return the young intellectuals to their pragmatic roots by urging them to be more pragmatic or more true to pragmatism's standard of testing ideas in
terms of their consequences in the material world. As a student
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and an ardent believer in pragmatism, he had maintained that it
emphasized the importance of social experimentation rather than
rational proof as the ground for the truth of an idea and the importance of recognizing the intersubjective (not objective) nature
of truth.
Truth to Qames] is thoroughly comprehended experience, it is
created as we go along, it is what proves its verity by being verified. We thus speak of more truth or less truth, not of Truth and
Error. Relativity is thoroughly scientific; it is the absolutest way
of thinking that is theological, and my quarrel with the rationalist is that ... he is fundamentally unscientific. 44
Pragmatism's appeal was in the emphasis o_n the role of subjectivity in the construction of truth and on social experience as the testing ground of ideas in which continent, workable truths could be
articulated. Pragmatism did not lead to a set of fixed truths but to
a flexible set of contingent truths, to be tried out in one's shifting
alliances and encounters with other people. Its promise was in its
ability to neutralize the orthodoxy of any philosophy to which it
was affixed.
By September and October 1917, Bourne had explicitly named
Dewey as leading the intellectual class to embrace "militaristic values and new tastes for power." His "Twilight ofldols," triggered by
Dewey's tolerance for the suspension of civil liberties' protections,
reflected the "war and laughter" of Nietzsche's.original, exposing
the cultural damage caused by the war at home as well as the consequences to pragmatism itself.
To separate the issue of pragmatism from its role in the war,
Bourne raised two objections. First, he noted that the subordination of vision to technique in Dewey's pragmatism was an abandonment of the philosophy that had inspired young radicals
during the prewar years to become actively involved in social
change. It is worth quoting the essay at length:
To those of us who have taken Dewey's philosophy almost as
our American religion, it never occurred that values could be
subordinated to technique. We were instrumentalists, but we
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had our private utopias so clearly before our minds that the
means fell always into its place as contributory. And Dewey, of
course, always meant his philosophy, when taken as a philosophy of life, to start with values. But there was always that
unhappy ambiguity in his doctrine as to just how values were
created, and it became easier and easier to assume that just
any growth was justified and almost any activity valuable so
long as it achieved ends .... It is now becoming plain that
unless you start with the vividest kind of poetic vision, your
instrumentalism is likely to land you just where it has landed
this younger intelligentsia which is so happily and busily
engaged in the national enterprise of war. You must have your
vision and your technique. The practical effect of Dewey's philosophy has evidently been to develop the sense of the latter
at the expense of the former. 45
If pragmatism "worked," it did so as long as one had one's "private
utopia" in hand. Without it, it was a philosophy of mere strategy.
In a modern wartime instrumentalism, Bourne found

no provision for thought or experience getting beyond itself.
If your ideal is to be adjusted to your situation, in radiant
cooperation with reality, then your success is likely to be just
that and no more. You never transcend anything. You grow,
but your spirit never jumps out of your skin to go on wild
adventures. 46
Moreover, bureaucratic pragmatism made no provision for the personal point of view that James wrote about because it required conformity and routinized responses to hierarchical command. 47
"There is nothing in the outlook that touches in any way the happiness of the individual, the vivifying of the personality, the comprehension of social forces, the flair of art-in other words, the quality
oflife."
But, of course, pragmatism's emphasis on the ability to judge
consequences told one nothing about how to select among them
or order them. Pragmatism had nothing to offer with regard to the
criteria needed to judge political values. There were only private
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values. 48 Moreover, in a liberal society, where private values are valorized, pragmatism accommodates them. For Bourne pragmatism
had "worked" because it was a philosophy guided by (radical)
social principles, which preceded and informed one's pragmatic
adjustments. It was a philosophy with fundamental precepts and
ethical principles to substantiate one's pragmatic orientation
toward experience. But the pragmatism of Dewey and James
required nothing of the kind of centered, principled orientation
that Bourne now insisted was a part of it. Pragmatism, as Dewey
and James had formulated it, was expressly designed to do away
with a priori principles. It looked to experience as a guide. It
employed the criterion of consequences to bypass the recurrent
questions of philosophical or moral principle. It was designed to
demonstrate the practical value of certain social truths, to democratize authority through collective inquiry and education, and to
resolve personal anxiety and philosophical doubt by emphasizing
the authority of the subjective experience.
Yet the reminder was that pragmatism in theory promised a
choice of ends as well as means, a choice guided by one's political
values. "Dissatisfied with the given means or ends, one chooses
another to effect." To many philosophers and political theorists
today, it is precisely this tolerance toward ends that constitutes its
appeal. It is agnostic with respect to values, and even to ranking
them. Ethical judgments or evaluations of merit are left to others.
As a pragmatist, one can be foundationalist or antifoundationalist,
humanist or deconstructionist. One can select among a variety of
private utopias-democratic, liberal, or feminist. This tolerance
has attracted some philosophers and theorists to pragmatism and
driven others away from it. 49
Bourne's second objection to the arguments of the social reconstructionists was that pragmatism ultimately did not work in times
of war. It was a philosophy suitable for times of peace and prosperity, when there was a "fund of progressive good will" and a
"strong desire for progress," when it could promote experimentation and social reform because institutions were flexible and
human resources were plentiful. Schools could be turned into laboratories for educational reform because technicians could control the conditions under which they worked. The means and the
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practical working out of ideas as an experiment were part and parcel of the ends achieved. But because war "determines its own ends
and means," even the old pragmatism was ineffective. In a war administration, where the military environment was not controllable,
pragmatism was useless. "War is just that absolute situation which
is its own end and its own means, and which speedily outstrips the
power of intelligent and creative control. ... Once entered upon,
neither means nor ends can really be revised nor altered." 50 The
"inevitables" of total war swept along all other ends in its wake.
Hence, the boast of the "realists" that they could direct the war and
Dewey's optimism that the war could be turned to democratic ends
Bourne viewed with deep skepticism. "If the war is too strong for
you to prevent, how is it going to be weak enough for you to control and mould to your liberal purposes?"
His second criticism was different from his earlier, more principled objection to the bureaucratic pragmatism of the younger
intelligentsia. Initially Bourne had argued that the pragmatism of
"intelligent service" and "adjustment" had become instrumentalism: it had failed to test ideas or to establish its own (independent)
ends. In short, pragmatism failed because it was not principled
enough. Now he argued that pragmatism would not work even ifit
were tried because it was ineffective, that is, unable to stop the war
or change its course; and it was unable to mount a program of
social reform because institutions were no longer subject to popular control. This objection was more pragmatic, perhaps, if by that
one means that it was an inquiry into pragmatism's "workability."
Bourne's argument was a claim that the testing of an idea's truth,
and therefore merit, through its practical consequences-the principal pragmatic method-was useless, particularly during wartime.
These objections to an instrumental pragmatism have been criticized as unpragmatic distortions of the pragmatic philosophy.
Daniel Levine, for instance, defended Dewey against the first
charge of an empty, visionless politics by claiming that Dewey's
ends were individual freedom; the means he advocated were also
individual freedom. Rick Tilman, by contrast, argued that Dewey's
ends were progress and that his means vacillated between "welfare
state capitalism and genuine socialism." 51 If Dewey's ends are difficult to pin down, the lack of clarity may be due, as C. Wright Mills
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has argued, to the lack of values in liberalism itself, or in the corporate liberalism of th e early century. Because Bourn e ultimately
linked pragmatism to th e politics of the liberal state, which conducted war on the premise of progress and spreading the cause of
freedom, it seems clear that h e, too, concluded that libe ralism had
d erailed his preferred philosophy. ' 2
This conclusion led to a break with the old pragmatism. "I come
to . .. a sense of being left in the lurch , of suddenly finding that a
philosophy upon which I had relied to carry us through no longer
works." He called for a r econceived pragmatism, one that dealt
with the realities of power-corporate power, the power of war's
imperatives-and recognized that everyone was implicated in
them. The pragmatism he proposed understood that knowledge
was interested and that the knower was embedded in a complex of
social relations that shaped an idea's knowledge and what was
known. It was a pragmatism that required a "more skeptical, malicious, desperate, mood" to replace Dewey's optimism. It made the
powerlessness to affect events a place for the "vigorous assertion of
the values in which the war has no part." Avoiding orthodoxy and
propaganda, it began the reconstruction of social values. "It is creative desire more than creative intelligence that we shall need if we
are ever to fly. "53

If Bourne's dispute with Dewey had concerned only the failures of
pragmatism in practical affairs or the limitations of progressivist
social reform policies, it might be of interest primarily to Dewey
scholars or contemporary pragmatists. But their debate was also
about the political responsibility of intellectuals in times of peace
and war and the nature of war in the liberal state. It raised another
question: to what extent can intellectuals be expected to remain
independent of the imperatives of war when their participation is
so essential to its conduct? Bourne seemed to think that the idea
of intellectual independence was an illusion. He did not ask the
young intellectuals to be independent; indeed, he asked that they
not hide behind the veil of independence. Put differently, his dispute with Dewey and Lippmann was not on the grounds that they
were interested or had political objectives but that they had been

INTELLECTUALS AT WAR

107
false to their own standards of independently testing ideas in the
real world.
The veil of independence was the disguise of Nietzsche's ascetic
priest. Every culture was engulfed in a cloud of ideology about
itself and its own spiritual principles, Nietzsche wrote, and the
ascetic ideal, the scientific philosophy, was the dominant ideal of
the modern age. Its priestly disguise was that of the disinterested
intellectual. Nietzsche viewed the ideal as a mere dodge by which
philosophers expressed their own inverted wills to power. The myth
enabled them to engage in strenuous intellectual activity, but it carried a corresponding sacrifice of animal energy. Modern philosophers, assuming the ascetic countenance and a belief in ascetic
values, tried to escape the wrath of priests in ascetically oriented
religious cultures, who had the prestige the intellectual lacked. As
the natural enemy of the priest, the intellectual assumed the
priestly disguise. The disguise itself became a new ideology, however, replacing the desire to be free of religion with its own religion, as cruel in Nietzsche's view as the one against which it had
originally risen. The triumph of the disinterested ideal signaled
the death of life-serving philosophy. 54
The "realists" at the New Republic were Nietzsche's ascetic priests,
enchanted by science and technocracy and interested in power in
the form of expertise. Their new science of pragmatism assumed a
priestly aura, enchanting them with the allure of technique and of
process. In the desire to apply progressive ideas about social control
to military ends, the realists represented the moment ofunmediated
apollonianism, the will to form, in the guise of service to the state.
The idea of intellectual independence was also embedded in the
first use of the term "intellectual" in 1898. The intellectuals were
the novelists, philosophers, and publicists who took up Alfred Dreyfus's cause, branded by their enemies as critics of society. They
defined themselves, however, as the conscience of France. Their
moral authority derived from the intellectual vocation itself, as
Romaine Rolland argued, from the life of the mind as necessarily
distanced from the larger society and immune to its moral degeneration. William James, privately identifying with the defenders of
Dreyfus, began to appropriate the term and its political implications
of independence to the American context:
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We "intellectuals" in America must all work to keep our precious birthright of individualism and freedom from these
institutions [of church, army, aristocracy, royalty]. Every great
institution is perforce a means of corruption-whatever good
it may do. Only in free personal relations is full ideality to be
found.
He also suggested in a lecture to college professors that the intellectual center of activity was shifting from the universities to the
cafes and literary clubs where the young intellectuals gathered, a
move he welcomed as an expansion of intellectual freedom .55
Dewey also helped credential the term for American radicals,
suggesting in 1908 that he saw glimmerings of an organized intelligentsia forming, which, drawn from all classes and lifting itself
above its origins, was capable of solving the riddle of the common
good. Seeing intellectuals primarily as catalysts of democratic
change, his definition nevertheless carried the implication that the
intellectual's freedom from traditional class affiliations produced
a superior form of critical consciousness, a disinterested or objective ability that other, class-bound minds could not achieve. Dewey's
sense of the intellectual, it can be said, was similar to Mannheim's
category of a detached, "free-floating" intelligentsia that formed a
substratum in society, as both Dewey and Mannheim located the
basis of intellectual authority in the absence of bias or interest in the
search for knowledge. 56
Bourne's theory of the role of intellectuals was different from several contemporary theories of the intellectual's political role and
responsibility: from Dewey's emphasis on rational or disinterested
activity, from Rolland's idealization of the intellectual vocation, and
even from Julien Benda's approach and its requirement of fidelity
to universal or disinterested values. Where Benda chastised the
European intelligentsia for its engagement with politics, especially
nationalist politics, because it was detrimental to an appropriately
disinterested role, Bourne argued that the intellectual was most
himself when he was a meddler, much like the Sartrean intellectual
who was most profoundly intellectual when he was politically
involved. 57 And where Benda argued provocatively that an intellectual's thought should have no practical utility, singling out James,
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among others, with favor, for the new "religion" of utility, for
Bourne, just the opposite was required of the intellectual, who
addressed the day-to-day, practical questions of modern life. 58
The m eddling of the intellectual was a n egative role, or perhaps
more accurately, a counterhegemonic rol e, aiming to d e mys tify
official values. 59 Recommending that the "malcontented" intellectual take a position "below the battle," that is, outside th e dominant frame of public discourse, Bourne argued that the intellectual
could entertain political options that were not posed in terms of
either/ or alternatives: pacifist/ interventionist, Anglo-American
sympathizer / Germanophile, active/passive. To position oneself
"below the battle" was not a means of lying low, contrary to some
interpretations, but a disruptive act, a way to redefine the terms of
the debate and deliberately to avoid the orthodoxies of current
social thought. 60 It was not a stance of political independence; quite
the contrary, it was a position of social and political embeddedness,
from which the self emerged. The modern self was a product of its practices, its discourse, perhaps, who was, as with Nietzsche's pathos,
always in the process of becoming.
Ross Posnock has read convincingly Bourne's conception of the
self emerging from society's inexorables as social text written by
one's environment. This conception is consistent with Bourne's early
view of the self as a contingently constructed, decentered self, the
product of family upbringing, friendships, membership in "beloved
communities," corporate environments, and neighborhood politics.
"The self is a network of representations of the various codes and
institutions of society," as Bourne wrote. 61 It was indeterminate at the
same time that the self was multiply embedded.
Indeed, the notion of the autonomous individual was a fiction
that served as a social myth supporting a culture (ofliberalism)
that prized individualism. It was "group-will" and "group-desire" that
existed first, as the new anthropology of Columbia University had
taught him, and it was from group affiliation that a self was gradually individuated. But even the individuated self, common to the
ideology of liberal societies, was an indeterminate self, following
from Nietzsche as well as fromJames's idea of a multiple self, which
was revealed discursively and was constituted by its actions and
relations in the material world. Thus, the "glowing" and "vibrant"
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personality Bourne often embraced was a regulative ideal, a denaturalized, socially constructed identity able to deal with the complexities of the modern world. The idea of personality was a
performative self unfolding its inner divisions in its external or
social practices.
It was precisely this kind of contingently constructed, fragmented self that the pragmatic liberals of the early twentieth century seemed to have feared. They conceived of the liberal self as
an autonomous, preexisting subject, exerting its will on the world
as a rational agent. The young intellectuals had entered the war,
both as individuals and as a class, with a particular point of view,
on the premise that they as political subjects could shape events.
In a remarkable profile of their psychology, often overlooked,
Bourne argued that this new class, in their aspirations to power and
adulthood, which the war gratified, became the product of its
larger forces. Uncertain of their status and vaguely committed to
the idea of social reform, they escaped into war as an arena for personal ambition and class power. Their "itch to be in the great experience that the rest of the world was having" propelled them into
seizing "in a great healing wave of release some doctrine that can
immediately be translated into action," and they "regressed" to the
"primitive" idea that became a craving for action. And it was action
quite literally that they embraced.
War was seen as the crowning relief of their indecision. At last,
action, irresponsibility, the end of anxious and torturing attempts to reconcile peace-ideals with the drag of war towards
Hell. An end to the pain of trying to adjust the facts to what
they ought to be! ... The thankfulness with which so many
intellectuals lay down and floated with the current betrays the
hesitation and suspense through which they have been. The
American university is a brisk and happy place these days. Simple, unquestioning action has superseded the knots of
thought. The thinker dances with reality. 62
The language of "regression" and "irresponsibility" suggested the
childlike nature of the intellectual class. In joining the rush to war,
in Bourne's analysis, they became children again, fulfilling fantasies
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of being swallowed up by the larger processes, avoiding responsibility, avoiding adulthood. They signed on with a war administration as a way of avoiding responsibility but enjoying a (reflected)
power. "A people at war have become in the most literal sense obedient, respectful, trustful children .... In this recrudescence of the
child, there is great comfort, and certain influx of power." The psychic rewards of avoiding responsibility made the intellectual class
among the most enthusiastic supporters of the war.
The significance of the psychological language should not
obscure its political content. Bourne's argument was that the state
created children by denying them a role to play as citizen-rulers,
and they, in turn, fetishized the state, "full of the most naive faith
in the all-wisdom and all-power of the adult who takes care of
them." Nations required adults, "with a measure of autonomy and
power, and with an achieved maturity," but war demanded uniformity of action and opinion, so that even adults, convinced of the
necessity of unity, overthrew their "indifference" toward the state
and identified with it.
You feel powerful by conforming, and you feel forlorn and
helpless if you are out of the crowd. While even if you do not
get any access of power by thinking and feeling just like everybody else in your group does, you get at least the warm feeling of obedience, the soothing irresponsibility of protection. 63
As Marx wrote, "The political state is as spiritual in relation to

civil society as heaven is in relation to earth." During war, Bourne
argued, the state's idealism was magnified. It took on dangerous
mystical powers, able to compel consent without force, making
democratic accountability irrelevant. "War is the health of the
state," a refrain he invoked to reinforce the idea of totality and
absolution. War became a permanent and ongoing activity of the
state, and the "individual as a social being" reached his/her "apotheosis" in total surrender of being to it. Identification with the state
"blotted out" the distinction between the individual and society:
At war, the individual becomes almost identical with society.
He achieves a superb self-assurance, an intuition of the right-
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ness of all his ideas and emotions, so that in the suppression
of opponents and heretics he is invincibly strong; he feels
behind him all the power of the collective community. 64
The myth of the autonomy of the individual becomes complete in
total war; eclipsed by the political agenda, it becomes a means to
its end.
The inexorables of total war even blotted out the idea of democratic consent. Testing popular support for the war in February and
March 1917, Bourne endorsed a referendum on the question of
military involvement, standing by the idea that a war fought for
democratic ends must take account of democratic authority. With
Max and Crystal Eastman, Winthrop Jordan, Amos Pinchot, and
other members of the Committee for Democratic Control, he took
out two advertisements in the New Republic: "1917-American
Rights-1789" and "Do the People Want War?" urging a referendum. The referendum was dismissed in court. But he had begun
to suspect that referenda were inadequate means to test democratic sentiment and were irrelevant, in any case, in a modern, technological, total war. "The kind of war which we are conducting is
an enterprise which the American government does not have to
carry on with the hearty co-operation of the American people but
only with their acquiescence."65 With their "acquiescence," the state
could render a philosophy of "creative intelligence" useless and
dissent dangerous. Where freedom of choice was impossible, intelligence ceased to have a function, and the prospect of individual
responsibility became an illusion. 66 Posnock's reading glosses
Bourne's "embrace of the inexorables," ignoring the psychic damage Bourne diagnosed that resulted from the state's infantilization
of its citizens. But Posnock's conclusion, that from the radical contingency of the self a "politics of nonidentity" was formed, fully
comprehends the engaged political nature of the intellectual position Bourne proposed in being "below the battle." 67

In "The State," an unfinished manuscript published after his
death, Bourne treated the crisis as one of institutions and not of
individuals, focusing less on the pragmatists and the liberal intel-
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lectuals and more on the state. In the essay he analyzed the institutional, social, and psychological support for the state and its
principal activity of international military conflict. He focused on
the inner workings of the relationship between the state and war,
and their support under capitalism, concluding that "war is the
health of the state," that is, that war is the state's profit and prestige and the activity in which it finds its purpose and raison d'etre.
He theorized that war was a function of the state system, an international network of "military-industrial" dynasties (a phrase first
used by Bourne) competing with one another for economic and
military supremacy.68
In the fragment he also put forward an understanding of the
state as a builder of social cohesion or a unifier of the ruling
classes. Anticipating the state theories of Gramsci and Nicos Poulantzas, Bourne's analysis, less systematically, examined the means
by which the state forged class alliances and built social cohesion,
a strategy that at times exacerbated class antagonisms and at other
times frustrated them, depending largely on the democratic nature
of the state coalitions. Although the state often acted as an instrument of class rule, relying on the traditional methods of force or
coercion, it sometimes acted as a builder of hegemony, relying on
traditional intellectuals, extracting democratic concessions through
a combination of force, fraud, and consent that Gramsci described.
In this role, it was a builder of social coalitions and of ideological
consensus. The combination of those strategies enhanced not only
its own prestige but also the social and intellectual prestige of the
groups that supported it. 69
Although the Bourne legend holds that he discarded the unfinished manuscript in his final days and that it was discovered by
friends after his death, there is nothing in the essay that was inconsistent with the direction of his thought in his final essays on war
and the mystification of the state. Underlying its widely ranging,
discursive exploration was the thread that connected all his writings, namely, the question of democratic change: was it possible in
an age of bureaucratic institutions and impersonal, "herd-like"
social forces and, if so, what form would it take? What were the preconditions and possibilities for social revolution in America and in
the international arena?
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In an essay he wrote as a student at Columbia, he first addressed
the question of social democratic change and concluded that the
prospects of a new "Socialist Industrial Democracy" were encouraging, as the successes of the syndicalists in France and the growing militancy of the IWW in the United States demonstrated. In a
move similar to Gramsci's recommendation that revolution need
not attack the institutions of government directly-in a "war of
maneuver"-it could target the industrial sector, the shop floor,
the corporate bureaucracies, and the centers of cultural production-in a "war of position"-because control over social and economic productivity was in the hands of the industrial sector.
Further, in Gramsci's view, power resided in culture, articulated
most clearly in hegemonic common sense. In Bourne's analysis,
modern revolution should be industrial rather than political, and
an "industrial democracy" would be the goal because "the industrial is ... more powerful" than the political state. 70
But by 1917, something had happened in American society to
threaten substantially the prospects of revolution. That something
was the war, enhancing the state's prestige and making any potential alignment of the "possessing classes" and the "working classes"
impossible.
We cannot expect, or take measures to ensure, that this war is
a war to end war, unless at the same time we take measures to
end the State in its traditional form .... With the passing of
the State, the genuine life-enhancing forces of the nation will
be liberated. 71
Bourne drew a then-common distinction, probably influenced by
Rousseau, between the nation, state, and government to make his
case about the compatibility of war and the state. The country or
nation, Bourne explained, was a peaceful if not homogeneous community of people; it pertained to the "non-political aspects of a people, its ways of living, its personal traits, its literature and art, its
characteristic attitudes toward life." The state, on the other hand,
was "the country acting as a political unit," acting "as a repository of
force, determiner oflaw, arbiter ofjustice." The government was simply the political apparatus, or the current administration of the

INTELLECTUALS AT WAR

115
country's political institutions, for carrying into effect the state's functions. "Government ... is the machinery by which the nation, organized as a State, carried out its state functions." Rather than a locus
for democratic participation, government was simply "the idea of
the State put into practical operation." As the concrete "framework"
for the state's powers, "it is the visible sign of the invisible grace." 72
The distinction between states and governments was based on
their real and ideal aspects. "Government is the only form in which
we can envisage the State," Bourne wrote, suggesting that government is a sign but that the state itself was a "mystical conception"
whose reality (materiality) was hidden, operating covertly to "direct
... [the] activities of Government." States are then mystical or ideal
but real in the manifestations of their power. They became real,
moreover (although remaining mystical), in time of war because,
ironically, their ideal or mystical power reached its highest "power
and glory." Their reality is a function of their capacity to enchant
and deceive. The nation was the counterpoint; it was real, concrete, geographical, organic. It was material because it was part of
the people, and the people instantiated it. Nations could be seen
as materially and ideally distinct as well. Nations had no motive for
war. As Rousseau noted, only states fought wars; nations never did
(because, as Rousseau put it, "it is the link between things rather
than men that constitutes war"). 73
Bourne concluded similarly that war was the inevitable by-product of a state system. "War is a function of this system of States, and
could not occur except in such a system." 74 The state promised universality, as did Hegel's liberal state, the full integration of the citizen into the service of a collective ideal, uniting his particularity
(as consciousness) and his universality (as a social being). 75 But
only during war could states deliver on the promise and then only
to particular classes. Warfare constituted the necessary condition
and mediation for the unity of the state's real and ideal capacities.
"The more terrifying the occasion for defense, the closer will
become the [state's] organization and the more coercive the influence upon each member.... War sends the current of purpose
and activity flowing down to the lowest level."
Yet the state's promise of universality was partial and strictly classbound. Like Hegel's bureaucrat, only the middle classes in America
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could attain universality because they were able to turn "from their
selfish and predatory ways" and "become loyal servants of society or
something greater than they." The "possessing classes" were permitted to "direct industry and government and all the institutions
of society pretty much as before," gaining the "pragmatic satisfaction
of governing" even while being stripped of "the psychic burden of
adulthood." Thus the propertied classes that had been attempting
to forestall the challenges from labor and radical political movements gratefully joined forces with the state, moving from "the direction of a large business in New York to a post in the war management
industrial service in Washington," their economic stability ensured
by the war's military demands and glorified by the political campaign
of state propaganda (or a simulacra, i.e., by symbols of a symbol). 76
But the economic security of the propertied classes was never
threatened seriously, showing the influence of Beard's political history. Having gained for themselves the political, legal, and representational mechanisms necessary to ensure their continual
economic and political health, their security, Bourne argued, was
fortified by a party system that they controlled, enabling them to
make democratic concessions to universal suffrage when it would
no longer make a difference to the orderly transfer of power.
Although political and social coalitions constituting the American
state changed several times, a democratic state was never an actuality in his analysis. Even in the last decade, he wrote, the state
coalition "was not likely to crumble before the anger of a few
muck-rakers, the disillusionment of a few radical sociologists, or
the assaults of proletarian minorities." 77 As the state system succeeded, so did the public schools, the universities, and professional
institutions;journals and industries prospered. The information,
commodities, and expert specialists that the system produced were
designed to fit the system as it operated so that even the psychic
gains were illusory. A herd-instinct, always latent, extinguished the
"gregarious-instincts," and the state began to hum like a well-oiled
machine.
But the unity of state and society was tenuous, Bourne argued,
even as the war tried to rationalize and consolidate their activities.
"War, which should be the health of the State, unifies all the bourgeois elements and the common people, and outlaws the rest."

INTELLECTUALS AT WAR

117
With each instance of the state's policy of "white terrorism ...
against pacifists, Socialists, enemy aliens, and a milder unofficial
persecution against all persons or movements that can be imagined as connected with the enemy," the "disaffection of labor
increased," the "tension intensified." 78
Ethnic loyalties that ordinarily in peacetime are maintained as
a "luxury," "tend to be strengthened" as the state's "invidious policy
of Americanism" challenged their identities and intensified the
"herd-feeling" within the "sect." And unlike "highly skilled workers who habitually identify with the owning and the significant
classes," the "revolutionary proletariat showed more resistance to
this unification" than any other social group, even when its "vanguard, as the !.W.W. is," was "remorselessly pursued." 79 The majority of workers remained "notoriously" unpatriotic because their
condition was altered only slightly by military production. "From
[industrial] serfdom, military conscription is not so great a
change," so they entered "the military enterprise ... with the same
apathy with which they enter and continue in the industrial enterprise." Because the "opportunity to regress" to "these primitive
childlike attitudes" was never offered to them, they gained none
of the psychic rewards of irresponsibility that the "significant
classes" enjoyed by surrendering to the state voluntarily. "Having
never acquired social adulthood, they cannot lose it. "80 The workers
viewed the war as "an upper-class sport" played out in the international arena and a "sport between the hunters and the hunted" in
the domestic. The type of manufactured patriotism compelled by
a wartime state-manifested in sedition laws, military conscription,
and War Issues courses--did not extinguish dissent; it merely drove
it underground.
It was in the unstable equilibrium of the social coalitions that
traditionally supported the state apparatus, which even in war were
not united, that Bourne found hope for a democratic resistance.
"The country must be dotted with dissatisfied people who must ...
be appealed to to desire certain things mightily." In "this class of
malcontents," Bourne saw as late as 1918 a prospect for a postwar
revival of social life. 81 It was a dim hope. Indeed at the same time
he anticipated the red scare of the 1920s, a campaign of intimidation and violence waged by "sensational editors, archaic radicals,
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... sedition-hunting Vigilantes, and by the saving remnant of older
liberals." 82 Referring to the novel crime of seditious conspiracy, he
warned:
the punishment for opinion has been far more ferocious and
unintermittent than the punishment of pragmatic crime ....
Even to attempt such a paralysis [of military conscription] is
a crime equal to a successful stroke. The will is deemed sufficient. ... The guardians of the State do not ask whether any
pragmatic effect flowed out of this evil will or desire. 83
The confusion and resignation of subordinates would give way to
a more virulent form of social control and would lead, he believed,
to a permanent "semi-military State-socialism."

If the war revealed an affinity with pragmatism, it was made possible by a pragmatism that was not self-correcting. It chose one point
of view and one political goal, and the liberal state enforced it.
Thus the rejection for instrumentalism was more fundamentally a
rejection of liberalism, or the absence of guiding values in a political philosophy and culture whose goal became the victory of the
liberal state at war.
In Bourne's call for a new kind of pragmatism, the idea of testing several irreconcilable points of view was proposed. This pragmatism (a "post-scientific ideology") would keep these viewpoints
alive as contradictory but equally valid truths, rather than resolving them, as the old pragmatism would have done. These contradictory values can be seen in his own alternating appeals, on the
one hand, to pursue the "values in which the war has no part" and,
on the other, to support the idea of a "moral equivalent" to war
offered by William James, in which the virtues of military service
(camaraderie, engagement, and commitment) were preserved in
the idea of a mass-based mobilization of civilian reformers. 84 For
some readers, the contradiction may be grounds for dismissing
Bourne's politics as those of an "impossibilist," or alternatively, as
the views of a politically quiescent critic removed from the fray, or
"above the battle." In my view, his unwillingness to affiliate politi-
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cally was a strength rather than a weakness, a means of providing
the necessary antidote to a feverish political climate. In the escalation of the political during the war, he held back from committing to the "official" point of view.
The war has brought an immense and terrifying inflation to
the political sphere, so that for most people non-governmentalized activity has ceased almost to have significance. But this
cult of politics has been inherent in the liberal intellectual's
point of view long before the war. Instead of politics taking its
place in the many-sided interests of the modern mind, it had
the dominant position. 85
Wartime politics eclipsed the private realm, intimidated cultural
production, and suppressed the individual and the idea of human
agency.
An analysis of the "politics of nonidentity"-or, more appropriately, the politics of multiple identities-reveals Bourne's concern
to theorize a "trans-national" American culture, a patchwork of ethnic and political communities in which individuals expressed multiple loyalties and affiliations. The idea of a transnational America
was a counternarrative to the dominant themes of assimilation and
Americanization. It constituted a new kind of democratic politics,
in which the political and cultural affiliations of America's new
immigrants in particular were acknowledged and validated. It was
an expression of Bourne's participation in a "vigorous assertion of
the values in which war has no part."

7
"TRANS-NATIONAL AMERICA"

In light of our changing ideal of Americanism, we must perpetuate the paradox that our
American cultural tradition lies in the future.
-Randolph S. Bourne, "Trans-National America"
I believe that we shall find in the currentJewish
ideal of Zionism the purest pattern and the
most inspiring conceptions of trans-nationalism.
-Randolph S. Bourne,
"The Jew and Trans-National America"

When the Seven Arts closed in October 1917 after only twelve
months of publication, it seemed to many in New York's intellectual community that political dissent had died along with it. Privately Robert Frost complained that Bourne's uncompromising
essays of dissent had precipitated the journal's demise:
The Seven Arts
In the Dawn of Creation that morning
I remember I gave you fair warning
The Arts are but Six!
You add Politics
And the Seven will all die a-Bourneing. 1
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The Seven Arts was only one of the many casualties of the war. In
the political climate of preparedness and war, American culture as
a whole was affected. Funding for journals was canceled; editors
were cautious. Innocuous or rebellious publications, such as the
Masses, were taken from circulation by Postmaster General Albert
Sidney Burleson, its editors tried for sedition. Radio programs were
banned, German music was removed from the airwaves, meetings
were broken up by police or vigilantes. The preparedness campaign aimed especially to rout political radicals, pacifists, and the
foreign-born. Although President Wilson and George Creel, former muckraker and then-director of the Committee on Public
Information, repeatedly condemned vigilantism, the creation of
Loyalty Leagues was organized under their direction. In the
schools and universities, patriotic curricula were introduced, in
one form as the War Issues Course taught by regular professors in
the social sciences and history. By 1918 preinduction centers were
established for male students in the universities, who took several
hours a week of military instruction in addition to their regular
classes, wore uniforms, and lived under military discipline. Programs for elementary schoolchildren included the reading of "war
biographies" of heroic figures from the Allied countries, and
course materials were developed to stress the ideals of "patriotism,
heroism, and sacrifice." 2
The cultural effect of the war at home was a politicization of private and public life:
We find a liberal war undertaken which could not fail to do
far more damage to American democracy at home than it
could ever do to the enemy abroad .... The war has brought
an immense and terrifying inflation to the political sphere, so
that for most people non-govemmentalized activity has ceased
almost to have significance. 3
Moreover, as the war politicized private activities, it aestheticized
politics. The commonly accepted boundaries of modernity between the political, the economic, and the cultural-aesthetic were
blurred. The state became a heroic actor whose mission was to create an illusory harmony, a place of escape for the middle class and

CHAPTER SEVEN

122
for the people dislocated by th e contradictions of modern society. 4
Bourne 's own experie nce of U.S. governme nt surveillance in
Connecticut redoubled his anxiety:
I feel very much secluded from the world, very much out of
touch with my times, except pe rhaps with the Bolsheviki. The
magazines I write for die violent d eaths, and all my thoughts
are unprintable. If I start out to write on public m atters I discover that my ideas are seditious, and if I start to write a novel
I discover that my outlook is immoral if not obscene. What then
is a literary man to do if he has to make his living by a pen?5
The "terrifying" logic of military preparedness affected the politics of immigration with particular repressiveness. Within a discourse of Americanization, immigration policies were linked to a
militant nationalism, aiming to eliminate "enemies within," through
deportations, the criminalization of dissent, and vigilantism, and
enemies without through international war. In the white imaginary,
the demonization of the foreign Other-in the form of ethnicity
and national origin-was a means of strengthening solidarity among
themselves at a time when their cohesiveness was being challenged
internally. 6 As such, this moment of America's internal control over
its immigrant self belongs to a longer tradition of American anxiety
over primitivism and disorder.7
Against the discourse of Americanization, Bourne put forward
a counternarrative of transnationalism to challenge both the ideas
of "100% Americanism" and cultural pluralism8 and to propose a
new conception of American national identity that was both ethnic and modern , American and cosmopolitan. His theory of
transnationalism challenged both theories of American national
identity by amplifying the "small narratives" of oppositional, subaltern, and countercultural groups in America's cities. Further, he
proposed a practical, collective, pacifist enterprise for intercultural
cooperation and social reorganization that was meant to be a counterweight to the military machine and a strategy for survival for
America's newest immigrants.
His idea of transnationalism also confronted what was at stake
in the debates over immigration and assimilation, that is, the cen-
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trality of ethnicity to American identity. 9 For Bourne, the idea of
an American national identity that did not take into account its
diverse origins and multiple experiences failed to fulfill the "American promise." An American nationalism that ignored the experiences of immigration, common to Anglo-Americans as well as to
the newest immigrants, conflated what it meant to be an American, a product of not one, but of several cultures. An American
identity that was based only in a neutral, that is, deracinated, cosmopolitanism failed to address the democratic side of civic membership or the possibilities of a common culture. Consequently, the
challenge he raised to early twentieth-century cultural-pluralist theories and Americanization programs was also a challenge to the
limits of American liberalism, asking how it was possible to create
a public interest or a shared moral consensus from a cluster of private interests and cultural differences, and whether, in the absence
of such shared commitments, a genuinely pluralistic democratic
culture was possible?
To understand the idea of transnationalism and its implications,
it is necessary to historicize it within the converging contexts of its
development: Bourne's personal autobiography as a young intellectual and an outspoken critic of the war; a social history of immigration amid a rising tide of nativism; a political history of military
preparedness, in concert with the shift from a liberal to a bureaucratic, corporatized state; and a cultural history of modern cosmopolitanism, emerging in New York, Milwaukee, Madison, and
Boston but coming to include the whole of America. In what follows, these four interrelated histories are untangled and briefly
examined, followed by an examination of the idea of transnationalism as a counternarrative to the dominant narrative of Americanization. In a concluding section, I will consider transnationalism
today as a challenge for America to recover its ethnic identities
through aesthetic-expressive forms of cultural production, organization, and discourse.

Bourne's counternarrative grew out of his personal experience of
profound and radical marginalization. The self-described Ishmael
found that identification with the immigrant, the New Woman, the
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urban poor, and other outsiders came easily, as they were seen, as
he was, as unchosen by Puritan elites and as "alien" by Protestant
Yankees. He chose to be a "spiritual vagabond" and "malcontent,"
"irreconciled" to both official policy and to social-reform programs.
Instead of service to the state, his generation of pragmatic-progressives should expend their considerable energies not in war but
in building America into the "first international nation." "The
war-or American promise. One must choose. One cannot be interested in both." 10
The roots of his transnationalism began before the war, when
he was a student at Columbia University and first began to reject
what Henry May has called the "certainties of the Victorian world"
and the Arnoldian conception of culture on which they were
based. The genteel critics of the school of belles lettres, influenced
by Matthew Arnold, regarded culture as the property of the chosen people, set against the shallowness of the philistines. Culture
was something to be acquired and consumed passively by people
who had no taste or who presumably did not know better. The
average person's tastes could be "cultivated" by exposure to the
classics, according to Arnold, and through an immersion in culture in this sense, civilization could be saved from the "anarchy"
that threatened to dissolve it. In America, Bourne argued,just the
opposite had occurred. Instead of culture saving Americans from
anarchy, Arnold's "cult of the best" had produced a nation of cultural parasites, convinced of their own cultural inferiority, directing their attention outward toward European standards rather than
inward to the cultivation of "inner taste." In "Our Cultural Humility," written in 1914, he suggested in a telling illustration that the
Armory Show of 1913, organized in New York City, had the "frankly
avowed purpose of showing American artists how bad they were in
comparison with the modern French." 11 He rejected the conception of culture as high art, challenging it as Anglophilic and classbound, and called for a resurgent "cultural chauvinism" that
championed contemporary American writers and artists who
helped to instill an "intense self-consciousness" of the "soul of this
hot chaos of America."
While traveling in Europe in 1913-1914, he began to assemble
the ingredients of a dynamic definition of culture that was more
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anthropological, emphasizing that culture was the interaction
among peoples, places, and artifacts rather than merely the cultivation of taste. Culture, in this sense, was a "living effort" of a people's self-expression and solidarity. It referred to the whole range
of personal, aesthetic, moral, and religious habits and values that
structured a people's unofficial and personal lives, uniting them
in a "common consciousness" and collective sense of identity. At
its best, culture sustained a sense of belonging and personal identification with a group, or what Bourne called "the good life of personality lived in the environment of Beloved Community." 12 At its
worst, it could breed a narrow like~mindedness, provincialism, and
a rigid intolerance of the Other.13
Indeed, when the eastern Brahmin elite in the United States witnessed the massive influx of immigrants between 1880 and 1920,
they became preoccupied with what they perceived to be the forces
of "anarchy," of which Arnold had warned, invading their "civilization." As Michael Rogin argues, urban immigrants, the poor,
public women, and political dissidents symbolized civilized breakdown, alien control, and the return of the repressed. 14 "Aliens"
were feared for the threats they posed to the "American way of
life," or the breakdown of boundaries between "us" and "them." At
the same time, according to Jacques Lacan, fears of the Other are
actually displacements of one's own desire, particularly to enjoy
the enjoyment of the Other-that is, to ertjoy his festivals and celebrations, his cuisine and language. Desire becomes destructive
through fantasies and fascinations about the Other and his "organized enjoyments," in particular, that they are inaccessible to us,
that they will threaten "ours," or even that the Other will steal our
enjoyments. 15 This explanation suggests that the feared threat to
the "American way of life" at the height of immigration was based
on "destructive desire," not merely aversion to foreigners. 16
Indeed, the face of American culture had changed. Between
1870 and 1920, 20 million immigrants came to America. By the end
of the first decade of the twentieth century, one in every three
Americans was an immigrant or had at least one foreign-born parent. In New York, by 1910, 40 percent were foreign-born. Moreover,
the new immigrants, principally from eastern and southern Europe
and from Russia, not only outnumbered their English, German,
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and Irish cohorts by as many as six times, 17 but they also spoke little
or no English, brought few or no personal possessions with them,
and were often religiously orthodox (primarily Catholic or Jewish).
Establishing their own political clubs and civic associations, founding over 3,400 newspapers that served over thirty different nationalities, the newest Americans created a vital, cosmopolitan network
of national cultures and neighborhood communities. 18
Yet increasingly Anglo-Americans saw the new arrivals as dirty,
unkempt, abject, unskilled, and decidedly "foreign." Nativist sentiments were voiced by settlement workers, school administrators
and teachers, university presidents and professors, town mayors,
and journalists of the yellow and liberal presses, and the objections
intensified during the 1910s. Anarchists, socialists, and the foreignborn in general were the principal targets of suppression and intimidation, but even within immigrant communities, religious and
class factionalism gave way to divisions over American identity and
Americanization programs. Prosperous German Reform Jews supported assimilation and Americanization programs, for instance,
but poor and working-class, Orthodox eastern European Jews and
Zionists opposed them. 19
By 1915 debates over nationalism and American identity became
linked inextricably to the military preparedness campaign and to
questions of loyalty and subversion. Under circumstances that
Bourne termed "the thinly disguised panic which calls itself 'patriotism,"' German Americans were added to the list of reviled foreigners. "One hundred percent Americanism" became militant
and militarist. In 1915 Theodore Roosevelt, a leader of the "citizenship training" movement, told the Knights of Columbus that
the duties of patriotism required giving up all other loyaltiesthose of class, ethnic group, or national origin-for loyalty to
America itself. "The only man who is a good American is the man
who is an American and nothing else. "20 In a similar vein, Woodrow
Wilson, in his first preparedness speech before the Congress, announced: "There are citizens of the United States, ... born under
other flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws
... who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries
of our national life." They must be "crushed out." Two months
later, he went further: "Any man who carries a hyphen about him
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carries a dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of this
Republic." 21
As Wilson acceded to demands for the deportation of immigrants
who had failed to learn English after living in the United States for
five years, twenty states imposed Americanization programs on the
public schools to promote "the language of America" and the inculcation of "American values." Groups per se became suspect, seen as
threats to American liberalism and the idea of the solitary, unattached contractarian and bearer of natural rights. In 1915 Wilson
made plain his antipathy to (unofficial) groups: "America does not
consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a
particular national group in America has not yet become an American. "22 In contradiction to the group theory underlying twentiethcentury corporate liberalism, first outlined and legitimated in
Arthur Bentley's Process of Government (1905), anxiety over the
spread of groups and the democratization of civil society became
pathological.
Within the rising tide of a militant nationalism, three competing theories of American national identity and its ethnic origins
appeared: the theory of Anglo-conformity, the melting pot ( or assimilation) thesis, and cultural pluralism. 23 Each theory constructed
American identity, to use Werner Sollors's terms characterizing the
ways in which ethnicity has been symbolized in America, either as
"descent" relations, that is, as based in ancestral tradition, family,
blood ties, or sacred election; or in "consent" determinations, that
is, those grounded in contract, reason, law, or marriage; or in a
combination of the two. 24 Although these terms of consent and
descent were not meant to be natural, according to Sollors, they
do suggest the preoccupation of American writers with foreignness
and ethnicity (ethnikos: heathen; ethnos: other) 25 as an aspect of
American identity and a concern with the Other in delimiting
American membership. 26
In its simplest form, the theory of Anglo-conformity posited the
notion that America was originally and remained irreducibly one,
single, pure strain of Anglo-Saxon stock, originating with the Puritan commonwealth and extending into the nineteenth-century genteel tradition. It insisted on the homogeneity or like-mindedness of
the American people (by which its proponents meant themselves),
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imagining an unbroken line of continuity be tween the culture of
the first English se ttlers and that of the nine tee nth-century "gu ardians of culture." Accordingly, Anglo-conformists conside red cultural identity to be based in descent rather than consent; for th em ,
national identity was something essentially given and fixed , and it
admitted of only a limited flexibility for certain classes.27
With the preparedness debates, Anglo-conformity turned into a
preoccupation with the idea of racial purity and a gen e ral fear of
"en emies within. " The case was m ade most forcefully by Edward A.
Ross in 1900 in praising the Teutonic America, a favored concept
within Brahmin circles, and warning that "unchecked Asiatic immigration might lead to the extinction of the American p e ople ."
These notions were subsequently picked up by Theodore Roosevelt
in his invoking the threat of "race suicide" and by Madison Grant
in his notorious The Passing of the Great Race ( 1916) .28
Melting pot-assimilationist images, on the other hand, can be
traced back as far as Hector St. John de Crevecoeur's conjectures
regarding the new American. ''What then is the American, this new
man? . .. Here individuals of all nations are melted into a race of
men." 29 The melting pot conception of American identity was based
on descent relations as well. Its proponents argued that America
was a hybrid nation and that Americans were a heterogeneous mixture of many national traditions, mingling and ultimately merging
into a unified .and harmonious whole. The determinant of cultural
identity, it seemed, was less racial than geographic in this conception, as if the special nature of America as a place was the source of
the common customs and values that made one an American .
American identity was rooted in descent determinations because it
involved something outside the individual's agency or will, an identity that was organic or natural rather than self-made. 30
Under the logic of a militant nationalism, proponents of the
assimilationist ideal became paranoid. Voiced by a wide range of
spokespersons, from Mary Antin to Frances Kellor to Woodrow Wilson, many assimilationists sought to quell extremist preparedness
sentiments and ethnocentrism by appealing to common values
among Anglo-Americans and the new Americans, often in terms
reminiscent of the nativists ' approach. Antin, for example , defended the new immigrants by arguing, "We ' re hard working,
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clean, upstanding, but humble recruits for democracy." Other proponents insisted on forced assimilation and Americanization. One
preparedness expert, for instance, argued that military service was
the only way to "yank the hyphen out of the Italian Americans" and
other "imperfectly assimilated immigrants." 31
The modern variant of cultural pluralism, the third theory of
American identity, was formulated by Horace Kallen, a philosopher andJamesian specialist who taught at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, in a 1915 article, "Democracy versus the Melting
Pot," an explicit attack on Ross's nativist tract, The Old World in the
New (1914). As Kallen's title suggests, his antiassimilationist program proposed the thesis that America was composed of many
pure strains and ethnic stocks that interacted with and related to
one another, forming into a heterogeneous and fundamentally
unmeltable whole. Kallen and early twentieth-century cultural pluralists (among them, Robert Park and Robert Mciver) valued the
variety of groups for the intrinsic worth of difference and diversity. In contrast, James Madison, the early founder of pluralist theory, understood the political value of groups ("factions") for
representing diverse interests but was wary of them as impediments to individual liberty and orderly government. In contrast
to Madison, as well, modern pluralists saw differences as based in
race, class, ethnicity, religion, or national origin ( natio: origin,
birth), whereas for Madison, the "most common and durable"
source of factional difference was in property or the private interest in economic security. 32
Kallen's theory of cultural pluralism therefore was formulated
in terms of descent identity. He argued that the inner cultural
identity of the immigrant, carried with him into his new land,
remained an "inward" experience, regardless of how his external
relations changed: "Men change their clothes, their politics, their
wives, their religions, their philosophies, to a greater or lesser
extent; they cannot change their grandfathers." As if to_underscore
the distinction between a given, descent identity and a flexible,
consent identity, he continued: "An Irishman is always an Irishman,
a Jew always a Jew. Irishman or Jew is born, citizen or lawyer, or
church-member is made. Irishman and Jew are facts of nature; citizen and church-member are artifacts of civilization." Because the
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melting pot idea threatened an individual's internal, ethnic particularity, Kallen argued that democracy must be m ad e to apply to
groups as well as to individuals, guaranteeing groups the right to
exist, so that the immigrant could retain and enjoy his essential,
irreducible cultural identity even while participating fully in the
civic affairs of the new land. 33
Kallen used the metaphor of society as an orchestra to illustrate
the sort of democracy he advocated that preserved various traditional cultures. "Culture thus constitutes a harmony, which people
and nations are the producing instruments, to which each contributes its unique tone, in which the whole human past is present
as ... a background from which the present comes to light." The
problem with the metaphor of the orchestra of course, is that each
instrument has a particular function, as violins cannot become
flutes, and each instrument follows only one part of the orchestral
score . A democratic harmony at best can achieve the protection
and perfection of given, distinctive cultural differences, but no one
can expect to transcend those roles. 34 Kallen 's pluralism did not
alter or subvert Anglo-Saxon hegemony or question the rules of
democratic participation. It sought to preserve ethnic and cultural
differences, nothing more. As Irving Howe has pointed out, the
argument allowed American Jews a position in American society,
but "they would be in it, at least as much as they were allowed to,
but not entirely of it. "35
As an alternative to Kallen's pluralism and as a direct challenge
to the theses of assimilation and Anglo-conformity, Bourne fashioned a notion of cultural identity, based partly on descent and
partly on consent, and a theory of American nationalism that was
explicitly pacifist and internationalist. Like his friend Kallen, he
believed that identity was a product of the given "place," that is,
the regional, traditional, and familial determinants of a people
(descent); but he also recognized that identity was manifested in
willed attachments to others (consent) or through affiliations in
"communities of sentiment." This socially embedded, constructed
self of multiple affiliations was the result of the mix of one's private and public associations, a self that, as Nietzsche determined,
was constantly in the process of formation. In Hegel's terms, the
process of individuation involved separation from one's primary
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associations (family, ethnic group) and affiliation with secondary
(national and civic) memberships. In this sense, one always existed
within a group; the self was irreducibly a social self. 36
Although Bourne did not adopt Kallen 's notion of society as an
orchestra or the idea that each group retained an irreducible, static ethnic identity, he took Kallen himself-a German-born immigrant, organic intellectual, a scholar ofJames, and an active and
ardent Zionist-as an exemplar of the "Zionist idea" and an individual with a "spiritual world citizenship," whose multiple levels of
identity and consciousness formed a whole American self and a distinctive personality. The Zionist represented the ideal of modern
cosmopolitanism to Bourne, "the purest pattern and the most
inspiring conception of transnationalism." Bourne spelled out the
idea of dual citizenship that underlay his conception of a modern
transnationalism: "The Zionist does not believe that there is a necessary conflict between the cultural allegiance to the Jewish centre
and political allegiance to a State." Rather, he enjoyed a "dual citizenship," at once a "complete Jew and at the same time ... a complete citizen of any modern political State where he happened to
live and where his work and interests lay."
The idea of dual citizenship lent equal standing to immigrants
and natives in any country. Echoing Kallen, Bourne denaturalized
(and subverted) his thesis: "Once a citizen, always a citizen, no
matter how many citizenships he may embrace." 37 By way of illustration, Bourne singled out Associate Justice Louis Brandeis of the
Supreme Court, "at once an ardent Zionist and at the same time
an incomparable American leader in economic and social reconstruction." Brandeis, an example of the sort of modern cosmopolitan Bourne had in mind, used as his Zionist credo: "To be
good Americans, we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews, we
must become Zionists." 38 The idea that Jews in America could be
Jewish and American, and more fully so than if their cultural and
political terrains were identical, suggested the pattern for the kind
of dual citizenship that was possible for every "hyphenated" American. "This dilemma of dual allegiance must be solved in America, it must be solved in the world, and it is in the fertile
implications of Zionism that I veritably believe the solution will be
found." 39
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Moreover, early Zionism also pointed the way to the sort of
nationalism Bourne endorsed, one that was pacifistic and internationalist. The Zionist state was nonmilitary and delimited the role
political loyalty should play in the modern world:
As I understand it, the Jewish State which Zionists are build-

ing is a non-military, a non-chauvinistic State. Palestine is to
be built as a Jewish centre on purely religious and cultural
foundations. It is not to be the home of all the Jewish people.
Zionism does not propose to prevent Jews from living in full
citizenship in other countries.
Whether Jews living outside Palestine were perceived to be
"aliens," "marginal men," or, as Chaim Potok put it, "an inbetween
person, at home and not at home at the same time," Judaism had
always been perceived as an obstacle to full membership in the
lands of exile. 40
Yet Bourne, reversing the conventional conclusion of exclusion
and enclosure, insisted, "the Jew in America is proving every day
the possibilities of this dual life." 41 Zionism represented more than
marginality or otherness to Bourne. For him and for second-generation American Jews, Zionism represented freedom from both
ethnocentrism and 100 percent Americanism. Moreover, there was
something distinctively modern, even avant-garde in the Zionist
idea that had implications for modern intellectuals in general.
Indeed in 1919 Veblen would suggest that the "pre-eminence" of
modem Jewish intellectuals was due to their detachment from traditional nationalisms, which freed them from orthodoxy and class
bias. 42 But Veblen saw the Jew as shedding alliances, and Bourne
saw him as acquiring new ones.
Both men agreed, however, that the mark of an exceptional
intellectual was to have overcome the confines of orthodoxy and
provincialism, enabling him or her to be truly critical. The cosmopolitan individual, who eajoyed a dual citizenship with divided
loyalties and multiple perspectives, represented not so much alienation as a healthy self of fluid identity, "at home" in several worlds.
It was as if the split between bourgeois and citizen in the secular
state, of which Marx had written in "On the Jewish Question,"
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entailed no necessary contradiction in Bourne's modernist conception but led to a more resilient self. Alienation of this sort, or
what Bourne referred to as the unintegrated self, was the most
advantageous position for the marginalized, the outsider, or the
hyphenate-American. It kept the new immigrant either from drifting along or succumbing to the influences of Anglo-conformity or
commercialism. 43
Modifying Kallen in reference to the mediation of national identity, Bourne wrote:
Although the Frenchman may accept the formal institutional
framework of his new country and indeed become intensely
loyal to it, yet his Frenchness he will never lose. What makes
up the fabric of his soul will always be of this Frenchness.
What Bourne seemed to be saying in Kallenesque language is that
one would never conceive of saying, "I used to be French," or "I
used to be Jewish." That is, one cannot unlearn what one knows
about one's self. In some sense, one always retains an element of
one's parentage or, quoting Bourne, "dwells still in his native environment." Thus a "Frenchman" is always a French man, but in a
particular context he is also more than French, and not Frenchthat is, not the French man he once was. We carry "nations within
us," Bourne suggested, those of origin and of choice. Like the Zionist, the transnational lived in both worlds at once. As such, one
learns to reinvent oneself as the Other, the first step toward bridging the gap between parochial identities. 44 In this modem conception of the cosmopolitan individual, consent- and descent-identities
were thoroughly mediated through active participation in the building of a democratic culture. 45
In reversing the conventional depiction of Jews and other immigrants as marginalized, Bourne transvalued the meaning of
marginality itself. Marginality, in another light, was a form of embeddedness, an anchor that kept one either from being sucked
into the "centripetal" forces of the city or scattered into atomized
isolation by the centrifugal forces of liberal society. Without this
"spiritual internationalism," Bourne maintained, "America ran the
real danger of becoming a queer conglomeration of the prejudices
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of past generations, miraculously preserved here, after they have
mercifully perished at home."
Consequently, he could not condone the maintenance of political loyalty to a homeland or of unchanging cultural practices.
[Those who] fondly imagine that they are keeping the faith
... have not really kept the faith. The faith is a certain way of
facing the world, of accepting experience. It is a spirit and not any
particular form. 46
The point is significant. An unmediated descent identity was premodem; it did not affect a negotiation between old and new cultures
or between former and present selves. A successful cosmopolitanism
involved a mediation of consent- and descent-identities in one's
experiences in the new land. More important, Bourne was suggesting that a modem cosmopolitan identity was not reducible to a particular pedigree or set of experiences. Rather, it entailed a certain
"spirit" or stance-toward oneself and the world-that de/formed
and re/ formed the individual. As a certain practice and discourse,
one's ethnic and cultural identity was continually made and remade,
in contact with other individuals and groups.
Traditional nationalism, therefore, was at best a temporary source
of identification for the hyphenate-American. It would not do
because it was mired in the past, in a "weary old nationalism-belligerent, exclusive, inbreeding," and was rapidly becoming obsolete
by the breakup of geopolitical units, the international "mobility of
labor," and the rise of the multinational corporations. The idea of
transnationalism did not do away with nationalism or national identity; it treated it as a point of departure for a new conception of
American national identity. 47
On a practical and theoretical level, Bourne wanted to expose
the melting pot ideal as a failure and a hoax. 48 It was a failure
because, though cultural communities were broken up and dispersed, individuals retained strong memories of their former lands.
"Assimilation, in other words, instead of washing out the memories of Europe, made them more and more intensely real." 49 But it
was also a hoax because it formulated a corrupt ideal that was
foisted upon the new immigrants. Assimilation was designed to
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take place in terms of the dominant culture and produce results
"congenial to the ruling class." Americanization meant "Anglo-Saxonizing," when it succeeded. When assimilation failed, on the
other hand, it sentenced immigrants to "the most rudimentary
planes of America life, the American culture of the cheap newspaper, the 'movies,' the popular song, the ubiquitous automobile."
They become "the flotsam and jetsam of American life." Dispersion became the lot of every immigrant; "America has become a
vast reservoir of dispersions." Yet he was careful to note that the
"cultural wreckage of our time" comes "from the fringes of the
Anglo-Saxon as well as the other stocks." 50
Linking the Anglo-Saxon with the European immigrants as
"detached fragments of peoples" clearly suggested that AngloAmericans were also immigrants. "We are all foreign-born or the
descendants of foreign-born, and if distinctions are to be made
between us they should rightly be on some other ground than
indigenousness." Only American natives were able to claim an
organic link to a national identity; every group arriving since had
been a "hyphenate." "The Anglo-Saxon was merely the first immigrant, the first to found a colony. He has never really ceased to be
the descendant of immigrants."51
The idea that "all Americans are immigrants" ignored the very real
historical differences between immigrants and "colonized minorities," to borrow from Alan Wald, in terms of their absorption into the
American economy, the forms of discrimination they experienced,
and their cultural acceptance (language, religion) in the larger society.52 Moreover, it is a claim that comes close to the "we are all ethnics" position that gained some degree of popularity in the 1950s and
that has reemerged in the debates over cultural diversity and multiculturalism since the 1980s. Cultural and ethnic studies scholars are
rightly concerned with the false universalism implicit in this position
and the tendency to "reduce" race, as Sollors does, to "one aspect of
ethnicity."53 In my view, the emphasis on ethnicity also has the effect
of reinforcing the hegemony of liberalism ("individualism, mobility,
self-reliance, free enterprise"), because liberal values are conceptualized as neutral, and in some sense "natural," rather than as a "particular set of interests" conceived within a middle-class society, which
have emerged from contestation and challenge during the last three
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centuries. 54 As Slavoj Zizek cautioned, the "massive presence" of the
"world system" of global capitalism is rendered "invisible" by debates
over cultural differences and ethnic particularity, which do not challenge it but take it for granted. 55
But if Bourne's transnationalism too readily universalized the
experience of immigration and the condition of rootlessness and
dispersion, it was too restrictive by its inclusion of (only) European
immigrant groups. He wrote to address a specific historical crisis,
the politics of immigration and the ideology that justified deportations, vigilantism, and Americanization programs, and to defend,
in particular, American Jews from the "terrible like-mindedness"
of the Anglo-Saxon culture. The politics of race, he noted in private correspondence, suggested a different problematic. Nevertheless, at the heart of his effort was a concern to define just what
it meant to be an American and to decouple that meaning from
its Anglophilic associations. In this pursuit of "what an Americanism might rightly mean," his silence over the racialism of American identity is a striking omission.56
The idea of transnationalism rewrote America's story of origin.
Although Bourne did not repudiate the idea of an organic founding, he argued that the founding must be extended into the new
century. "In light of our changing ideal of Americanism, we must
perpetuate the paradox that our American cultural tradition lies
in the future." Every arriving group of immigrants had an equal
claim to reshaping American culture. Each group that arrives in
America becomes a co-founder, an equal participant in shaping
America's identity. America was being constantly refounded and
regenerated with each arriving group. Thus new immigrants could
become part of an organic continuum, an ongoing and continuous founding, and help to define a modern America. "America
shall be what the immigrant will have a hand in making it."
A new way of conceptualizing American national identity was
needed, a way through which ethnic minorities and Anglo-Americans might find common cause in democratic opposition to corporate commercialism.
What I mean by co-operative Americanism ... is, an ideal of
a freely mingling society of peoples of very different racial and
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cultural antecedents, with a common political allegiance and
common social ends but with free and distinctive cultural allegiances which may be placed anywhere in the world that they
like. 57
Stated differently, American transnationalism would begin where
classical pluralism had left off: with the idea of democracy as a confederation-decentralized, pluralistic, self-critical, and self-correcting, in a Deweyan formulation of democracy that creates a
public in the process and practice of democratic participation.
Borrowing from WilliamJames,Josiah Royce, and Horace Kallen,
Bourne reconstructed the contours of an American pluralism that
reflected its oppositional and democratic nature. From James, he
took the image of a "plura-verse"-the idea that the universe is
"more like a federal republic than an empire or a kingdom" 58-and
applied it to American society. America was in miniature what
Europe was in general, a "federation of cultures," a "unique sociological fabric ... a weaving back and forth, with the other lands, of
many threads of all sizes and colors." The idea of a federated America suggested that it had no cultural core. It was like an onion: all
layers, with no center. 59
From Royce, Bourne derived his communitarianism, the idea
that a beloved community could act as a brake against the modern
maladies of rootlessness and, alternatively, conformism. In such
places-such as Columbia University or the editorial offices of the
Seven Art.r-Bourne discovered the "international intellectual world
of the future," where he "breathe [d] a larger air" and felt himself
a "citizen of a larger world." In particular, Bourne looked to the
cities for this democratic and oppositional form of cultural politics. In the cities' multiethnic, polycentric culture, Bourne found
the makings of a viable, countercultural alternative to the ward politics of the urban machine. In its neighborhoods, "communities of
sentiment" were supported, where "little pools of workers, appreciators of similar temperaments and tastes" emerged in its working
and living communities. In the cities (metro-poleis), artisanal or
bohemian activities were producing alternatives to the corporate
commercialism of the movies, dance halls, and amusement parks.
In the cities, the beginnings of a new kind of expressivism could
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be found, a dionysian energy and a certain disorder that presumed
competition between groups and the absence of certain shared values and norms without a common integrating force. 60
His conception of the possibilities of the modern metropolitan
experience, therefore, challenged the progressives' concerns over
the dangers of the city. Like the progressives, Bourne saw the city
as disruptive. It signified not simply freedom from provincialism
but liberation from patriarchy, the bourgeois family, and traditional
gender roles. Unlike the progressives, who sought to contain its
disruptive potential in organized leisure, planned amusements, settlement work, and reformist politics, he encouraged the expression of that energy in new forms of art. Cities reshaped the
possibilities of art, in group pageants, community festivals, and
neighborhood theater productions. Group pageants, like the Paterson Pageant, were modern incarnations of dionysian feasts and
rites; they exploded the division between artist and audience and
brought art to all classes. Their appreciation of the dionysian
undercurrent in urban culture had a regenerative appeal:
The outburst of Pagan expressiveness is far more revolutionary than any other social change we have been making. It is a
New Freedom that really liberates and relaxes the spirit from
the intolerable tensions of an over-repressed and mechanicalized world. 61
In contrast to the urban realists, dadaists, and impressionists of
the early twentieth century, who represented the city architectonically by identifying New York with its skyscrapers, elevated railways,
electric lights, and human congestion, 62 Bourne saw the city as a
center of human vitalism, containing a primal, almost sexual, primitive energy of mass man:
Who can walk the lighted streets at night and watch the flowing crowd, the shining youthful faces, the eager exhilaration
of the sauntering life, or who can see the surge of humanity
on holiday or Sunday, without feeling the strange power of this
mass-life? ... In this garish, vulgar, primitive flow of Broadway,
are not new gods being born? This exaltation of the flowing
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crowd, is it not one with the mystic thrill of the dancing savage, a new affirmation of life?
For millions of Americans, city life was "the real religion, the daily
toil the real sacrifice, the evening saunter and amusement the real
worship." Finally, cities generated their own kind of group life, the
"merging of one's petty individuality and cares into this throbbing
dynamic life" such that "the individual is transcended." In the city,
one recognized that "the highest reality of the world is not Nature
or the Ego, but the Beloved Community." 63
The connection between metropolitanism and cosmopolitanism
suggests the distinct modern subtext of Bourne's transnationalism.
In the city, one reached another state of consciousness, expressing
oneself in ways not directly reducible to the past, in particularistic
blends of current and past cultures and traditions. Modern urban
transnationalism contained elements of diversity and a little disorder. The frenzied release of crowds on Broadway had their pacific and intimate counterparts in the city's beloved communities,
acting as loci of group life. Both situations were faces of the "hot
chaos" of modern urban life: the anonymity of the crowd and the
intimacy of strangers commuting on the same bus; the willed mutual commitments of different minds and spirits bound together
by friendship, common ideals, or both. Each was an alternative
means of offsetting the misguided apollonianism of the rational
and the iron cages of the technological. 64
Bourne's modern, urban transnationalism ultimately failed to
supplant the narratives of Americanization and cultural pluralism and the politics of corporate liberalism. The four intersecting histories-personal, social, political, and cultural-reinforced
one another to close off the opportunity for "spiritual internationalism" and a "cooperative Americanism." Bourne's death in
1918 was followed by the 1919-1920 alien raids, supervised by J.
Edgar Hoover and Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. The
1920s saw a further increase in anti-immigration fever and the
criminalization of dissent, when for the first time surveillance and
crime control were combined under one agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The race riots of 1919, which Hoover
blamed on subversive forces, also helped bring to a close the

CHAPTER SEVEN

140

unrestricted immigration of the previous decade. The commercialism and consumerism of the 1920s displaced and dispersed
much of the artistic experimentation of the prewar years. For
these and other reasons-including an end to the cooperative
internationalism among European nations that Bourne noted
before the war-the countercultural, pacifistic counternarrative
of transnationalism remained what it had been at the outset: a
call to create a "progressive democratic reconstruction of America" hospitable to difference.
As with most of Bourne's political prescriptions, the politics of
transnationalism were a form of cultural politics. As Casey Blake has
aptly remarked, historians have traced the ways in which cultural
activities-the amusement park, baseball, the motion picturebrought together ethnic working classes, "but Bourne understood
that power relations did not disappear when Americans went to the
same movies or cheered the same baseball teams, and his critique
of consumer culture-like his protest against more coercive forms
of Americanism-was ultimately made on political grounds. 65
In my view, his transnationalism was also, to borrow a phrase
from Winni Breines, a form of "prefigurative politics," oppositional
and alternative forms of politics and education less concerned with
challenging directly the policies of the liberal state and more concerned with creating alternative public spaces in which to work out
collective solutions to political problems. Prefigurative politics
attend to personal and political discontents by redefining problems experienced by the unorganized, marginalized members of
society, enabling them to gain a sense of personal authority and
collective integrity that is missing in traditional interest-based associations. For instance, the halfway houses of the civil rights movement served as crucial political and social resources for cultivating
alternative political strategies. 66 In freeing individuals to develop
nonstatist communities as substitutes for the patriarchal family, the
provincial town, the public school, and the organized pressure
group, prefigurative politics anticipate possibilities for society at
large. They are, at the same time, practical experiments in social
reorganization, working in concrete ways to restructure relations
among work, family, and community. 67
Consequently, transnational politics begin where democratic pol-
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itics already exist: in the prefigurative politics taking place in America's subcultures, schools, churches, and neighborhoods. In the
aesthetic-expressive realm of contemporary culture, one need only
think of the origins of rap music or the multicultural music coming out of Los Angeles to appreciate the explosion of traditions
being suggested: a mix of Asian, Mexican, Latino, and Anglo music
and instrumentation that is wholly new, an exuberant yet respectful
merging of the old and new. 68 As the contestation over otherness
increasingly takes place in the aesthetic-expressive realm, these
local, decentralized centers of identity can be transformed into loci
and strategies of power. These alternative forms of group identity
and organization are important, even when operating semiautonomously in terms of goals and strategies, because they redefine
normal politics, taking it out of the state and returning it to the city
(polis), bringing it closer to the lived experiences of the many. 69 The
impulse toward nonstatist, oppositional cultural politics is important to nourish, not because minorities are able to join the mainstream but because they help redefine it. The prefigurative politics
of a democratic transnationalism suggest a cultural politics that is
beyond militarism, and importantly, beyond liberalism. As such, it
offers a significant narrative of dissent.

8
"CREATIVE DESIRE"

One keeps healthy in wartime not by a series
of religious and political consolations that
something good is coming out of it all, but by
a vigorous assertion of values in which the
war has no part.
-Randolph S. Bourne, •~ War Diary"
It is the creative desire more than the creative intelligence that we shall need ifwe are
ever to fly.
-Randolph S. Bourne, "Twilight of Idols "

Perhaps it was Lewis Mumford who gave currency to the idea of
Bourne as a war casualty retreating from politics in his final year.
Writing in the 1930s, he saddled Bourne with the responsibility of
"shaping the dangerously a-political sensibilities of intellectuals in
the twenties," 1 a remarkable claim, given the more likely causes of
the withdrawal of intellectuals from politics after the war, including the red scare, a postwar disillusionment, and the relative lack
of support in America for its artists and writers. Nevertheless, it is
an interpretation shared by others, even the people who knew
Bourne, often substantiated by pointing to the fact that he never
wrote about the war after the closing of the Seven Arts and that the
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single piece of political theory he did write, the fragment on the
state, was discarded in the trash in his room, its writing broken off
in mid-sentence. His friends and literary executors, moreover, tried
to recast him as a cultural critic rather than as a political radical.
Van Wyck Brooks, for instance, his friend and the author of The
Wine of the Puritans, who repeatedly urged Bourne to remain silent
on the war, recounted how he had anticipated Bourne's full flowering into one of the nation's foremost literary critics who would
help to heal the split between the "highbrow" and "lowbrow" that
he, Brooks, found to be severing America's cultural identity. 2
Historians have similarly discounted Bourne's politics or concluded that he abandoned all interest in politics after the Seven Arts
closed. They have argued along one of two lines. One group has
maintained that Bourne became disenchanted with politics because
it was inseparable from war, and having renounced the war, he
renounced all political involvement and turned to art as the only
salvation for the regeneration of American society. The other has
suggested that because Bourne was ultimately ineffective either in
stopping the war or in shaping liberal politics in general, his contribution to American politics was, in the final analysis, negligible.
Charles Forcey, in his influential study of the wartime debates
among New Republic liberals, belongs in the first group in concluding that Bourne "rejected politics in favor of the delights of
artistic anarchism" and offered no "practical alternatives" to the
support of American participation in World War I.3 Paul Bourke's
thesis, as well, found Brooks's political passivity to have influenced
Bourne so substantially that "the effect was to produce in him an
almost total repudiation of politics altogether." In Bourke's reading, the antiwar essays published in the Seven Arts constitute "a sustained polemic against political involvement of any kind," and the
unfinished manuscript, "The State," made "it clear that the enemy
had become, simply politics." 4
The important study by Christopher Lasch, in contrast, belongs
with the second group of historians in arguing that the "new radicals"
of Bourne's generation had consistently confused politics and culture, proposing "political solutions for cultural problems and cultural
solutions for political problems." This confusion made them ineffective politically, and ultimately, insignificant as political radicals,
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unable to shape state policies to radical ends. Casey Blake's assessment of Bourne's political thought followed from this Laschean perspective, concluding that Bourne's search for "beloved community"
was, in the end, insufficiently civic-minded and inclined toward the
romantic. With Blake's study, the historical judgment has come full
circle in recapitulating Mumford's disappointment with Bourne's politics as "romantic defeatism." 5
These are significant criticisms, and any assessment of the importance of his political thought in the history of American dissent
depends on a serious consideration of them. I analyze Bourne's literary and cultural criticism, and his theory of the roles of the artist
and the cultural critic in modem society, in light of these criticisms.
Specifically, I address the claim that Bourne's tum to cultural issues
signaled a retreat from political engagement and argue for an alternative reading, that his cultural criticism was an intrinsic part of
his political theory. My argument requires looking at Bourne as a
particular kind of political theorist, one whose subject was frequently political but whose analyses often were not. (More often,
in fact, his subject was culture.) An interest in culture does not in
itself signify a diminution of political commitment if, as Bourne
believed, cultural solutions could stimulate political responses. His
attention to culture, therefore, makes sense immanently as a political critique.
I also address the related and perhaps more important claim
that the kind of cultural politics he did advance-namely the production of art, literature, and theater by small cooperatives, literary
clubs, and theater collectives-ran the risk of.exclusivity and insularity, compromising the democratic ideals to which he was committed. I suggest that his cultural materialism and his theory of the
function of art underlay his support of these groups and that he
turned to them as a form of prefigurative politics, as exercises in
social democracy, reorganizing already existing social relations.
Moreover, he believed the art and literature produced in the new
cooperatives were more democratic than either the works created
by the individual artist, supported by bourgeois patronage, or the
products of mass culture because the former were produced collaboratively and were available to all classes, and they rejected the
division between the highbrow and lowbrow. Further, he repudi-
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ated the antidemocratic implications of the idea of cultural leadership, suggested by Brooks, political leadership as a notion that
was too close to vanguardism. 6 Ultimately, I argue that the art he
most admired-group art, pageantry, imagist poetry, the novels of
Dreiser and Dostoyevsky-can be seen to illustrate his democratic
commitments, expressing the "paganism" of the modern experience, tracing the thread of desire underlying human ambitions, or
doing both.
The arguments of Brooks and Mumford, as well as many historians, are based on an implicit assumption that cultural concerns are
somehow outside the domain of normal politics, as if culture were
a place to which one withdrew when real politics gets too rough.
This assumption reflects a bias toward liberal politics as normal politics, insofar as liberalism presumes a sharp division between public and private and leaves the private as distinctly reserved for
cultural pursuits and personal (read: unorganized) solutions. The
possibility that culture itself may be a locus of politics itself or that
cultural criticism may have political significance is not considered
because, by definition, they were outside the realm of politics.
Moreover, because liberal politics are largely consensus politics,
interested in building coalitions among elites (assuming there is
no fundamental cleavage among them over principles or core values), they aim to forge compromises over the minutiae of policy
formulation and implementation rather than the formation of the
values of a common life. As liberal politics in America has been
elite politics, in some fundamental sense, ascribing to itself the
tasks of administration, regulation, and social control, they have
not been concerned with the construction of communitarian values or attention to personal fulfillment through democratic participation, which it has assumed already exists. Because Bourne
rejected liberal politics and its institutional forms, he is considered
to have abandoned all politics.
But it was the liberal politics of the New Republic and the Wilson
administration that Bourne repudiated, not politics itself. His rejection of politics was based on the view that the "war liberals" had
distorted politics, overestimating its importance and using the government to intervene in private activities. With the escalation of
the political, the boundary between the public and the private, on
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which liberalism depended, collapsed; and politics consumed personal lives, trampled academic freedom, and disfigured cultural
meanings. Despite the democratic objectives of many progressives,
politics had become an occupation for elites, an increasingly insular form of politics that no longer needed to rely on the consent
of the majority but only on its acquiescence. In short, the enemy
was not politics but an elite politics that knew no limits.
Bourne explained his position to Brooks, as if anticipating the
criticism that he was retreating from politics.
Do we [malcontents] deny that politics has no influence on
the everyday personal and social life of a nation? Of course
not. What we object to is the calm uncritical attitude toward
this relation. Nothing arouses the curiosity of these malcontents more than this question of how political systems, political changes, political manipulations, do affect the civilized life
as it goes on around us. 7
"The real antithesis" between the liberals and himself, as he put it,
was the difference "between interest in expensively exploiting
American material life, and interest in creatively enhancing American personal and artistic life." 8 Liberal politics had aspirations to
"mastery" that aimed to remake society directly. But political reform had to take account of and preserve the culture it believed
itself to be saving.
The conservation of American promise is the present task for
this generation of malcontents and aloof men and women. If
America has lost its political isolation, it is all the more obligated to retain its spiritual integrity.
Accordingly, he advised against any attitude or activity that minimized the importance of art or literature or culture in general.
"This nobly-sounding sense of the futility of art in a world of war
may easily infect conscientious minds. And it is against this infection that we must fight." 9
In 1917 he signaled the move he was about to make. "One keeps
healthy in wartime not by a series of religious and political conso-
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lations that something good is coming out of it all, but by a vigorous assertion of values in which the war has no part." 10 His concern
with American culture was an effort to discover and articulate those
"values" and "ends" that were unexamined in, or absent from, the
political agenda. Therefore he came out for "politics taking its
place in the many-sided interests ofa modern mind." 11
As Carl Resek has suggested, Bourne thought art and politics
could be separated "only at each other's peril," 12 agreeing with the
editors of the Seven Arts that the health of the arts was a public concern. James Oppenheim, in the journal's opening editorial,
announced their philosophy:
It is our faith and the faith of many, that we are living in the
first days of a renascent period, a time which means for America the coming of that national self-consciousness which is the
beginning of greatness. In all such epochs the arts cease to be
private matters; they become not only the expression of the
national life but a means to its enhancement. 13
As public matters, the arts-including the art of politics-were the

appropriate subject for the radical critic. The modern critic had to
become aware of and able to discuss the relation of literature and
art to the larger social environment. Although the precise relation
of art and politics, or for that matter culture and politics, ultimately
eluded Bourne, his efforts to examine the products and practices
of cultural life, in terms of their aesthetic, social, and political aspects and influences, should be seen as part of a wholesale effort
to weld radical politics and radical culture into a coherent theory
and practice, or form of life.
Waldo Frank argued that Bourne had achieved that integration,
joining through his work "the political and cultural currents of
advance." In his cultural criticism, he aimed to link revolutionary
politics with an appreciation of experimental art and thus tried to
create a new mode of discourse and cultural ideal. His cultural criticism focused on the aspects of social life that nurtured and shaped
the writer and broadened the reader's awareness of the writer's
milieu. Cultural criticism in this sense was an extension of his rebellion against the older generation and its Arnoldian "cult of the best"
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and a repudiation of his own generation's preoccupation with
administrative politics. Bourne set for himself as a radical critic the
goal of welding a radical politics and cultural criticism into a coherent theory and practice, believing in its democratic potential. 14

If Bourne was a formalist on arriving at Columbia University, identifying art with the expression of the spiritual and the ethical, by
the time he returned from his European tour five years later, he
was a socialist realist, looking to the political impact of art and literature. Whether either philosophy of the role of art in society and
the standards for judging it had democratic implications requires
an understanding of his reasons for supporting them.
His early aestheticism can be seen in a college essay, "The Suicide of Criticism," in which he challenged the anti-intellectualism
and antirationalism of the "new criticism." Joel Spingarn, his professor and a noted expert in Renaissance art, maintained that art
had nothing to do with morality, only with expression, and must
not be interpreted in terms of any other criteria. The new critic
must renounce "standards" and ask only "what has the author tried
to express, and how has he expressed it?" Bourne's 1911 critique
made a case for the validity of criticism guided by art, and vice
versa. To blur the distinctions between art and criticism meant the
suicide of each. "Art is purposive; it means control and concentration. For the artist does not strive merely to express himself, but to
make a point. And this making a point is what we mean by form."
Bourne insisted in his essay on the importance of artistic form and
on the value of its ethical content. "The attempt to root out the
ethical is a deadly blow at the very existence of Art." Although Spingarn's expressionism did not strike Bourne as immoral, as it did
Paul Elmer More and Irving Babbitt, the "new humanists," it did
seem to be an endorsement of intellectual anarchy and aesthetic
romanticism. 15
By the time he returned from Europe in 1914, Bourne had
abandoned the ethical interpretation of art. There was no single
or absolute standard of what was "good" or "best," as the variety of
literary and performing arts in Europe showed that each country
defined for itself its own standards and its own canon. He blamed
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the new humanism of the genteel critics rather than the expressionism of the new critics for turning art education into "almost a
branch of moral education." Under the influence of Babbitt, More,
Paul Shorey, and Stuart Sherman, Americans had learned that "to
be cultured has meant to like masterpieces" and to worship the
classics.
I am not denying the superlative beauty of what has come to
be officially labeled "the best that has been thought and done
in the world." But I do object to its being made the universal
norm. For if you educate people in this way, you only really
educate those whose tastes run to the classics. You leave the
rest of the world floundering in a fog of cant. 16
When culture was "reserved for the few," the majority was left to
the culture of commercialism and advertising and the popular
novel, and America's writers and artists went unknown and unsupported. Yet the purpose of an education in art was not only to
recover America's artists or to cultivate popular taste but also to
enhance social sensitivity.
The mere callousness with which we confront our ragbag city
streets is evidence enough of the futility of the Arnold ideal.
To have learned to appreciate a Mantegna and aJapanese
print, and Dante and Debussy, and not to have learned nausea at Main Street, means an art education which is not
merely worthless but destructive. 17
The roots were less Platonic than Rousseauian. Bourne's primary
concern was not with the idea that the arts created a false or an illusory reality, which individuals confused with the real world, but
with the consequences of the Arnoldian standard. The cultivated
person, like Rousseau's patron of the theater, learned to ignore the
misery of the poor as he became civilized, losing his natural empathy (amour de soi) and becoming egoistic and self-regarding (amour
propre). 18 Rousseau's genealogy of the corruption of men anticipated Bourne's assumptions about the original sociability of
humans and the process of separation or individuation, justified
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by the bourgeois ethos of individualism. Yet Bourne's modernism
deviated from Rousseau's return to a premedieval communitarianism in his conviction that the arts could attend to the problems
of modern alienation and social misery-not only in the ways in
which they were produced but in their effect on consciousness.
Therefore, the development of aesthetic taste and the standards
to judge it became a political imperative.
Life [is] enriched by a certain ... sensitiveness to art ... ahd
the complete lack ofit ... brutalizes the people. So if you can
do anything towards spreading that sensitiveness ... you have
a work before you as important as that of the best social
reformer. Any general improvement in taste means a demand
for a rise in the standard of living, and this rise is the great fulcrum, I am convinced, in social progress. Until people begin
really to hate ugliness and poverty and disease, instead of
merely pitying the poor and the sick, we shall not have, I fear,
any great social advance. 19
The change in Bourne's thinking about the role of art and the
standards for judging it came in part from his encounters with the
"social art" of the Continent. In a letter from Europe, he wrote of
his enthusiasm for its public arts and city planning. "I am immensely
interested in civic art, town planning and kindred movements over
here." Europeans took city planning seriously, considering "cities
as communal homes," unlike the architects who planned American
towns, which were dingy and sprawled chaotically, and American
cities, where they were "obsessed with the individual building."
European city planners worked with the community and its space
holistically to create designs in accordance with people's needs. 20
Such a possibility was ignored by American architects, who considered architecture as high art and were therefore contemptuous of
city planning or the "common humdrum building" of apartment
houses and office buildings, preferring to leave them to commercial builders. 21
In "American Use for German Ideals," an article that provoked a
storm of controversy and demands that its author be deported for
treason, 22 he praised the bold and exciting architectural styles of the
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University ofJena and the Stuttgart Theater, the estimable town planning of the city of Ulm, the municipally built and owned apartment
buildings in Munich, the model garbage-disposal plant in Furth, and
the garden-city workingmen's suburb in Lichtenhof, where
everywhere, as in the great ages of creative art, the styles are
those in which form grows out of function, so that the work
of factories and water-towers and railroad bridges suggests the
motives of design. Steel and cement set the lines for wholly
novel forms. 23
Architecture was potentially the most democratic of arts, "because
of its completely social nature." It had the ability to shape people's
conceptions of space, productivity, feelings of belonging and intimacy, and freedom. 24 In the culture of the cafe, for instance, private buildings often served as public spaces with multiple purposes,
alternative arenas for the life of citizenship, for shared speech,
action, and recognition. Here the private sphere could be relied
on to draw out the impulse toward a life lived in common. Bourne
even believed that architecture could become part of the solution
to the problems of homelessness, poverty, and slum life.
It was a romantic conception perhaps that individuals could find
the life of "beloved community" in the heart of the city, but it also
revealed a modernist, and Nietzschean, romance about the function of art. It suggested that art had a utilitarian or social function as
well as an ideological or spiritual one. His cultural modernism combined both theories of the relation of art and society. It acknowledged that art had a direct material application and could be a tool
of social reform, and it suggested that the arts could be a source of
cultural regeneration by their potential to transform consciousness
and reinspire common ideals, such that their ideological value was
a prerequisite to the transformation of social arrangements.25
Bourne's views were based on the premise that the production
of art was a social practice. How the artist produced was as important as what was produced and how it was understood. He took as
his subject the artist as creative agent, the choices the artist made in
the creative process, and what the text revealed and refracted
about the social environment in which the artist produced.
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Although he seemed to hold the view that art was created autonomously, the conditions of that autonomy varied, and the texts
could give readers clues as to the state of art in the larger social
process. In this way, the modern critic could judge art and literature immanently but also in social terms. He saw his own task as a
culture critic as that of laying bare the relation between art and
society and of making that relation more apprehensible to artists
and their audiences. 26
This view of art as a collective process, influenced by the conditions of family, community, and work and later developed by E. P.
Thompson and Raymond Williams, also attended to the ideological consequences of art. The process of creation influenced not
only what was produced but also the consciousness of the producers and their audiences. As an ideational force, it had the potential
to politicize them or, at least, to increase their "social sensitivity."
This materialist perspective-in which culture is a practical form of
social organization that shapes its ideological effect-explains his
support for the artists' cooperatives, neighborhood theaters, and
literary collectives of the early twentieth century. Each of them was
involved in a new form of cultural/ social production as participants
of artistic and critical communities unconnected with, and sometimes opposed to, the state and its cultural/ national-patriotic norms.
Artists and critics living and working together as members of "selfconscious cultural nuclei," in contrast to the ways in which art was
traditionally produced by individual artists and supported by cultural elites, created new forms of art: group art, pageantry, avantgarde dance, and performance art, shaped by their collective
organization. They also produced a
new social consciousness [that] demand[ed] its poetry ...
new gods of a collective humanity . .. [a] new social religion
[that] has on the one hand its elevated sentiments of democracy and a restored Christianity, [and] also down in the heart
of the people its Pagan side, vague, formless, terrible, the stirrings of an incalculable force. 27
The pageantmakers were the "Prosperos of today, conjuring up
by their magic all the latent charm and beauty that is among us."
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The democratic implications of this new kind of art were evident
in the effect on its audiences. Group pageants and community festivals were modern incarnations of dionysian feasts and rites
responding to the "elemental cravings" of moderns and, according to Bourne, satisfying the "social hunger" for community. Although group art did not guarantee great art-the Washington
Square Players disappointed him because they lacked discipline
and a sense of the dramatic 28-the artists invoked a new "social purpose," which meant "work[ing] towards a creative, imaginative and
inter-stimulating community life, in which personality and expressiveness shall flourish as they cannot under present institutions."29
Because of their liberating potential, Bourne encouraged every cultural worker to "search out its own group, its own temperamental
community of sentiment," writing for one another and criticizing
freely. "We are now to form little pools of workers and appreciators
of similar temperaments and tastes." 30
The potential insularity of these groups, as has been noted by literary critics and historians, did not go unnoticed in Bourne's cultural criticism. Some groups would be homogeneous ethnically, or
in terms of class or nationality. "Each national colony in this country seems to retain its foreign press, its vernacular literatures, it&
schools, its intellectual and patriotic leaders, a central cultural nucleus." Other groups would be internationalist and, like the Seven
Arts, multiethnic, where, as he wrote of himself, he "breathe[d] a
larger air." He supported them because he thought they would give
new Americans an anchor in the tide of commercialism and a defense against the "most rudimentary ... American culture of the
cheap newspaper, the 'movies,' the popular song, the ubiquitous
automobile." 31 He also endorsed the groups as alternative forms of
social organization and brakes on the ethos of individualism. And
he championed them as democratic alternatives to the practice of
private patronage, which privileged the individual artist and effectively kept the public from participating in an artistic education.
The standards of the social patron had become the standards for
society, and ironically, he found them to have a leveling influence.
"Society," we say, whether it be in the form of the mob or the
cultivated dinner-circle, is the deadly enemy of the literary
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artist. Literary promises can be seen visibly fading out in the
warm beams of association with the refined and the important. And social glamour was never so dangerous as it is today
when it is anxious to be enlightened and liberal. Timidity is
still the reigning vice of the American intellect, and the terrorism of "good taste" is yet more deadly to the creation of literary art than is sheer barbarism. The literary artist needs
protection from the liberal audience that will accept him
though he shock them, but that subtly tame him even while
they appreciate. 32
The dangers of social patronage seemed to underscore the need
for artists and critics to band together, writing for one another, criticizing each other.
The new form of mass culture, the motion pictures, contributed
to the split between the highbrow and the lowbrow. With the current diet of melodrama in the "movies," he argued, "we seem to be
witnessing a lowbrow snobbery. In a thousand ways it is as tyrannical and arrogant as the other culture of universities and millionaires and museums." Yet he did not "put the thing down to the low
intelligence of a dear deluded public." Melodrama was officialism's
"movie interpretation of life," seen in the panicked support for a
sanatorium to deal with the tuberculosis crisis or the contest between corrupt city officials and more corrupt supporters. Thus,
whether it was the standards of the social patron or of officialdom,
the leveling of taste offended his democratic sensibilities. "I don't
know which ought to be more offensive to a true democrat-this
[stale culture of the aristocrat] or the cheapness of the current life
that so sadly lacks any raciness or characteristic savor." 33
Yet, for a social democrat, he advanced a seemingly undemocratic position for judging cultural texts. "All good writing is produced
in serene unconsciousness of what Demos desires or demands. It
cannot be created at all if the artist worries about what Demos will
think of him or do to him." A truly democratic art was constructed
by ignoring the standards imposed by the current social order. "The
artist writes for that imagined audience of perfect comprehenders.
The critic must judge for that audience too." 34 It was a position that
recapitulated Walt Whitman's credo, used as the motto of Poetry, the
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Chicago-based journal of avant-garde verse: "To have great poets,
there must be great audiences too."
Bourne was ambivalent, however, over the elitist implications of
this theory of culture. In "The Artist in Wartime," he fashioned an
imaginary debate over the relation of the artist to the war among
three aspects of his own conflicted mind. The protagonists were
"Clement," an aspiring novelist whose worry that literature was an
indulgence in a world gone mad with war produced in him an artistic paralysis; "Sebert," a "flaneur" and sybarite who was able to write
because he serenely disregarded the war with the justification that
"society [was] a hysterical mob" and could not be saved; and an
unnamed narrator, who worried that Clement's depression made art
useless in war and futile to pursue and that Sebert's dismissal of the
war was socially irresponsible, insular, and self-absorbed. Bourne did
not resolve the question of the futility of art during war, because, in
addition to being conflicted himself, he realized that both positions
destroyed art: the first by suicide, the second by becoming an accomplice to the war's effort. "Suppose all the world agreed with [Sebert]?
Would it be safe for anything, even for Sebert himself?" The debate,
a modem Rameau s Nephew, is significant for the insight it lends into
Bourne's divided mind over the autonomy of art and the artistic
process. To produce in blissful ignorance of social corruption or
malaise was unacceptable; but at the same time, an artistic sensibility must protect itself from a forgiving (uncritical) culture. 35
He concluded that "cultural 'Modernists'" must learn to write
for one another and ignore, for the short term, not only the standards of the social patron but also the sterile debates between the
new humanists, who measured all art in terms of the classics, and
the new critics, who advocated a subjectivist art-for-art's-sake appreciation of the "expressiveness" of art.
Far better for the mind that aspired towards "culture" to be
told not to conform or worship, but to search out its own
group, its temperamental community of sentiment, and there
deepen appreciations through sympathetic contact.
He encouraged the formation of these "cultural nuclei," despite
the risks of insularity, because he expected that they would disagree
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with one another and thereby police their potential elitism. Disharmony could be expected, even a certain disorder, as was evident in
the ongoing debates among the social realists, the modernists, and
members of the avant-garde. But such struggles were essential to
the vitality of the artistic spirit. "Far better a quarrel among these
intensely self-conscious groups than the issues that had filled the
Atlantic and the Nation with their dreary obsolescence." 36
As an example, he undertook a friendly dispute with Harriet
Monroe, Poetry's editor, in 1918, for her position that art should be
judged immanently, or strictly in aesthetic terms.
You can discuss poetry and a poetry movement solely as
poetry-as a fine art, shut up in its own world, subject to its
own rules and values; or you can examine it in relation to the
larger movement of ideas and social movements and the
peculiar intellectual and spiritual color of the time. To treat
poetry in terms of itself is the surest way to drive it into futility and empty verbalism. 37
What he meant by "more careful and better oriented criticism,"
was a "discussion of a larger scope," which understood art "as an
expression of life ... separating the false in [the critics'] work from
the true, and placing them in relation to a larger intellectual and
artistic whole." It was important for critics to "broaden their imaginative and intellectual horizons." The call for a new criticism was,
in: short, a call for self-criticism.
The problem of the literary artist is how to obtain more of this
intelligent, pertinent, absolutely contemporaneous criticism,
which shall be both severe and encouraging. It will be
obtained when the artist himself has turned critic. 38
Therefore, while maintaining the distinction between the function
of art and the function of criticism, he showed a growing appreciation of the need for each cultural worker, the artist and the
critic, to learn from the other. The involvement of the audience,
not only the literary critics, was important to the realization of the
artist's vision.
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He explicitly rejected Brooks's call for a "new literary leadership." Because culture was a collective process, the possession and
practice of everyone, all must be involved in its creation and preservation. If critics were to take any part in this social enterprise, they
would first need to overcome their own class and cultural backgrounds, which the young intellectuals in their political leadership
failed to do. Even if they could, he cautioned that any sort of critical literary leadership should be constructed only as "a pious
hope, a youthful insolence," not as a fact that could be "weighed
tangibly." At most, it could be a "vital myth," an inspiration, but it
"could not point to things done. It could only be a ferment or a
goad. You would not expect it to be anything else." His alternative
was the leadership of the class of "malcontents" and "desperate
spiritual outlaws," individuals from all social classes, who were too
entangled in America and its "promise" to go into exile and too
dissatisfied with things as they were to be apathetic. "The country
must be dotted with dissatisfied people who cannot accept any of
the guides offered to them." Their leadership would be more
democratic but also more political than the cultural leadership of
the critic, who, like Brooks, stayed resolutely out of politics. 39

In his own literary criticism, Bourne addressed not only what texts
revealed but also what they distorted or concealed. Contradictions
between form and content, or contradictory meanings, often disclosed the unconscious tensions in the writer's sense of himself, the
world, or both. The new critic and would-be literary radical had to
make those contradictions known to the artist and to his audience
and interpret their meaning in social terms. Anticipating Bakhtin's
theory of critical dialogics, Bourne determined that the task of the
cultural critic was not to repair the text or to complete the literature but to unveil its contradictions and identify the principle that
underlay its conflicted meanings and contradictory elements. As he
put it, "The new critic must intervene between public and writer
with an insistence on clearer and sharper outlines of appreciation
by the one, and the attainment of a richer artistry by the other."40
In much the same way that the ironist was to heighten contradictions but not resolve them, so the new critic would interpose
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himself between the artist and his audience and attempt to render
an interpretation that had meaning to the audience in their personal lives. The radical critic, in taking a middle position between
the author and the public, interpreted for artists and their audiences the social significance of the creative vision and the multiple meanings in the text itself. It was a role decidedly unlike that
of the postmodern critic "against interpretation," in that it involved
an active intervention in the interpretation of meaning, according
to aesthetic and social standards. His role, decidedly secondary to
that of the artist in stimulating the imagination and transforming
consciousness, nevertheless was an essential part of the artistic
process. As long as the critic was aware of its limitations, criticism
could be a vital arbitrator of cultural taste.
Perhaps because Bourne was concerned primarily with literature, he did not question the limitations of art to express the
depths of human suffering or its inability to capture the common
experience. Later pop artists and painters, perhaps because of the
limitations of the media, became self-referential, incorporating
common objects into paintings in an effort to depict the culture
of materialism. Bourne's sense of the artistic sensibility seemed to
admit of the need to be ironically self-referential as one means of
capturing what he called the "personal point of view." As he saw it,
the work of artists, and poets in particular, brought one closer than
any other form of expression to the subjective and primal forces
in the human experience, the dionysiac given form through the
artist's touch.
Nevertheless, he remained concerned with the importance of
form, more so than were the cultural nationalists on the Seven Arts
(save Brooks), yet not as much as the later Dial critics in the 1920s
were , though never to the exclusion of the work's social significance. At a minimum, Bourne argued, artists must not sacrifice
form for exuberance. The contemporary fashions of art for art's
sake (for example, Walter Pater's aestheticism) and art for society's
sake (for instance, H . G. Wells's socialism) sacrificed form for effect
and did not give art the freedom to grow or experiment. 4 1 On the
other hand, much of Vachel Lindsay's writings, especially the Congo
and General Booth, struck him as "imitative" and "banal." 42 Amy
Lowell's "imagist" poetry achieved the right balance. She chose the
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form to accord with her "revolutionary tone .... Her sound intuition gets the better of her class-feeling even in her attitude towards
the war." In her literary criticism as well, she treated poetry as a significant element of daily life, "neither as a refined dessert to be
consumed when the day's work is done, nor as a private hobby
which the business man will deride if he hears about it." 4'
In an overlooked essay, "A Sociological Poet," he offered an
appreciation of the imagism ofJules Romain and the Belgian poets
of the European renaissance of the 19 lOs. He also indicated of his
search for the sources of democratic culture, admiring it for
reflecting the "social conscience" of the age and a new sociability
that revived the instinctual social consciousness and the sense of
being a "collective person" of man's primitive ancestors. Romain's
poetry "shows the way of that return," singing the song of "the life
of the common soul." He was "a Whitman industrialized," a "poet
of the crowd" and of "mass-life." 44
He admired the work of Dreiser most of all, in Sister Carrie and The
Genius, for its unsentimental rejection of Puritan optimism and its
"habit of redemption" and for Dreiser's frank treatment of the
themes of power and sex. 45 His raw naturalism, also seen in A Hoosier
Holiday, revived Bourne's faith in American literature. It seemed that
only Dreiser understood the "sense of determinism that pervaded
all life." He tried to reach below the "conventional superstructure"
to the life force of desire. "One feels that this chaos is not only in the
Genius's soul, but also in the author's soul, and in America's soul." 46
The attention to the relation between the artist's spiritual health and
the material culture in which the artist lived-suggesting that both
were texts to be interpreted-was a frequent theme in Bourne's literary criticism. The author's characters could be understood as particular representations of both the modern condition and the
author. Yet this tracing of desire cannot be construed as a psychoanalytic interpretation of authorial subjectivity but as a recognition
that desire was intertwined with material reality. "A good novelist
catches hold of the thread of human desires. Dreiser does this, and
that is why his admirers forgive him so many faults." 47
Bourne did not dismiss Dreiser's lack of form, however. He had
"the artist's vision" but none of the "sureness of the artist's techniques." His "clumsy" technique, his indistinct style, his resort to a
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conventional form, the long, episodic structure of the nineteenthcentury novel, and his tedious details, "which are too minute to be
even good photography," compromised his artistic skill. Still,
Bourne wanted to forgive him because Dreiser tried to "make something artistic out of the chaotic materials that lie around us in American life." His sincerity and straightforwardness counted for a great
deal in a culture of melodrama and Victorian sentimentalism.
Earlier American novelists were better at sociology and autobiography because their manner was straightforward, and they made
no pretense at fiction. In 1916 he decided that Upton Sinclair's
King Coal, an attempt to integrate fiction and fact, was the best
compromise that had been achieved by an American novelist. Yet
he likened sociologic fiction to "a movie transcription of life" or
"sociological observation 'filmed."' Like the popular movie, its
characterization was shallow, its plot made one "smile," and it was
motivated by a melodramatic urge to get its "message" across.
Given its different purposes, he suggested, the standards for judging sociological fiction ought to be different from those for art and
literature. "All we say is, Does the novel make visible conditions as
they are and as they ought to be speedily altered?" After a fashion,
Sinclair had succeeded, but largely because his attempts at drama
were so feeble and poorly integrated into the reportage that the
reader could easily extract the story without losing any of the
drama of the grim conditions of coal-mining camps or the brutal
repression of the Colorado coal strike by unorganized miners in
1913-1914. 48
On the other hand, Ernest Poole had "erred in attempting art,"
and H. G. Wells's sociologic novels sacrificed art for effect, the
characters exploited in an effort to convey a political point. Zola
was the only "master of the sociological novel" Bourne could recommend, because he managed to transmit dispassionately the passions of human relations.
Zola lives because .. . he laboriously painted in every segment
of his canvas, documenting sensual impression and confused
aspiration, as well as institutional circumstance, so as to produce, through sheer massiveness and breadth, a feeling of
personal life.
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Similarly, although with a different technique, Dostoyevsky captured "the inner life we know.... After reading Crime and Punishment, you are yourself the murderer. For days the odor of guilt
follows you around." Because the twentieth century was attempting to splinter traditional dualisms between "spirit" and "matter,"
"intellect" and "instinct," Dostoyevsky appealed to the modem sensibility, making no distinctions between "the normal and the abnormal, or the sane and the insane." In shattering conventional
dualisms, he brought his readers into the "full warm unity of emotional life." The reader felt a part of the unfolding drama. "In Dostoevsky's novels it is not only the author that is immanent. The
reader is also absorbed." Older writers often exploited their subjects, but he did not impugn their motives. "There was no falsification" in the presentation of a neatly dualistic life in the writings
of Scott, Balzac, Dickens, Thackeray, and Trollope, because
they were writing for an epoch that really had stable "character," standards, morals, that consistently saw the world in a
duality of body and spirit. They were a reflection of a class that
really had reticenses, altruisms, and religious codes.
Bourne's literary criticism accommodated the historical context of
the artist's work. 49
The newer artists that compelled his imagination and inspired
his idealism were those writers who, like himself, had shed conventional certainties. Willa Cather, one of the new American artists,
understood the new ethical and social landscape and was conscious
that her readers were of different classes. In My Antonia, Bourne
wrote, Cather did not purport to set down "eternal truths" but gave
her readers an "understanding of what these people have to contend with and grope for that goes to the very heart of their lives."
She was "convincing" because her "novel has that serenity of the
story that is telling itself, of people who are living through their
own spontaneous charm," in contrast to the "cluttered" prose and
"self-conscious" moralisms of William Allen White. 50
In the work of the novelists Bourne admired-Cather, Dreiser,
and Twain, among the Americans, and Zola, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy,
Lagerlof, Nexo, Gorky, and Rolland, among the Europeans-he
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saw reflected the dionysian undercurrent of human personalities,
affecting the readers and drawing them into the work. In terms of
technique and stance, the novelists did not condescend, but neither did they insert themselves into the story as a conscious presence. The artists either let the story "tell itself' or kept a serene
distance from the material. In either case readers were not aware
of the writers' art or their presence or message. The story breathed
in the readers themselves; they became a part of it. In contrast to
Brecht's later theory of critical detachment, Bourne seemed to be
suggesting that audiences must become involved in the work itself
to have the work live in them in order to recognize themselves in
it, or to imagine living the life depicted and understand more fully
their place in the social order. It was the critic's task to bring the
audience out of the work again, interpreting its meanings in terms
of social conditions.
Bourne worried at times that American writers were unable to
present convincingly the struggle of life as experienced by the
lower classes, not because they were ignorant of it but because they
adopted a patronizing attitude rather than "the delicate art of sympathetic detachment." In 1916 he had decided that Sinclair's socialist realism would have to do for Americans until a form could be
found "in which the writer not only keeps the faith towards his sociological material, but creates also a drama of personal life." 5 1 By
1918 he had changed his mind. "It is not enough that a book should
be radical." For a novel to be great, it had to tell its story artfully,
and critics whose judgment did not distinguish between a writer's
ideology and his art, or who judged the latter in terms of the
critic's own political persuasions, were "propagandists," substituting one "orthodoxy" for another.52
Nevertheless, the contradictions in Sinclair's journalism-cum-literature suggested to Bourne that there was still room for new
forms of art in America that responded to the cosmopolitan sensibilities of the best-educated, most culturally heterogeneous public to that time. The difficulty of finding those new forms to
capture the "new spirit" he understood to be the result of peculiarly modem problems of man, rootless, drifting, but also threatened by militarist or socially repressive orthodoxies of public and
private comportment. 53 The new art would have to address and
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confront the competing loyalties of America's artists and their
publics; and with the efforts of a social criticism, those angles and
contradictions could be made conscious and socially meaningful.
Writing of himself as "Miro" in "History of a Literary Radical,"
one of his last essays, Bourne suggested he had reached a turning
point in his cultural education. "Miro had a very real sense of
standing at the end of an era." He had learned to "put literature
into its proper place, making all 'culture' serve its apprenticeship
for him as interpretation of things larger than itself, of the course
of individual lives and the great tides of society." Having undergone a "transvaluation of values," he no longer believed that art
revealed truth or virtue but social life itself and its undercurrents
of desire and power. The new art must express what it knew best,
namely the social nexus in which it was embedded. "The American
has to work to interpret and portray the life he knows." 54
In a remarkable anticipation of the debates of the 1980s over
opening the canon of Western literature in the universities to literature of Western colonials and other nations, Bourne argued
that literature had no national limitations and that in a practical
sense it was no longer a question of importing "alien culture in the
form of 'comparative literature'" but of understanding that an
internationalist world order had brought into being its own form
of art. The call for a new inclusiveness in university studies and in
the literary marketplace was meant to challenge the militarization
of culture, first put into effect by the War Issues course in 1918 on
university campuses (later transmogrified in fall 1919 at Columbia
University to a required course, "Contemporary Civilization") .55
The literature that spoke to him and his generation evoked the
common experiences of many people in various countries and had
the effect of transfiguring their consciousness, creating in them a
sense of solidarity with people of divergent traditions.
Miro found the whole world open to him, in these days,
through the enterprise of publishers. He and his friends felt
more sympathetic with certain groups in France and Russia
than they did with the variegated "prominent authors" of their
own land. Winston Churchill as a novelist came to seem more
of an alien than Artzybachev. 56
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The new literary radicals were "cultural 'Modernists"' of "classical
background"-not "cultural vandals"-who mined the cultural past
for writers belonging to a "certain eternal human tradition of
abounding vitality and moral freedom"; through them the new radicals "buil[t] out the future." 57
As a culture critic and literary radical, Bourne had turned to Nietzsche for inspiration. He believed that art, a combination of the apollonian will to form and the dionysian will to chaos, could mend a
culture and reinspire its ideals. Yet he also tried to turn Nietzsche
into a democrat, suggesting that the "American tribe of talent"
would come from no single class or national culture but from those
individuals with a "taste for spiritual adventure, and for sinister
imaginative excursions." The prospects of a democratic cultural
revival came appropriately from the margins, in rebellion against
social patronage and the mass culture of Main Street. 58

9
EPILOGUE

The country must be dotted with dissatisfied
people who cannot accept any of the guides
offered to them.
-Randolph S. Bourne to Van Wyck Brooks, 1918
We can be skeptical constructively, if, thrown
back on our inner resources from the world
of war which is taken as the overmastering
reality, we search much more actively to clarify our attitudes and express a richer significance in the American scene.
-Randolph S. Bourne, "A War Diary"

Bourne contributed to the construction of his own myth, as I suggested at the outset of this book. Through the artful creation of personality and the crafting of auto-American-biographies designed to
unite his destiny with that of his generation, he wanted, he wrote,
following Nietzsche, to tum his life into a work of art. In his autobiographical writings, he constructed himself as a witness to, and
prophet of, his generation's ideals, formed by their experiences in
the modern world of corporate liberalism. Living as an "unintegrated self," he participated in "both worlds"-the puritan world of
restraint, rationality, and guilt and the pagan world of personal
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expressivity, alternative families, and social activism-a contradictory
situation that he regarded as a common one for young moderns.
With an ironic stance of "creative skepticism," he traveled between
"both worlds," in his words, comparing "the is and the ought," much
as Nietzsche's aesthetic impulse moved dialectically between the
dream and the reality, to compare, to "build out a new world."1
But of course he could not control his story, and by the 1920s,
he had become a mythic figure, a martyr to the war, and a voice of
conscience. Part of the myth relied on the idea that his radicalism
was a function of his personal dislocation, or more plainly, that his
"irreconcilability" was a result of his physical differences-his
hunched back, his twisted face, his dark cape worn to hide his misshapen body-and of his marginality, which made it easier to dismiss his politics, as did Amy Lowell ("deformed body, deformed
mind"). For his critics, his radicalism was the result of his being an
alienated and embittered outsider, longing to belong. For others
who knew him, he was marked-indeed, chosen-as the prophetic
voice of the age. As they told it, the afflictions of the body were
overcome , disembodied by the miracle of speech, in Dreiser's
account, or by acts of moral courage, in the memoirs of Oppenheim and Frank. One of Oppenheim's poems is typical:
For in himself
He rose above his body and came among us
Prophetic of his race,
The great hater
Of dark human deformity
Which is our dying world.
For Dos Passos, his ability to transcend reached biblical proportions. 2
Perhaps it was his iconic status that delayed serious studies of his
work. 3 For decades, his name appeared as a footnote in histories
of the twentieth century, principally as an opponent of World War
I, protesting that "war is the health of the state." There were a few
exceptions, a full-length biography, Max Lerner's valuable assessment of his theory of the state, and the recovery of his antimilitarist
writings and personal letters by the editors of Twice-a-Yearin the
1940s. With Christopher Lasch's influential study of the "new rad-
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icals" in the 1960s, Bourne scholarship took a dramatic turn. He
became the subject of several biographies, a central figure in intellectual histories of the early twentieth century, and a political critic
considered by political theorists to be a significant influence on
the tradition of American· dissent. His communitarianism was
recovered by Wilson Carey McWilliams as a critique of liberalism,
its emphasis on friendship and fraternity as a counterweight to its
individualism. Thomas Bender established Bourne as a public intellectual, the last of the independent intellectuals, committed to
a cosmopolitan American culture and a democratic society. In
Robert Westbrook's definitive intellectual biography of Dewey,
Bourne emerged as its hero, his criticism of Dewey's wartime instrumentalism vindicated by Dewey's later embrace of it in a stance
of "cultivated naivete." 4
The critical reception was different from the myth in that it was
not uniformly celebratory. Lerner dismissed Bourne's critique of
the liberal state as reductionist and insensitive to the distinctions
between imperialism and totalitarianism, depending too closely on
the working class to defend against the "anti-democratic and antihumanist" state. Harold Laski, by contrast, rebuked Bourne for
ignoring the corporatist nature ofliberalism. Charles Forcey sought
to restore Bourne's politics to the plane of liberal respectability,
concluding that the differences between his political criticism and
that of the progressives were a matter of style, not of content. Sidney Kaplan reached the same conclusion but saw Bourne as a "halfway figure" between liberalism and socialism/ syndicalism. More
recently, Sheldon Wolin characterized Bourne as sympathetic to
conservatism because of his interest in restoring community values
and rescuing America's "usable past," although Casey Blake's study
of the Young Americans of the early twentieth century carefully distinguished his communitarianism as a combination of the romantic anticapitalist and republican traditions in American thought,
leaning, perhaps, too far toward romanticism. 5
The revolution in Bourne scholarship prompted by Lasch's work
also altered the analytic framework, introducing a psychosocial analysis of political ideas. Historicizing the "new radicalism" of Bourne's
generation as a response to the growing crisis of liberalism in the
twentieth century, Lasch interpreted Bourne's critical dissent as a
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product of both personal and generational alienation. As a member
of the first class of self-described intellectuals, Bourne (and his generation of new radicals) was alienated from his middle-class background because of the breakdown of family values, the absence of
discipline, and the reliance of weak and ineffectual parents as well
as the schools on experts to administer private relations. The progressives, according to Lasch, sought reintegration in society by supporting programs that aimed to impose a (repressive) social order
through practical or intellectual forms of control, but Bourne pursued a form of personal politics based on friendship rather than on
citizenship, an immature assessment of political agency that was
inadequate as a political solution to the crisis of authority in the family and in other social institutions. Blake's study of the Young Americans reflected the Laschean psychological analysis, arguing that the
breakdown of the late Victorian family (read: the absence of the
father and the failure of material nurturance) turned these culture
critics inward, in an infantile craving for "oceanic" wholeness or
unity, searching for a "beloved community" that consequently weakened their civic commitments. 6
The new radicals' lack of attention to institutional politics and
their tum to personal politics formed the basis of the Laschean critique. Lasch seemed to be troubled by the influence of the new
radicalism on the culture of contemporary America. His argument,
subsequentJ.y debated for almost three decades, suggested that the
politics of the new radicalism led indirectly to the further breakdown of the family and patriarchal authority in the later part of the
twentieth century; the decline in marital love; the rise of a culture
of narcissism, with its turn to experts, therapy, personal expression,
and the general escape from adult responsibility; and, as a particular example of its excesses, its influence on the personal politics
of the New Left. 7
Lasch's critique of the crises of capitalism, and his disdain for
the culture of narcissism that ironically supported it, is less important to my analysis than the psychological premises on which it is
based. Lasch seems to fear the loss of the idea of a stable, unified
self, able to establish internal boundaries and discipline and to
enforce the reality principle, to determine the limits of the possible. I have suggested that Bourne's rejection of the terms of a lib-
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eral discourse can be seen to extend to his rejection of the liberal
conception of the self, on which it is based. Lasch, and to a lesser
extent, Blake, is wary of the breakdown of boundaries-between
self and society, love and friendship, history and truth-yet Bourne
recognized and welcomed the collapse. This is not to say that he
embraced a sense of the performative self, playing out a "drama"
of fantasies on a refracted mirror stage (Lacan), but he did regard
the self as a "network of representations of the various codes and
institutions of society," a socially embedded and fragmented or
multiply affiliated self, that prefigured the postmodern self, constructed by self-alienation (separation).
The "unintegrated self' of Bourne's social psychology confronted
the possibilities of boundary breakdown-between the masculine
and the feminine, the young and old-and, in particular, did not
fear the feminine, or in Bourne's terms, the dionysian. It is important to be clear. The construction of a "vital" and resilient self in
Bourne's understanding did not collapse the boundaries between
self and other or between the natural and the social, contrary to
Ross Posnock's reading, but it did, as Posnock suggested, permit a
fluidity of affiliations and an instability of perspective that Bourne
cultivated to keep his radicalism from collapsing into orthodoxy.
Therefore, if one considers the Freudian self as the norm, with its
well-integrated super ego, then the "unintegrated self' of Bourne's
psychology, with its embrace of the feminine, will seem to be immature or stuck in adolescence. 8
Bourne's "unintegrated self' had its political and intellectual
corollary in his stance of "creative skepticism" in that he was both
connected to the particularities of day-to-day politics and at the
same time grounded in theory. This position, which Posnock
termed the politics of nonidentity, meant that Bourne's political
commitments were constantly in flux, contingent on specific circumstances but relying on "intellectual suspense" to test them critically. In a letter written to Paul Strand in 1917, Bourne described
the difficulty of translation and transcendence:
Being of marked physical deficiency and therefore draftless,
I often fear that I write about the war without that poignant
sense of it that must come to the men who have the direct
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issue made for them. I feel it all, but I may be too much "in
the air," as they say. One is happy, however, in these times, to
find one's self saying anything that brings help to anybody. 9
In this rare reference to his physical disability, Bourne underscored
the dangers of abstraction. "Intellectualism is the 'liberal' curse,
the habit of moving in concepts rather than in the warm area of
pragmatic life," he wrote to Brooks. The restlessness of a "creative
skepticism" reformulated the experimentalism of pragmatism and
recovered theJamesian "personal point of view."
Despite the many troubling implications of Lasch's critique of
the culture of self-love, his thesis cannot be dismissed out of hand.
The implication that Bourne was stuck in suspended adolescence
or, more generally, was unable to offer a mature or constructive
politics to deal with the political crises of corporate capitalism is a
recurrent theme in Bourne scholarship. It has found its expression
in Mumford's disappointment in Bourne's "romantic defeatism,"
and, more recently, in Michael Walzer's reading of Bourne's final
writings as a retreat into "despair" and "distance." 10
Against the psychosocial imagery, I would like to address the
same issue by repositioning Bourne's politics within the Nietzschean terms of this book and particularly in the metamorphoses
of the three spirits. In Zarathustra's first speech, he relates the voyage of the spirit: "Of the three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell
you: how the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion, and
the lion, finally, a child. " 11 In Nietzsche's allegory, the camel was
the stage of the "yea-sayer," the long-suffering, willing bearer of
pain, who would carry any burden and submit to any pain. It was
the soul's moment of reaction, enduring life's contradictions and
accepting them as natural. The lion represented the "nay-sayer,"
the rebel whose form of rebellion was in absolute negativity against
all that went before . The lion was not creative in his revolt but
sought only to be free. The final stage, the moment of the child,
was the stage of willful innocence and potential rebirth. Through
the act of forgetting, that is, in the willful remembering of one's
past and of taking it in, a return to the stage of childlike joy was
possible. Only those individuals who were stuck in their pasts, who
had grievances they could not forget, were unable to move to the
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last stage, unable to act to liberate themselves. They were at war
with their own time and at war with themselves. 12
The interpretation of Bourne as stuck.in the stage of Nietzsche's
lion-in the position of always saying no-is persuasive in light of
the breadth of his critique and the persistence of his "irreconcilability." His hostility to bureaucratic institutions, his antistatism, his
repudiation of scientific management and professional expertise,
and his animus toward the myths of progress aided by technology
were consistent and absolute. His fears of conformism under the
"herd instinct" of the family, the school, the state, and the communities of feminists and the literati followed him from his first
writings on the generational conflict. His critique of the misdirected faith in science-not of science itself-and the experiments
in social reform and welfare administration placed him outside the
progressive community in the view of many people within it. His
critique of a one-dimensional mass culture and its commercialism
left him in a compromising position for a cultural democrat. Many
of these positions are unsupportable today, even for people on the
left-because such views underestimate the possibility of democratic resistance and dismiss the constructive role of statist politicsbut they raise the question of whether the nature of his dissent was
so thoroughgoing that it precluded any constructive or creative
politics of affirmation.
My point is that Bourne's politics, although largely anti-institutional, were neither defeatist nor irredeemably negative. His support for the prefigurative politics of a transnational American
culture was not in itself anti-institutional. Indeed it redefined the
nature of politics and opened up the political space to outside
voices and alternative sites of engagement. His politics of cultural
experimentation were grounded in a democratic impulse that
communities of artists and writers could reorganize social relations
in their own practices as well as produce art for all classes. His
belief that cultural solutions could stimulate political responses
grounded his enthusiasm for the transforming influences of architecture and city planning.
Moreover, Bourne did indeed endorse some forms of institutional
politics, what I have called prefigurative politics, or the neighborhood-based politics of halfway houses, settlements, experimental
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schools, and cooperatives that involved feminine labor, self-help, and
nonstatist alternatives to centralization and bureaucratic management. Prefigurative politics were not substitutes for centralized institutional politics, but they were practical, experimental, and alternate
spaces for education and engagement, where the relations between
family, work, and the community were reorganized. His redefinition
of the political was a breakdown of the boundaries between institutions and culture, public and private, on which liberalism depended.
Put in Nietzschean terms, Bourne saw power (or the will to power) in both nature and in convention, constituting individuals and
structuring their activity and discourse. While Nietzsche dissolved
the concepts of community and culture (and past and future) in
the interest of creating the autonomous individual, Bourne aimed
to free men from both nature and convention for participation in
"beloved community." In his fragment, "Old Tyrannies," his resignation to the forces of social determinism, the fact that "we live a
completely social life" in which we "have never overtaken the
given," seems complete. Perhaps it was less a cry of despair, as most
have read it, and more a recognition of the need to create alternative communities without the "sect-pressures" of both natural
and conventional groups.
Let us compel the war to break in on us, if it must, not go hospitably to meet it. Let us force it perceptibly to batter in our
spiritual health. This attitude need not be a fatuous hiding in
the sand, denying realities. When we are broken in on, we can
yield to the inexorable. Those who are conscripted will have
been broken in on .. .. [Others] can resist the poison which
makes art and all the desires for more impassioned living
seem idle and even shameful. For many of u s, resentment
against the war has meant a vivider consciousness of what we
are seeking in American life. 13
These communities, in my view, were not insular enclaves or an
opportunity for escape into romantism but an anchor against the
centripetal forces of society, dispersing individuals and atomizing
them, and the centrifugal forces of the state, imposing a national/
patriotic identity.
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Perhaps the issue of Bourne's negativism might be differently
phrased, in order to inquire into the implications of his dissent. If
one chooses to analyze power from outside the state and outside mass
society, is one in a difficult position to look for a source of resistance?
Is one forced into a position of a solitary critic, or can one find a basis
for a democratic criticism that speaks to the common experience in
the common language? The answer seemingly depends on a reading
of Bourne's critical position, "below the battle," the space where he
worked out both his critique and his proposals for America's
"promise." Taking a position "below the battle," he argued, was a
stance for impossible situations: when one is forced to choose
between two fixed or false choices or when choices are foreclosed by
the "inexorables" of social and political forces, making individual
resistance ineffective and mass protest untenable. It was not a position of political quiescence, contrary to Blake, or of aloofness. "This
does not mean any smug retreat from the world, with the belief that
the truth is in us and can only be contaminated by contact." 14 It was
a position that was necessary for the "malcontents" of all classes, who
"cannot accept any of the guides offered to them." 15
Ironically, at the same time that Bourne's stance was a concession of the limits of dissent-for the critic who is below the battle
cannot influence official policy, but neither need the critic support
it-it created the precondition, indeed the necessity, for a creative
politics worked out in the unmapped space of the impossible. Its
"creative skepticism" resembled Nietzsche's aesthetic impulse, moving between dream and reality, or in Bourne's terms, between the
is and the ought. The tension was creative; the comparison of alternatives, the shifting of the light, in his photographic metaphor of
the ironic vision, altered the nature of reality, until the normal
became the deviant and the sane became insane. By altering perception, heightening imagination, and shattering illusions, irony
was both constructive and destructive. "If the ironist is destructive,
it is his own world he is destroying; if he is critical, it is his own
world that he is criticizing .. . his irony is his critique of life." His
effort, like Nietzsche's artist, was to show other modems how to see
the world differently and thereby to change it.
Perhaps it does not misconstrue the nature of his dissent therefore to conclude that he was not caught in Nietzsche's "laughing
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lion" but was drifting to the stage of the child, trying to recover a
youthful innocence that came, for Nietzsche, in remembering the
slaughter that founded nations so that if one took it in, it burned
in one's memory in order not to repeat it. "We have art in order to
not die from the truth," according to Nietzsche. Bourne's call for
"creative desire," in a similar fashion , may be a means to recover
from the truth:
A more skeptical, malicious, desperate, ironical mood may actually be a sign of more vivid and more stirring fermenting in
America today. It may be a sign of hope. That thirst for more
of the intellectual "war and laughter" that we find Nietzsche
calling us to may bring us satisfactions that optimism-haunted
philosophies could never bring. Malcontentedness may be the
beginning of promise. That is why I evoked the spirit of
Williams James, with its gay passion for ideas, and its freedom
of speculation .... It is the creative desire more than the creative intelligence that we shall need if ever we are to fly.16
In this way, the politics of affirmation would come of necessity from
a position "below the battle."
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68. Randolph S. Bourne to Carl Zigrosser, April 19, 1912, Carl
Zigrosser Papers, University of Pennsylvania, reprinted in Sandeen, ed.,
Letters,'p. 52.
69. Bourne, "Some Thoughts on Religion," p. 196.
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Bourne Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p. 82. Cf. Carroll SmithRosenberg, "The New Woman as Androgyne: Social Disorder and Gender Crisis, 1879-1936, in Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 245-96.
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Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p . 207.

NOTES TO PAGES

82-87

196
84. Randolph S. Bourne, "Chivalry and Sin," review of The Cry of Youth,
by Harry Kemp, and The Americans, by John Curtis Underwood (n.d .), first
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the American Province: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ideas
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 44-55.

CHAPTER

6.

INTELLECTUALS AT

WAR

1. For a review of the myths surrounding Bourne's opposition to the
war, see A. Beringause, "The Double Martyrdom of Randolph Bourne,"
Journal of the History of Ideas 18 (1957) : 594-603.
2. Friends and colleagues who viewed Bourne's "irreconcilability" as
pacifism include Elsie Clews Parsons, "A Pacifist Patriot," Dial68 (March
1920) : 367-70, and Freda Kirchwey, "Randolph Bourne," Nation 3 (December 1, 1920): 619, review of Van Wyck Brooks, History of a Literary Radical and Other Essays. See also Sherman Paul, Randolph Bourne (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Presss, 1966) ; Paul F. Bourke, "The Status of Politics 1909-1919: The New Republic, Randolph Bourne and Van Wyck
Brooks," journal of American Studies 8(2) (August 1974): 198-99; Michael
Walzer, "The War and Randolph Bourne," in The Company of Critics (New
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York: Basic Books, 1988), p. 56; and Gary Bullert, The Politics ofjohn Dewey
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1983), p. 63. (Bullert also claimed that
Bourne was an anarchist.) Cf.John Moreau, Randolph Bourne (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966), pp. 160-61. Bourne's own distinction between his position and that of the religious or political pacifist,
conscientious objector, or both is developed in "Below the Battle," Seven
Arn 2 (July 1917): 270-77, and "Conscience and Intelligence in War," Dial
63 (September 13, 1917): 193-95. For a further indication that Bourne
did not dismiss out of hand a policy of armed defense, see "The Collapse
of American Strategy," Seven Arts 2 (August 1917): 409-24, for a discussion of the strategy of a limited naval war aimed at the "destruction of the
attacking submarines" of the German forces.
3. Thomas Bender, New York Intellect (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1987), p. 243.
4. See, however, Charles Beard, "A Statement," New Republic 13 (December 29, 1917): 249-51. For Bourne's defense of Cattel and Dana, see
"The Inquisition of Columbia," New York Tribune, March 16, 1917; "Conspirators," Seven Arts 2 (August 1917): 528-30; and "Those Columbia
Trustees," New Republic 12 (October 20, 1917): 328-29. On academic freedom, see "Who Owns the Universities?" New Republic 3 (July 17, 1915):
269-70; "Democracy and University Administration," Educational Review
(May 1915): 455-59; and "The Idea ofa University," Dial63 (November
22, 1917): 509-10. See also Carol S. Gruber, Mars and Minerva (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), p. 205; and Clyde Barrow,
Universities and the Capitalist State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1990), especially chapters 7 and 8.
5. Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 1:
xxxi, 64-65, and 3-106 passim. Treitschke venerated the power of the
state, particularly as revealed in war, and scorned the "dream of eternal
peace," in which people's attention would be diverted from the state and
"underrate" it.
6. John Diggins, The American Left in the Twentieth Century (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), pp. 34-39; cf. John Diggins, The
Promise of Prapnatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chap.
3, where knowledge for James was linked to desire-the desire to know,
the need to resolve doubt-and therefore to pleasure or the satisfaction
of desire. See also Howard M. Feinstein, Becoming William James (Ithaca,
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1984), for James's desire to resolve the anxieties of a "sick soul." Cf. Diggins, Promise, chap. 5, on Dewey's pragmatism as an attempt to merge religious faith with scientific analysis. For a
similar interpretation, see Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of Amer-
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ican Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1995). Cf. Robert B. Westbrook,john
Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1991) , who sees Dewey alternatively as a social or a moral democrat.
7. Randolph S. Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," Seven Arts 2 (October
1917): 688-702, reprinted in War and the InteUectuals, ed. Carl Resek (New
York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 56. For a sympathetic study of Dewey's
shift from issues of education to issues of central planning and political
action, see Alan Cywar, "John Dewey: Toward Domestic Reconstruction
1915-20," Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969) : 385-400, and ''John
Dewey in World War I," American Quarterly 21 (1969): 578-95. Paul F.
Bourke also recalled that Dewey thought philosophy "recovers itself when
it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and
becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers for dealing with the problems of men" (quoted in Bourke, "Philosophy and Social Criticism:John
Dewey 1910-1920," History of Education Quarterly 15 [Spring 1975] : 6).
8. Cf. Bruce Clayton, Forgotten ProfJhet (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1984), who argued that Bourne committed "intellectual
suicide" with his antiwar articles, effectively putting his career as a political critic to an end (p. 202).
9 . James Oppenheim offered an affectionate tribute to Bourne in
"The Story of the Seven Arts," American Mercury 20 (June 1930) : 156-64,
acknowledging the risks of publishing Bourne's essays, which he, as editor, willingly undertook.
10. Randolph S. Bourne to Everett Benjamin, November 26, 1917,
Bourne Papers, reprinted in Letters of Randolph Bourne, ed. Eric Sandeen
(Troy, N.Y.: Whitston, 1981) , p. 404.
11. The details of the Dial controversy are told most authoritatively by
Nicholas J oost, Scofield Thayer and the Dial ( Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1964), 4-13, 37, 78, 188, 201, 230-32, 265, 271-72, and
Joost, "Culture vs. Power: Randolph Bourne, John Dewey and the Dial,"
Midwest Quarterly (April 1968) : 245-58. See also letters from Bourne,
Bourne Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, pp. 415, 419, 423. The
story is a complicated one. After the Dial came out in support of the war
in 1917, Bourne's position there became increasingly precarious. Martin
Johnson, the journal's editor, was wary of the confrontational tone of his
articles and decided that Bourne was a liability who had to go. Through
the intercession of Scofield Thayer, a friend and admirer of Bourne's and
a financiaf backer of the journal, Bourne's demotion or outright firing
was prevented for about a year, and he remained unsuspecting of the contest between Thayer and Johnson. Meanwhile,Johnson was courting
Dewey, and one of Dewey's demands was that Bourne be let go. Bourne

NOTES TO PAGES

91-92

199
remained on the editorial board in 1917 at Thayer's insistence but was
not invited to editorial conferences and was isolated by the supporters of
Johnson and Dewey; in the last year he wrote only reviews. Eventually the
staff became so split over the feud between Thayer and Johnson, and
Bourne and Dewey, that when the journal moved to NewYork,Johnson
reorganized the staff and placed Dewey in charge. Bourne was out of a
job; Thayer resigned in support of Bourne and within a year had severed
all ties with the journal, including financial support. Ironically, Dewey left
the journal within the next year, traveling first to California and then to
China to set up education programs.
12. See Westbrook, Dewey and American Democracy, pp. 195-212; Diggins, Promise, pp. 250-59; Ryan, Dewey, pp. 157, 341; and Posnock, "Politics," 49-54. Westbrook documents carefully the changes in Dewey's
thought after the war and argues that Dewey ultimately embraced
Bourne's critique ofinstrumentalism and considerably more radical politics, thus vindicating Bourne's wartime critique (a conclusion to which
Diggins takes exception). The nature of Dewey's postwar politics, although outside the purview of this book's focus, nevertheless appears to
be quite different, in my view, from Bourne's politics both before or during the war. Though Dewey became a noninterventionist in World War
II, Bourne's argument was that modern war exaggerated the bipolarity of
liberal politics so that neither militarism (intervention) nor pacifism
(nonintervention) was an adequate response to the political and cultural
aspects of international conflict and cooperation. Moreover, his politics
both before and during the war were distinctly nonstatist, often personal
politics; and Dewey's politics-which he sometimes called a "radical liberalism" and which Westbrook has called a democratic socialism-seem
nearly always to have included some degree of state intervention or
involvement.
13. C. W. Mills, Sociowgy and Pragmatism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1966) .
14. Bourne, "Below the Battle," in Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals,
pp. 15-21. The title inverts Romaine Rolland's "Above the Battle" and by
implication its pacifist stance. See also Bourne, "A War Diary," Seven Arts
2 (September 1917) : 535-47, reprinted in Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals, pp. 41, 43.
15. Posnock, "Politics," p. 35.
16. Bourne, "A War Diary," p. 45.
17. David Kennedy, Over Here (New York: Oxford University Press,
1980), chap. 1.
18. Bourke, "Status of Politics," pp. 186--87.
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19. Herbert Croly to Randolph S. Bourne, September 15, 1914,
Bourne Papers.
20. Edward Stettner, Shaping Modern Liberalism (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1993), chap. 7.
21. Editorial, New &public 1 (November 7, 1914): 1. See also Croly's
letter to Dorothy and Willard Straight, which suggested that the role of
the critic was to "transmute the experience the American people will
obtain ... into socially formative knowledge" (quoted in Bender, New Yark
InteUect, p. 227).
22. William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The
Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," Mississippi VaUey Historical Review, 39(3) (December 1952): 483-504. See also
William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy ofAmerican Diplomacy (New York:
Dell, 1959) for the view that U.S. diplomacy has been based on objectives
of imperialism and economic expansion.
23. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism," p. 490, quoting Herbert Croly in
Willard Straight (New York: Macmillan, 1924), pp. 422ff., 503.
24. Croly, Promise of American Life, pp. 289-90, 301-33, 169.
25. Ibid., p. 500.
26. There is some debate among historians over the nature and content of the New &public's foreign policy during the years of preparedness
and mobilization. Bourke ("The Status of Politics," pp. 176--87) argues that
Croly in particular, and the editors in general, lacked any commitment to
specific political reforms or policies but aimed deliberately to transcend
the contingency of social and political events or programs and to discuss
issues of a more "permanent" nature. In Bourke's reading, their abstract
and idealistic rhetoric signified their intent to speculate on hypothetical
institutional arrangements and social plans, articulating common principles and broad objectives rather than narrow, partisan preferences. Charles
Forcey, by contrast, in The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann,
and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1961), p. 270 and chap. 8, passim, argues that the New &public's editors
"effectively made over Wilson's foreign policy into their own," a policy that
did not square with their own liberal principles but that they eventually
had to embrace, once the turn of events took away their hopes of controlling them. Finally, Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America,
1889-1963 (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 184, 192, and chap. 6,
passim, suggests, along with Bourke, although for different reasons, that
the editors lacked a specific or concrete foreign policy and agrees with
Forcey, again on a somewhat different basis, that they "improvised" a foreign policy, but only when it was forced upon them by political, military,
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and diplomatic events, and they became dissatisfied with neutrality because
it contributed to their passive observation from the sidelines. The consensus, if there is one, seems to be that, for whatever combination of reasons, a specific foreign policy did emerge among the New Republic's editors,
a policy that bore a striking resemblance to the militarist nationalism of
the Progressive party. In my reading, the rhetoric in New Republic editorials between 1914 and 1918 reflects a solid support for the Progressive
party's domestic and foreign policy initiatives, i.e., for a vastly increased
role of the state-supporting rather than merely supervising the relations
between large, organized interests and the government-and for the role
of an activist state as a major actor in the world order.
27. James Harvey Robinson, "A Journal of Opinion," New Republic 3
(May 8, 1915): 9-11.
28. Amos Pinchot, "A Communication," New Republic 3 (May 29,
1915) : 95.
29. See John Dewey, Characters and Events, ed.Joseph Ratner (New
York: Henry Holt, 1929), p . 91.
30. See, for instance,John Dewey, "Timid Neutrality," New Republic l
(November 14, 1914): 7; Dewey, "Pacifism vs. Passivism," New Republic l
(December 12, 1914): 7; and Dewey, "Aggressive Pacifism," New Republic
5 (January 15, 1916): 263-65.
31. Walter Lippmann, "Uneasy America," New Republic 5 (December
25, 1915): 195-96.
32. See, for instance,John Dewey, "War at Any Price," New Republic 5
(November 27, 1915): 84-85.
33. John Dewey, "In a Time of National Hesitation," Seven Arts 2 (May
1917): 6.
34. John Dewey, "What Are We Fighting For?" Independent 94 (June 22,
1918): 474,481.
35. Westbrook suggests that Dewey initially gave his support to the war
because he took seriously the idea of an international democracy, thinking the war might be the way to spread democracy, and because he was
opposed to German absolutism, which he considered to be hostile to
pragmatism (Dewey and American Democracy, pp. 197-202). Dewey's New
Republic writings on the war are reprinted in Characters and Events, ed.
Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt, 1929), vols. 1, 2. Bourne objected
specifically to Dewey's "Conscience and Compulsion," "The Future of
Pacifism," "What America Will Fight For," and "Conscription of Thought"
(reprinted in Ratner).
36. John Dewey, "The Future of Pacifism," New Republic 11 (July 28,
1917):359.
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37. John Dewey, "The Social Possibilities of War," reprinted in Ratner,
ed., Characters, 2: 558. Dewey suggests that this arrangement is a form of
democratic socialism, temporarily requiring the intervention and administration of the state, but it appears to be a form of corporatism.
38. John Dewey, "Conscience and Compulsion," New Republic I I (July
14, 1917): 298; "Conscription ofThought," NewRepublicl2 (September
1, 1917): 128-30; "In Explanation of Our Lapse," New Republicl3 (November 3, 1917): 17. Westbrook notes that Dewey made a distinction between
force (energy) and violence to evaluate pragmatically which was the more
efficient means of accomplishing a certain end and argues that only when
war became the most efficient means was Dewey willing to support it
(Dewey and American Democracy, pp. 201-2, quoting from "Force and Coersion," New Republic [1916)). Cf. Daniel Levine, "Randolph Bourne,John
Dewey and the Legacy of Liberalism," Antioch Review 29 (Summer 1969:
234-44), who suggests that Dewey thought force and violence were
morally neutral, thus enabling him to be ethically uncompromised in his
support for war.
39. Walter Lippmann, "Morale," New Republic IO (April 21, 1917):
337-38.
40. [Unsigned], "Who Willed American Participation?" New Republic
10 (April 14, 1917) : 308-10.
41. Randolph S. Bourne, "The War and the Intellectuals," Seven Arts 2
(June 1917): 133-46, reprinted in Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals,
pp. 3-14.
42. Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," pp. 59-60.
43. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1977; rpt., New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
44. Randolph S. Bourne to Prudence Winterrowd, February 5, 1913,
Bourne Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p. 71.
45. Bourne, "Twilight ofldols," pp. 60-61.
46. Ibid., pp. 61, 63.
47. See Casey Blake, Be/,oved Community (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1990), on Bourne's own instrumentalism (pp. 97-98).
48. The author thanks Michael Weinstein for this argument.
49. For an indication of the range of political values (not to say "private utopias") to which pragmatism has been applied, see Pragmatism in
Law and Society, ed. Michael Brint and William Weaver (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1991) .
50. Bourne, "Twilight ofldols," p. 55.
51. Levine, "Bourne, Dewey," pp. 238-39; Rick Tilman, C. Wright Mills:
A Native Radical and His American Intellectual Roots (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1984), p . 150. Cf. Bullert, Politics of Dewey, who
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reduced Bourne's critique of Dewey's wartime pragmatism to a personal
vendetta and a "demonic quest for notoriety" (pp. 60-64). Bullert thoroughly misunderstands Bourne's position claiming that he wanted a German victory and thereby misunderstood Dewey's arguments on political
grounds.
52. Mills, Sociol,ogi,cal Imagi,nation, pp. 111-41. See also R. Jeffrey Lustig,
Corporate Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982),
pp. 150-94.
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56. John Dewey, Ethics (New York, 1908), p. 26, quoted in Sidney Kaplan, "Social Engineers as Saviors," Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (June
1956): 349; Karl Mannheim, ldeol,ogy and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), pp. 153-71. See also Alvin W. Gouldner's
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(April 1917) : 1. Cf. Forcey, Crossroads, on the liberals' gravitation toward
power like "moths" to a flame.
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76. Bourne, "The State," pp. 69, 74-75.
77. Ibid., pp. 100-101, 103.
78. Ibid., pp. 77-79.
79. Ibid., pp. 76-78.
80. Ibid., pp. 75-76. See also "A War Diary,", pp. 36-47, where the disproportionate impact of the war on different classes is discussed.
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Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, pp. 413-14; Bourne, "The
State," pp. 76-77.
82. Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," p. 60.
83. Bourne, "The State," pp. 78, 89.
84. See Randolph S. Bourne to Prudence Winterrowd, March 2, 1913,
Bourne Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p . 76. "You tease me by
misrepresenting James; he was very far from being a defender of existing
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Bourne, "A Moral Equivalent for Universal Military Service," New Republic 7 (July 1,1916): 217-19, reprinted in Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals, pp. 142-47, where he argued the idea was no longer utopic. See
Blake, Beloved Community, on Bourne accepting the military equivalence
thesis (pp. 97-99) . For Bourne's own pragmatic analysis of the ends and
means of military involvement and the idea of a limited military engagement, see "The Collapse of American Strategy," Seven Arts 2 (August
1917): 409-24.
85. Randolph S. Bourne to Van Wyck Brooks, March 27, 1918, Brooks
Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p. 412.
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7.

"TRANS-NATIONAL AMERICA"

1. Robert Frost to Louis Untermeyer, November 3, 1917, in The Letters of Robert Frost to Louis Untermeyer, ed. Louis Untermeyer (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 60. For a history of the short-lived
Seven Arts, see Waldo Frank, "The Tragedy of the Seven Arts," in Memoirs
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2. Masses Publishing Company v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (So. Dist., N.Y,
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University Press, 1960); H. C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite, opponents of War,
1917-1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), chap. 5;James
Weinstein, The Decline of American Socialism in America (New York: Vintage,
1969), chap. 3; Carol S. Gruber, Mars and Minerva (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1975); Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin
of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979); and
David Kennedy, Over Here (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980),
chap. 1.
3. Randolph S. Bourne to Van Wyck Brooks, March 27, 1918, Brooks
Papers, reprinted in Letters of Randolph Bourne, ed. Eric Sandeen (Troy,
N.Y: Whitston, 1981), p. 412.
4. The familiar epigram, the "aestheticization of politics," is Walter
Benjamin's, constructing the process of Fascist domination. See Walter
Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in
Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968),
p. 242. For a brilliant comparison of fascist and modem forms of aesthetic
politics, see Linda Shulte-Sasse, "Leni Riefenstahl's Feature Films and the
Question of a Fascist Aesthetic," Cultural Critique 18 (Spring 1991):
123-48.
5. Randolph S. Bourne to Everett Benjamin, November 26, 1917,
Bourne Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p. 404.
6. See Michael Lind, The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism
and the Fourth American Revolution (New York: Free Press, 1995), on the
efforts of the "second republic" to create a common American identity
on the basis of nativist assimilationism (chaps. 2 and 6); cf. Eldon J. Eisenach, The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1994), who is strangely silent on anti-immigration campaigns during the Progressive Era.
7. See, for instance, Michael Rogin, Fathers and Children, Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian (New York: Vintage Books,
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Demonology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), and Ronald
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Brown, 1993).
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9. To be sure, the question of American identity has been inseparably related to questions of its ethnic origins, according to Norman Jacobson, from the very beginning. Depending partly on when one dates its
founding, America's national identity has been determined either to be
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a mixed and fundamentally unmeltable entity. The question of American
identity and the meaning of America itself are complicated further by the
fact that the "idea of America" preceded its "discovery" by European settlers. As early as 1519, European intellectuals began to refer to America
as a once and future idea, part fantasy and part reality. A possession of
the European imagination, and a term over which the European mind
battled in its efforts to come to grips with its own failures and disappointments, America became a repository of European expectations and
illusions. It symbolized at once the absence of European culture and an
emblem of what could be, the potentiality and testing ground of their
noblest ideals. Even today, the word "America" is ambiguous, denoting
the name of an entire hemisphere and connoting at the same time a
place, unspecified and indefinite.
10. Randolph Bourne, "A War Diary," in War and the InteUectuals, ed.
Carl Resek (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 46.
11. Randolph S. Bourne, "Our Cultural Humility," Atlantic Monthly 114
(October 1914): 503-7, reprinted in History of a Literary Radical and Other
Essays, ed. Van Wyck Brooks (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1920), p. 41. The
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set aside for the more ambitious plan of an international retrospective of
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huge display of over 1,600 paintings, drawings, prints, and pieces of sculpture. Although American art dominated the exhibit in actual number of
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colors and shapes of the antirealism of the Europeans. For studies of the
Armory Show and its impact, see Milton W. Brown, The Story of the Armory
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a people or group or as a form of life peculiar to a specific period of time.
This tradition begins with Johann Herder (and implicitly with Hegel) and
informs Thomas Jefferson's and de Tocqueville's studies of American
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political culture; it is influential in the work of Charles Beard and Franz
Boas in the 1910s. The third tradition refers to the works and practices
of intellectual and artistic production. This conception focuses on the
aesthetic processes, relations, and artifacts that constitute a nation 's
ideational identity. The first and third sense of the term are closely
related, and in the case of Matthew Arnold, virtually identical. Bourne's
conception of culture, and "national culture" in particular, falls in the second tradition primarily, as did the cultural nationalism of the writers on
the Seven Arts. But he also wrote of culture in the third sense, in terms of
the Ii terature and art of a people (see chapter 8). This hybrid sense of
culture, the convergence of the second and third definitions, finds its
contemporary expression in the works of the Manchester school, among
its members the cultural critics Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson,
who understand culture to be a collective creation, not a fixed symbol system but a continuously constituted structure of meanings created by family, community, and work. In my analysis, the hybrid sense of culture will
be assumed.
14. Michael Paul Rogin, "Political Suppression, Intimidation and Control," American Encyclopedia of Political History, ed. Jack P. Greene (New
York: Scribners, 1984), pp. 392-416.
15. The psychology is even more complicated, as Slavoj Zizek outlines,
for the Other is part of the Self, and the hatred of the Other becomes
hatred of our own excesses of enjoyment (see Slavoj Zizek, "Eastern
Europe's Republics of Gilead," in Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed.
Chantal Mouffe [New York: Verso Press, 1992], pp. 193-207).
16. Ibid. See also Michael Rogin, Black Face, White Noise (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 25.
17. Ronald Fernandez, "Getting Germans to Fight Germans: The
Americanizers of World War I," Journal ofEthnic Studies 9 (Summer 1981):
52-56.
18. George E. Pozzetta, "The Italian Immigrant Press of New York City:
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insider views of the urban immigrant experience, see also Uri D. Herscher, "The Metropolis of Ghettos," Journal of Ethnic Studies 4 (Summer
1976) : 2, 33-47.
19. Nativism is well entrenched in American political history, its theories of national culture, and its immigration policies, beginning as early
as 1609. See William S. Bernard, "Immigration: History of U .S. Policy,"
Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, ed. Stephen Thernstrom,
Ann Orlov, and Oscar Handlin (Cambridge : Harvard University Press,
1980), pp. 486-95. For the definitive history of nativism at the turn of the
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century, see John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Brunswick NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1955).
20. Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in Michael Kazin , "The New Historians," New York Times Book Review, July 2, 1989, p. 18.
21. Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Kennedy, Over Here, pp. 24, 87.
22. Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Irving Howe, World of Our Fathers (New
York: Touchstone, 1976), p. 411.
23. Higham usefully sorted out the competing theories of American
national identity and its ethnic origins that came to prominence between
1880 and 1920 in "Immigration and the Redefinition of America in the
Early Twentieth Century," a speech delivered at the New York Public
Library, July 1, 1986. He pointed out that in the nineteenth century
Anglo-conformity and the melting pot theses frequently overlapped in an
often-unrecognized and built-in contradiction, but by the twentieth century, the split became apparent. The divergence, he suggested, was due
to a generational change in the intellectual community, as individuals of
the genteel tradition were replaced by the "young intellectuals" of progressive and pragmatist inclinations. My emphasis is on the role of preparedness imperatives, as they affected both generations, creating a
schism not only between generations but within them as well. Bourne, in
particular, differed from his progressive and pragmatist counterparts on
issues of military participation, nationalism, social reform, and so forth.
24. Werner Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 4-6.
25. Sollors offers a fascinating etymology of the terms "ethnic" and
"ethnicity," which reveals, in his telling, a progressive transformation from
its earliest usage as a conception connoting a deficit or a quality or status
lacking in certain persons to one that is prized as an asset or mark of distinction. The root ethnikos, meaning "gentile" or "heathen," carried with
it the connotation of being foreign or not one of "the people" (i.e., nonGreek), and its noun form ethnos denoted "other-ness" as well. English
usage based on the Greek shifted from referring to non-Israelites to nonChristians, and in fourteenth- to nineteenth-century usages, the term generally held the meaning of being "heathen." By the mid-nineteenth
century in Christian usage, "ethnicity" came to carry the meaning commonly associated with it today, as something "peculiar to a race or nation."
Ethnicity had a sense of the "pagan" about it, as "other" or "non-people,"
and in the United States as "non-Americans. " Even American natives
referred to themselves as "the people" and to all others as strangers
(pp. 20-39) . Though ethnicity has become a source of pride for many people and the basis of a grassroots politics associated with the idea of cultural
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diversity, it nevertheless still retains its sense of illegitimacy (as non-American) or deviancy (as disloyal), which can be a political liability.
26. For an alternative understanding of recognizing strangers-not as
foreigners, but as ourselves-see Julia Kristeva, Nations Without Nationalism, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (1990; rpt., New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993) .
27. Cf. Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity, whose consent adaptations are indistinct from assimilation.
28. Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, or, the Racial Basis of
European History (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1918), quoted in Bruce
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1984), pp. 190-91. See also Edward A. Ross, The Old World in the New: The
Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American Peopk (New York:
Century, 1914).
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31. Kennedy, Over Here, pp. 17-18.
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Higham, "Ethnic Pluralism in American Thought," in Send These to Me:
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33. Horace Meyer Kallen, "Democracy versus the Melting Pot," Nation
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379-80, and The Structure of Lasting Peace ( 1918), quoted in Sollors, Beyond
Ethnicity, p. 151. For informative analyses ofKallen's thought and its influences on Bourne, see Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity, pp. 97, 99, 151, 181-83,
186, and Higham, Send These to Me, pp. 204-11, 213, 220.
34. The point is further developed by Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity, pp. 151,
182-83, 231, 254, and Higham, Send These to Me, pp. 212, 207; see also
Higham's conclusion that ethnic diversity is incompatible with democratic ideals (pp. 225-30).
35. Howe, World of Our Fathers, p. 413.
36. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace
and A. V. Miller (1971; rpt., New York: Oxford University Press, 1984),
pp. 255-68.
37. Randolph S. Bourne, "The Jew and Trans-National America," Meno-
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the Intellectuals, pp. 124-33.
38. Brandeis's turn to Zionism was not out of religious conviction but
out of his own insecurity as an American, according to Lewis J. Paper,
Brandeis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1983). Brandeis's late support (after the age of fifty) of Jewish pioneers in Palestine was a way of
demonstrating his American patriotism, for he had convinced himself
they were the modern incarnation of his Puritan ancestors. And indeed,
partly through his efforts at philanthropic organizing, American Zionism
was credentialed as an affirmation of American patriotism. See also
Philippa Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 1993), chap. 5.
39. Bourne, "The Jew and Trans-National America," p. 128.
40. Chaim Potok, quoted in Richard F. Shepard, "Chaim Potok, Man
of Contrasts," New York Times, November 2, 1986, p . 71.
41. Bourne, "The Jew and Trans-National America," pp. 129-30.
42. Thorstein Veblen, "The Intellectual Pre-eminence ofJews in Western Europe" (1919), reprinted in Max Lerner, ed., The Portable Veblen
(New York: Viking Press, 1948), pp. 467-79. Veblen's significant essay
regarding Jewish "exceptionalism" was written three years after Bourne's
study of Zionism, and they share the same spirit.
43. The benefits of a double citizenship applied equally to Afro-Americans. W. E. B. DuBois, whose Souls of Black Folk (New York: New American Library, 1969) Bourne had read, told of his own struggles to reconcile
his racial and national identities, "two warring ideals in one dark body."
"Am I an American or am I a Negro?" he asked in another book. "Can I
be both? Or is it my duty to cease to be a Negro as soon as possible and
be an American?" DuBois understood that assimilation would have to
occur within the terms of an Anglo-Saxon hegemony, requiring a sacrifice of one part of his self, a price he was unwilling to pay.
44. For the importance of cosmopolitanism for American intellectuals, see David A. Hollinger, "Ethnic Diversity, Cosmopolitanism, and the
Emergence of the American Liberal Intelligentsia," American Quarterly 27
(May 1975): 133-51, and Terry A. Cooney, The Rise of the New York Intellectuals: Partisan Review and/ts Cirde, 1934-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), chap. 1. For the decline of cosmopolitanism, see
Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 250-54.
45. Cf. Michael M. J. Fischer, "Ethnicity and the Post-Modern Arts of
Memory," in Writing Culture, ed. James Clifford and George Marcus
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 194-233.
46. Bourne, "The Jew and Trans-National America," pp. 130-31
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(emphasis added). For the dangers ofan atrophied cultural identity, see,
for instance, Maxine Hong Kingston's Tripster Monkey: His Fake Book (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989) .
47. Cf. David M. Potter, "The Historian's Use of Nationalism," in History
and American Society: Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 75.
Potter argues that nationalism itself can provide the social glue necessary to
hold together disparate groups into a "mutually supportive relation." Potter's conception of nationalism is close to Bourne's notion of dual citizenship or transnationalism in finding no contradiction in having multiple
loyalties or identifications. But Bourne recognizes the very real possibility of
discord and dissension in attaining common ends, and Potter presumes a
preexisting harmony underlying the social order that is enhanced by dif..
ferences and the protection of them. Thus he restates the Roycean position.
48. As Philip Gleason argues, critics of the melting pot theory have
often presented confused analyses seeking to challenge the thesis, not
always distinguishing clearly between its failure as reality (as unattained
and never existing, and therefore a myth) and a reprehensible reality that
ought never to be. Bourne's confusion is slightly different from the others, but he shared the same contradictory approach, aiming to discredit
the melting pot thesis as a "mere" myth and a reprehensible one as well
as declaring it to be a failed reality (unworkable and unsuccessful in
accomplishing its ends) . It was, thus, neither adequate as a description of
American society nor desirable as a prescription. See Gleason, "The Melting Pot, pp. 20-46, and "Confusion Compounded: The Melting Pot in
the 1960s and 1970s, Ethnicity 6(1) (March 1979): 10-20.
49. Bourne, "Trans-National America," pp. 107-8.
50. Ibid., pp. 108-9, 112-14, and "The Jew and Trans-National America," p. 124. See also Randolph S. Bourne, "Americans in the Making,"
New &public 14 (February 2, 1918): 30-32, review of An American in the
Making by M. E. Ravage and The Rise ofDavid Levinsky by Abraham Cahan.
51. Bourne, "Trans-National America," pp. 109, lll.
52. Alan Wald, "The Culture of 'Internal Colonialism': A Marxist Perspective," MELUS 8(3) (Fall 1981) : 18-27.
53. See, for instance, E. Sanjuan, Jr., "The Cult of Ethnicity and the
Fetish of Pluralism: A Counterhegemonic Critique," Cultural Critique 18
(Spring 1991): 215-29, and Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity, p. 36. Sanjuan is also
critical of the mechanistic treatment of ethnicity in Sollors's descent/ consent binary. In my view, what is missing in the schema is a classification of
identity as constructed by others. Sollors uses the terms to characterize
how ethnicity is symbolized in American literature; the construction of
identity by others is thereby built in.
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55. Slavoj Zizek, "Ideology Between Fiction and Fantasy," Cardozo Law
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56. Randolph S. Bourne to Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, December 21 ,
1916, Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant Papers, Beinecke Library, Yale University, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, pp. 391-92. See also [Unsigned],
"The Will to Lynch," New &public 8 (October 14, 1916): 261-62.
57. Bourne, "The Jew and Trans-National America," p. 130.
58. William James's idea of a pluralistic universe was fleshed out in A
Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longman 's Green, 1909), but its initial outline was hinted at in The Will to Believe (New York: Longman's Green,
1897).
59. Bourne, "Trans-National America," pp. ll0, ll4, 121. See also Randolph S. Bourne, "Emerald Lake," New Republic 9 (January 6, 1917):
267-68.
60. Cf. Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in
Turn-ofthe-Century New York (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).
61. Randolph S. Bourne, "Pageantry and Social Art," [n.d.], Bourne
Papers, first published in The Radical Will, ed. Olaf Hansen (New York:
Urizen Books, 1977), pp. 515-19.
62. George F. Roederer,Jr., "What Have Modernists Looked At? Experiential Roots of Twentieth-Century American Painting," American Quarterly 39 (Spring 1987): 5~3, and Wanda Corn, "The Artist's New York,"
typescript The entire issue of American Q;tarterly (Spring 1987) is devoted
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63. Randolph S. Bourne, "A Sociological Poet," [n.d.], Bourne Papers,
first published in Hansen, ed., Radical Will, pp. 521-22. The city's magnetism had a negative impact, reducing surrounding towns to skeletons
as their residents commuted to the city and left political administration
in the hands of the town elders. In his master's essay, written under
Dewey's supervision, Bourne examined his hometown, a suburb of
Newark, which was on the periphery of New York. In Bloomfield, an Italian working-class community resided in the northern part of town, providing the skilled labor for the town's clothing factory. As first generation
immigrants, they spoke little English, attended parochial schools and the
Catholic church, shopped in separate stores, and benefited little from
the improvements in public schooling, made possible by the increased
tax base of the commuters. The essay is notable for its analysis of the
impact of the "suburbanization" of the town on various social classesthe workers, the commuters, and the town gentry-who, though living in
three separate worlds, were all affected by the larger social process. See
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Effects of the Process upon Its Social Life" (Master's thesis, Department
of Political Science, Columbia University, 1913), pp. 1-72, and a version
of the study, published as "The Social Order in an American Town,"
Atlantic Monthly 111 (February 1913): pp. 227-36. See also "Emerald
Lake," pp. 267-68, reprinted in Hansen, ed., Radical Will, pp. 271-74.
64. See Daniel Joseph Singal, "Towards a Definition of American Modernism," American Quarterly 39 (Spring 1987): 7-26, for its careful attention to the contradictions in American modernism (the rational and the
irrational, the orderly and the disorderly); cf. David A. Hollinger, "The
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65. Casey Blake, "'The Cosmopolitan Note': Randolph Bourne and
the Challenge of 'Trans-National America,'" Culturefront (Winter
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8.

"CREATIVE DESIRE"

1. Lewis Mumford, "The Image of Randolph Bourne," New Republic
64 (September 24, 1930): 151-52.
2. See Van Wyck Brooks, America's Coming of Age (New York: B. W.
Huebsch, 1915), p. 120. For his assessment of Bourne's healing potential
for American culture, see Van Wyck Brooks, "Introduction," in History of
a Literary Radical and Other Essays, ed. Van Wyck Brooks (New York: B. W.
Huebsch, 1920), pp. xxxi-xxxv. The terms "highbrow" and "lowbrow"
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1909-1917: Studies in the Social Criticism of Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, Randolph Bourne, and Van Wyck Brooks" (Ph.D. diss. , University
of Wisconsin, 1967). Bourke's conclusion rests on the persuasive claim
that "Bourne was not simply rejecting the performance ofliberals during
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13. James Oppenheim, "Editorial," Seven Arts 1 (November 1916): 52.
14. Waldo Frank, Our America (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1919),
p . 19. For historical appreciations of Bourne's work as deliberately uniting avant-garde ideas with revolutionary politics, see also Floyd Dell,
Homecoming (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1933); Resek, ed., "Introduction";James Burkhart Gilbert, Writers and Partisans (NewYork:John
Wiley, 1968), pp. 1-4, 7, 34-39; Daniel Aaron, Writers on the Left (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 45-49; Alan Trachtenberg,
"Introduction: The Genteel Tradition and Its Critics," in Critics of Culture:
Literature and Society in the Early Twentieth Century, ed. Nan Trachtenberg
(NewYork:John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp. 7, 9, 12; and Edward Abrahams, The Lyrical Left: Randolph Bourne, Alfred Stieglitz, and the Origins of
Cultural Radicalism in America (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1986),pp. 18-20,38-45,63-64,90-91.
15. Randolph S. Bourne, "The Suicide of Criticism," Columbia Monthly
8 (March 1911): 188-92. Spingarn later become the first director of the
NAACP.
16. Randolph S. Bourne, "The Cult of the Best," New Republic 5 (January 15, 1916): 275-76. See also Bourne's "Education in Taste," New
Republic 6 (March 4, 1916): 122-24, and "A Stronghold of Obscurantism,''
Dial62 (April 5, 1917): 303-5.
17. Bourne, "The Cult of the Best," p. 276.
18. Jean:Jacques Rousseau, Letter to M. D'Alembert on.the Theatre (1758),
trans. and with notes and introduction by Allan Bloom (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1978).
19. Randolph S. Bourne to Carl Zigrosser, November 3, 1913,
Zigrosser Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p. 167.
20. Randolph S. Bourne, "Our Unplanned Cities," New Republic 3
(June 26, 1915): 202-3. See also "Guiding the City,'' New Republic 7 (May
13, 1916) : 47-48. Review of City Planning, ed.John Nolen.
21. See Randolph S. Bourne, "A Little Thing of Brunelleschi's," [n.d.],
Bourne Papers, first published in The Radical Will, ed. Olaf Hansen (New
York: Urizen Books, 1977), pp. 528-31, in which he is critical of the professionalization of architecture and architectural education in America.
Cf. Uuvenis], "The Architect,'' NewRepublic5 (January 1, 1916): 222-23,
reprinted in Hansen, ed., Radical Will, pp. 279-81, where he argues that
architecture must be judged in terms of art and not engineering but
insists at the same time that architecture be functional and democratic,

NOTES TO PAGES

150-52

217
that is, concerned with the dailiness of ordinary men and women. For a
defense of town planning, see "Our Unplanned Cities," pp . 202-3
(reprinted in Hansen, ed., Radical Will, pp. 275-78) .
22. See Randolph S. Bourne to Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, October
10, 1915, Sergeant Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, pp. 339-40:
"Denunciations of my recent articles continue to come in. I have become
an impious, ungrateful, pro-German, venomous viper. This sums up my
college, Atlantic and German articles, and gives me a Byronic reputation
that I shall have work living down, even if I wanted to."
23. Randolph S. Bourne, "American Use for German Ideals," New Republic 4 (September 4, 1915): 117-19, reprinted in Resek, ed., War and the
Intellectuals, pp. 47-48. See also "Impressions of Europe, 1913-14," Columbia University Quarterly 17 (March 1915) : 109-26, reprinted in Brooks, ed.,
History of a Literary Radical, pp. 259-63.
24. Randolph S. Bourne to Carl Zigrosser, November 3, 1913, Zigrosser Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p . 167. See also Randolph
S. Bourne to Alyse Gregory,July 30, 1914, Gregory Papers, reprinted in
Sandeen, ed., Letters, pp. 262-63.
25. Cf. Hoopes, "Culture of Progressivism," for the view that Bourne's
cultural theory, like that of Croly, Lippmann, and Brooks, maintained
that art led to spiritual uplift and moral regeneration, a view strongly
influenced by the nineteenth-century notion of art as an expression of
the spiritual, even as they rebelled against it. Cf. Tuttleton, "American Literary Radicalism ," who considered the cultural radicalism of writers on
the Seven Arts, including Bourne, and those on the Masses (primarily John
Reed and Max Eastman) to be heirs to a "progressive" tradition with a
functionalist view of art as an instrument for social change (p. 29) . Cf.
Resek, ed., War and the InteUectuals, and Trachtenburg, "Introduction," in
Critics of Culture, pp. 3-13.
26. This perspective can be seen today in the criticism of Timothy J .
Clark, The Absolute Bourgeois (New York: New York Graphic Society, 1973) .
This interpretation is not to suggest that Bourne was or would have
become a Marxist cultural critic, a conclusion that is impossible to draw,
given the limitations in his literary criticism and the fact that it was closely
tied to the contemporary debates in the teens, specifically the debates
among the realists, influenced by W. D. Howells, the humanists, and the
expressionists. For a summary of the debates within New York's cultural
communities, see Arthur Frank Wertheim, The New York Litt/,e Renaissance:
Iconoclasm, Modernism, and Nationalism in American Cufture, 1908-1917
(NewYork: NewYork University Press, 1976), especially pp. 99-184.
27. Randolph S. Bourne, "A Sociological Poet," [n.d.] , first published

NOTES TO PAGES

153-58

218
in Hansen, ed., Radical Will, pp. 521-22. The probable date of the essay
was 1914, written during his travels to Europe or just after his return to
the United States.
28. Randolph S. Bourne to Alyse Gregory, [n.d.] October 1916, Gregory Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, pp. 376-77. Bourne also
dismissed the efforts of writers on the Masses for failing to achieve artistic "form" or "expressive beauty"; see his "History of a Literary Radical,"
Yale Review 8 (April 1919) : 468-84, reprinted in Brooks, ed., History of a
Literary Radical, p. 30.
29. Randolph S. Bourne, "Paul Elmer More," New Republic 6 (April 1,
1916): 245-47, reprinted in Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals, p. 169.
30. Bourne, "History of a Literary Radical," in Brooks, ed., History of a
Literary Radical, p. 26.
31. Randolph Bourne, "Trans-National America," in Resek, ed., War
and the Intellectuals, p. 113.
32. Randolph S. Bourne, "Traps for the Unwary," Dial 64 (March 28,
1918) : 277-79, reprinted in Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals,
pp. 182-83.
33. Randolph S. Bourne, "The Heart of the People" New Republic 3
(July 3, 1915): 233, reprinted in Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals,
pp. 173-74.
34. Randolph S. Bourne, "H. L. Mencken," New Republic 13 (November 24, 191 7): 102-3. Review of A Book of Prefaces, by H. L. Mencken, reprinted in Resek, ed., War and the Intellectuals, p. 164.
35. Randolph S. Bourne, "The Artist in Wartime," [n.d.], manuscript,
Bourne Papers, first published in Hansen, ed., Radical Will, pp. 408-13.
36. Bourne, "History of a Literary Radical," in Brooks, ed., History of a
Literary Radical, p. 27.
37. Randolph S. Bourne and Van Wyck Brooks, "The Retort Courteous," Poetry 12 (September 1918): 341-44, reprinted in Resek, ed., War
and the Intellectuals, p. 324.
38. Bourne, "Traps for the Unwary," p. 182.
39. Randolph S. Bourne to Van Wyck Brooks, March 27, 1918, Brooks
Papers, reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, pp. 410-14.
40. Bourne, "Traps for the Unwary," p. 181.
41. See Randolph S. Bourne, "Seeing It Through," Dial61 (December
28, 1916) : 563-65. Review of Mr. BritlingSees It Through by H. G. Wells, and
"The Relegation of God," Dial65 (September 19, 1918) : 215-16. Review
ofJoan and Peter by H. G. Wells.
42. Bourne, "The Retort Courteous," p. 343. See also Randolph S.
Bourne, "Sincerity in the Making," New Republic 1 (December 5, 1914) :

NOTES TO PAGES

159-63

219
26-27. Review of The Congo, General William Booth Enters into Heaven, and
Adventures Whil,e Preaching the Gospel of Beauty by Vachel Lindsay.
43. Bourne, "Traps for the Unwary," p. 181. Bourne's appreciation of
imagist poetry and modernist stream-of-consciousness novels can be seen
in "A Sociological Poet" and "An Imagist Novel," Dial 64 (May 9, 1918):
451-52. Review of Honeycomb by Dorothy M. Richardson.
44. Bourne, "A Sociological Poet," pp. 520-23.
45. Randolph S. Bourne, "Theodore Dreiser," New R.epublic 2 (April 17,
1915): Supp., 7-8, reprinted in Hansen, ed., Radical Will, pp. 457-61.
Bourne wrote three essays on Dreiser's work, among the best of his literary criticism.
46. Randolph S. Bourne, "Desire as Hero," New R.epublic 5 (November
20, 1915): Supp. 5-6. Review of The 'Genius'by Theodore Dreiser.
47. Randolph S. Bourne, "The Art of Theodore Dreiser," Dial62 (June
14, 1917): 507-9. In this essay, Bourne calls Dreiser a "true hyphenate, a
product of that conglomerate Americanism that springs from other roots
than the English tradition" (p. 509).
48. Randolph S. Bourne, "Sociologic Fiction," New R.epublic 12 (October 27, 1917): 359-60. Review of King Coal by Upton Sinclair, reprinted
in Resek, ed., War and the InteUectuals, pp. 175-78.
49. Randolph S. Bourne, "The Immanence of Dostoyevsky," Dial 62
(June 28, 1917) : 24-25. Review of The Eternal Husband by Fyodor Dostoyevsky. Cf. [Unsigned], "Dostoyevsky's Stories," New Republic 16 (September 28, 1918): 267. Review of The Gambl,erby Fyodor Dostoyevsky. See
also "From an Older Time," Dial65 (November 2, 1918): 363-65. Review
of Lovers of Louisiana by George Washington Cable.
50. Randolph S. Bourne, "Morals and Art from the West," Dial 65
(December 14, 1918): 556-57. Review of In the Heart of a Fool by William
Allen White and My Antonia by Willa Cather. See also [Unsigned],
"Diminuendo," New Republic 5 (December 11, 1915): 153-55. Review of
The Song of the Lark by Willa Cather. For a scathingly critical assessment of
the irreducibly middle-class character of the culture of the American
Middle West, see "A Mirror of the Middle West," Dial65 (November 30,
1918): 480-82. Review of The Valley ofDemocracy by Meredith Nicholson.
51. Bourne, "Sociologic Fiction," pp. 176-77.
52. Bourne, "History of a Literary Radical," p. 190.
53. Randolph S. Bourne, "The Brevity School in Fiction," Dial 64
(April 25, 1918): 405-7. Review of On the Stairs by Henry B. Fuller.
54. Bourne, "History of a Literary Radical," pp. 192-94, 196.
55. Carol Gruber, Mars and Minerva (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1975), pp. 242-44.

NOTES TO PAGES

163-68

220
56. Bourne, "History of a Literary Radical," p. 196.
57. Ibid., pp. 193-94, 197.
58. Randolph S. Bourne to Van Wyck Brooks, March 27, 1918,
reprinted in Sandeen, ed., Letters, p. 413; Bourne, "Twilight ofldols," in
Resek, ed., War and the lnteUectuals, p. 63.

CHAPTER

9.

EPILOGUE

1. For this interpretation of Nietzsche's aesthetic impulse, see Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical lmagi,nation in Nineteenth-Century
Europe (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 332.
2. James Oppenheim, "R. B.," in History of a Literary Radical and Other
Essays, ed. Van Wyck Brooks (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1920), p. viii.
3. See Louis Filler, Randolph Bourne (Washington, D.C.: American
Council on Public Affairs, 1943); Max Lerner, "Introduction" in ibid.; and
"Randolph Bourne: Some Pre-War Letters (1912-1914)," Twice-a-Year2
(Spring-Summer 1939): 79-102; "Randolph Bourne: Letters (1913-1914)"
and "Randolph Bourne: Diary for 1901," Twice-a-Year 5-6 (Fall-Winter
1940; Spring-Summer 1941): 79-88, 89-98.
4. For biographies of Bourne, see Filler, Randolph Bourne; John
Moreau, Randolph Bourne (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966);
James Vitelli, Randolph Bourne (Boston: Twayne, 1981); Bruce Clayton, Forgotten Prophet (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984);
Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The lntel/,ectual as a Social Type (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), chap. 3 and passim; Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1973), pp. 505-8; Thomas Bender, New York
lntel/,ect (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), pp. 228-48; and Robert Westbrook, john Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University
Press, 1991), pp. 195-240.
5. Lerner, Bourne, pp. 347-69; Charles Forcey, Crossroads of Liberalism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 221-315; Sidney Kaplan,
"Social Engineers as Saviors," Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (June 1956):
347-69; Harold Laski, "The Liberalism of Randolph Bourne," Freeman 1
(May 19, 1920): 237; Sheldon S. Wolin, "The New Conservatives," New
York Review of Books, February 5, 1975, pp. 6-11; and Casey Blake, Bewved
Community (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), chap.
3 and passim.
6. Blake, Bewved Community, chap. 1. For his analysis of the "feminine
ideal," conceived by the Young Americans as a substitute for both the mas-

NOTES TO PAGES

168-73

221
culine world of business and the feminine world of the household, see
pp. 24, 32-53, 62, 178, 230, 232, 307n. For a sympathetic treatment of
Addams's personal politics, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Self/Other, Citizen/State: G. W. F. Hegel and Jane Addams," in Meditations on Modern
Political Thought: Masculine/Feminine Themes from Luther to Arendt (New
York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 71-84.
7. Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, p. 76. See also Christopher
Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 3-43,
on the absence of the father and the dislocation of women from the center of household production, which led to a lack of discipline and the
overnurturance of children. For a critique of his analysis of the crisis of
capitalism and of the inadequacy of solutions to it, see Michael Fischer,
"Criticizing Capitalist America," in A Symposium: Christo,pher Lasch and the
Culture of Narcissism, Salmagundi 46 (Fall 1979): 166-73; see Fischer also
for the antifeminist implications of his thesis and Berenise M. Fisher, "The
Old Wise Men and the New Women: Christopher Lasch Besieged," History of Education Quarterly 19(1) (Spring 1979): 125-41.
8. See Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in
an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), and
The Minimal Self(NewYork: W.W. Norton, 1984). For a critique of his psychology of the intact (masculine) self and the self-absorbed feminine self,
see Janice Doane and Devon Leigh Hodes, "Mobilizing the Ranks of Reality," in A Symposium, pp. 185-93.
9. Randolph S. Bourne to Paul Strand, August 16, 1917, Paul Strand
Papers, Center for Creative Photography, University of Arizona.
10. See Michael Walzer, The Company of Critics (New York: Baisic Books,
1988), chap. 3, for his assessment of Bourne's unsuccessful accommodation of the demands of detachment and engagement. Walzer's underlying, and somewhat contradictory, purpose is to outline a prophetic role
for leftist intellectuals, and in these terms Bourne failed, according to
Walzer, by retreating in his final essays into "distance" and "despair." See
Randolph S. Bourne to Van Wyck Brooks, March 27, 1918, in Letters of
Randolph Bourne, ed. Eric Sandeen (Troy, N.Y: Whitson, 1981), p. 412.
11. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche,
trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1966), p.
137.
12. See Paul F. Bourke, "The Status of Politics, 1909-1919," American
Studies 8(2) (August 1974): 187-94.
13. Randolph Bourne, "A War Diary," in War and the Intellectuals, ed.
Carl Resek (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 46-47.
14. Ibid., p. 46.

NOTES TO PAGES

173-74

222
15. Irving Kristal, in his early Partisan Review days, cited Bourne favorably as an "irreconcilable" in his review of Saul Bellow's Dangling Man,
suggesting that Bourne was a precursor to Bellow's hero, demonstrating
"restraint, dignity and insight" in bracing against the war and fighting
"below the battle" and in holding onto, or searching for, alternative standards of value. See Irving Kristal review of Dangling Man, by Saul Bellow
Politics l (June 1944): 156.
16. Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," in Resek, ed., War and the
InteUectuals, p. 64.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscripts and Unpublished Writings
Randolph S. Bourne. Papers. Butler Library, Rare Books and Manuscript
Collections, Columbia University, New York.
Holdings include correspondence, college notes and essays, travel notes
and diaries, unpublished manuscripts, clippings and books. Unpublished writings include "Battle Call" (poem); "The Breakers" (poem);
"Comparison of Romeo and Juliet" (college theme); "Doctrine"
(poem); "Doubts About Enforcing Peace"; "The Fallen" (poem); "The
Justice of the Story" (college theme); The Major Chord (play); "Man"
(poem); "A Modern College"; "New Love and New Religion" (essay);
"Outline of a Proposed Autobiographical Novel"; [Untitled] "Progressive Educators"; "Sex and Ferryboats"; "Sketches" (poems); "Song for a
Little Boy" (poem); "A Spring Song" (poem); "A Study of the 'Suburbanizing' of a Town and the Effects of the Process upon Its Social Life"
(Master's thesis); "Twilight" (poem); "Two Sonnets on Youth"; 'The War
of Cultures"; "What Plato Means to Me" (college theme).
John Erskine. Papers. Butler Library, Rare Books and Manuscript Collections, Columbia University, New York.
Alyse Gregory. Papers. Beinecke Library, Yale University, New Haven.
Elsie Clews Parsons. Papers. American Philosophical Society Library,
Philadelphia.
Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant. Papers. Beinecke Library, Yale University, New
Haven.

223

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

224
Paul Strand. Papers. Center for Creative Photography, University of Arizona, Tucson.

Bourne's Published Works
"Some Aspects of Good Talk." Columbia Monthly 7 (January 1910): 92-97.
"Chesterton's 'Orthodoxy."' Columbia Monthly 7 (March 1910): 170-72.
["Aurelius."] "Prof. Peck's 'Studies."' Columbia Monthly 7 (March 1910):
176. Review of Studies in Several Literatures by Harry Thurston Peck.
"On Hero-Making." Columbia Monthly 7 (April 1910): 178-81.
"The Function of a College Literary Magazine." Columbia Monthly 8
(November 1910): 3-7.
"The Blue Bird for Happiness," Columbia Monthly 8 (December 1910):
61-64.
"On Playing at Five Hundred," Columbia Monthly 8 Uanuary 1911):
105-10.
["Aurelius Bloomfield."] "The Prayer of a Materialist." Columbia Monthly 8
(February 1911): 165-67.
Review. Columbia Monthly 8 (February 1911): 183-85. Review of Socialism
and Christianity by Percy S. Grant.
"The Suicide of Criticism." Columbia Monthly 8 (March 1911): 188-92.
Review. ColumbiaMonthly8 (April 1911): 269-70. ReviewofTheSocialBasis
of R.eligi,on by Simon S. Patten.
Review. Columbia Monthly 8 (May 1911): 313-15. Review of A Defense of Prejudice and Other Essays by John Grier Hibben.
"The Two Generations." Atlantic Monthly 108 (May 1911): 591-98.
"The Editor on Examinations-with Apologies to F. Bacon." Columbia
Monthly 8 Qune 1911): 344-46.
"Over the Quadrangle." Columbia Monthly 8 (August 1911): 401-3.
"The Handicapped." Atlantic Monthly 108 (September 1911): 320-29.
"The College: An Undergraduate View." Atlantic Monthly 108 (November
1911): 667-74.
Review. Columbia Monthly 9 (November 1911): 31-32. Review of The Mind
of Primitive Man by Franz Boaz.
"A Letter to Mr.John Galsworthy." Columbia Monthly 9 (December 1911):
36-43.
"Individuality and Education." Columbia Monthly 9 (January 1912): 88-90.
"The Mystic Turned Radical." Atlantic Monthly 109 (February 1912):
236-38.
"Seeing, We See Not." Columbia Monthly 9 (February 1912): 133-35.
"Law and Order." Masses3 (March 1912): 12.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

225
"Poker and Veronica." Columbia Monthly 9 (April 1912): 175-79.
"Youth." Atlantic Monthly 109 (April 1912): 433-41.
"Some Thoughts on Religion." Columbia Monthly 9 (May 1912): 229-32.
Review. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (May 9,
1912): 277. Review of The Moral Life by W.R. Sorley.
"Student Life." Columbia Monthly 14 (June 1912): 341-42.
Review. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (August 15,
1912): 471-73. Review of Nietzsche by Paul Elmer More.
"College Life Today." North American Review 196 (September 12, 1912):
365-72.
Review. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientifu Methods 9 (September
12, 1912): 530-31. Review of The Desire for Qualities by Stanley M. Bligh.
"Socialism and the Catholic Ideal." Columbia Monthly IO (November
1912): 11-19.
"The Excitement of Friendship." Atlantic Monthly 90 (December 1912):
795-800.
"Social Order in an American Town." Atlantic Monthly 111 (February
1913): 227-36.
Letter to Editor. Columbia Spectator (February 24, 1913). Re: Columbia
University's hiring of "scrubwomen" to clean student dormitories and
lecture halls.
"The Life oflrony." Atlantic Monthly 111 (March 1913): 357-67.
Youth and Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, [March] 1913; Edinburgh: Constable, [May] 1913.
Contents: "Youth"; "The Two Generations"; "The Virtues and Seasons
of Life"; "The Life of Irony"; "The Excitement of Friendship"; "The
Adventure of Life"; "Some Thoughts on Religion"; "The Dodging of
Pressures";, "For Radicals"; "The College: An Inner View"; "A Philosophy of Handicap."
Letter to Editor. Columbia Spectator (March 1, 1913). Re: the "scrubwomen" controversy.
"The New Revolution." Columbia Monthly IO (May 1913): 221-27.
The College Lecture Course as the Student Sees It." Educational Review 46
(June 1913): 66-70.
"Stoicism." The open Court27 (June 1913): 364-71.
"Arbitration and International Politics." No. 70. New York: American Association for International Conciliation, September 1913. A pamphlet.
"Sabotage." Columbia Monthly IO (November 1913): 1-2. A poem.
Review. journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods l O (N ovember 6, 1913): 641-42. Review of History of Past Ethics: An Introduction to
the History of Morals by Philip Van Ness Myers.
"In the Mind of the Worker." Atlantic Monthly 113 (March 1914): 375-82.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

226
"An Experiment in Cooperative Living." Atl,antic Monthly 113 (June 1914):
813-31.
"The Tradition of War." No. 79. New York: American Association for International Conciliation,June 1914. A pamphlet.
Review. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (June 4,
1914): 332-33. Review of The Making of Character: Some Educational
Aspects of Ethics by John MacCunn.
"An Hour in Chartres." Atlantic Monthly 11 (August 1914): 214-17.
"Maurice Barres and the Youth of France." Atlantic Monthly 114 (September 1914): 394-99.
"Our Cultural Humility." Atlantic Monthly 114 (October 1914): 503-7.
"Berlin in Wartime." Travel24 (November 1914) : 9-12, 58-59.
"In a Schoolroom." New Republic 1 (November 7, 1914): 23-24.
"Holy Poverty." New Republic 1 (November 14, 1914): 25. Review of The
Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists by Robert Wessall.
"Maeterlinck and the Unknown." New Republic 1 (November 21, 1914):
26. Review of The Unknown Guest by Maurice Maeterlinck and The New
Philosophy of Henri Bergson by Edouard LeRoy.
"Sincerity in the Making." New Republic 1 (December 5, 1914): 26-27.
Review of The Congo, General William Booth Enters into Heaven, and Adventures lVhile Preaching the Gospel of Beauty by Vachel Lindsay.
[Unsigned.] "A Danish Epic." New Republic 1 (December 19, 1914): 28.
Review of Pelle the Conqueror by Martin A. Nexo.
[Unsigned.] "Paul Claudel's East." New Republic 1 (December 19, 1914):
27-28. Review of The East I Know by Paul Claudel.
"Town Planning and the Law." New Republic 1 (December 19, 1914):
27-28. Review of Carrying Out the City Pl,an by Flavel Shurtleff.
"Bumptious Psychology." New Republic 1 (December 21, 1914): 26. Review
of The War and America by Hugo Muensterberg.
[Unsigned.] "Puzzle Education." NewRepublicl (January 2, 1915): 10-11.
[Unsigned.] "What Might Be in Education." New Republic 1 (January 2,
1915): 28. Review of lVhat Is and lVhat Might Be by Edmond Holmes.
"Continental Cultures." New Republic 1 (January 16, 1915): 14-16.
[Unsigned.] "The Schools from the Outside." New Republic 1 (January 30,
1915): 10-11.
"A Glance at German 'Kultur.'" Lippincott's Monthly 95 (February 1915):
22-27.
"A Substitute for Schools." New Republic 2 (February 6, 1915): 25-26.
"When We Went to School." New Republic 2 (February 27, 1915): 101-3.
"Impressions of Europe, 1913-14." Columbia University Qy,arterly 17 (March
1915): 109-26.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

227
"Mon Amie." Atlantic Monthly-115 (March 1915): 354-59.
"Class Struggle in Education." New Republic 2 (March 6, 1915): 135. Review
of School Discipline by William Chandler Bagby.
'John Dewey's Philosophy." New &public2 (March 13, 1915): 154-56.
"Schools in Gary." New &public 2 (March 27, 1915): 198-99.
"Communities for Children." New &public 2 (April 3, 1915): 233-34.
"Really Public Schools." New &public 2 (April 10, 1915): 259-61.
"A Map of the Public." New Republic 2 (April 17, 1915): Supp., 11-12.
Review of Problems of Community Life by Seba Eldridge.
"Theodore Dreiser." New &public 2 (April 17, 1915): Supp., 7-8.
"Apprentices to the School." New&public2 (April 24, 1915): 302-3.
"Democracy and University Administration." Educational Review (May
1915): 455-59.
"The Natural School." New&public2 (May 1, 1915): 326-28.
[Unsigned.] "The School Room." New Republic 2 (May 1, 1915): 333.
Review of School Hygiene by Leo Burgerstein.
"The Failing Church." New &public 3 (May 15, 1915): 49. Review of The
Reconstruction of the Church by Paul Moore Strayer.
"Fergus-APortrait." New&public3 (May 22, 1915): 62-64.
[Unsigned.] "The Inside ofaSettlement." New&public3(May29, 1915):
87-89.
"The Wasted Years." New &public 3 Uune 5, 1915): 120-22.
"Schools Overwhelmed." New York Times,June 15, 1915, p. 12. Letter.
"Platitude." New&public3 Uune 19, 1915): 183-84. Review of Play in Education by Joseph Lee and Education Through Play by Henry S. Curtis.
[Unsigned.] "The Issue in Vocational Education." New &public 3 Uune
26, 1915): 191-92.
[Unsigned.] "Our Educational Prospect." New &public 3 Uune 26, 1915):
210-11. Review of Schools of Tomorrow by John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey.
"Our Unplanned Cities." New &public 3 Uune 26, 1915): 202-3.
"The Heart of the People." New &public 3 Uuly 3, 1915): 233. Review of
The White Terror (movie).
[Unsigned.] "Educating the Educators." New &public 3 Uuly 10, 1915):
263-64. Review of The Hygiene of the School Child by Louis M. Terman.
"The Professor." New &public 3 Uuly 10, 1915): 257-58.
"Who Owns the Universities?" New &public 3 Uuly 17, 1915): 269-70.
"A French Glimpse at America." New Republic 3 Uuly 24, 1915): 318.
Review of America and Her Probl,ems by Paul H. B. d'Estournelle.
"Studies in Tone Poetry." New &public4 (August 7, 1915): 26-27. Review
of Nature in Music by Lawrence Gilman.
[Unsigned.] "The Organic School." New &public 4 (August 21, 1915): 64.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPI-N

228
"Medievalism in the Colleges." New Republic 4 (August 28, 1915): 87-88.
[Unsigned.] "Social Workmanship." New Republic 4 (August 28, 1915):
108. Review of The Field of Social Service, edited by Philip Davis.
"This Older Generation." Atlantic Monthly 116 (September 1915) : 385-91.
"American Use for German Ideals." New Republic 4 (September 4, 1915):
117-19.
['Juvenis."] "One of Our Conquerors." N ew Republic 4 (September 4,
1915): 121-23.
"To Make Undergraduates Think." New Republic 4 (September 4, 1915) :
134-35. Review of The College and the Future by Richard Rice,Jr.
[Unsigned.] "Mental Unpreparedness." New Republic 4 (September 11 ,
1915) : 143-44.
[Unsigned.] "What Is Opinion?" New Republic4 (September 18, 1915):
171-72.
"The Undergraduate." New Republic 4 (September 25, 1915): 197-98.
"The Fortress of Belief." New Republic 4 (October 16, 1915): 283-84.
[Unsigned.] "The Democratic School." New Republic 4 (October 23,
1915) : 297-99.
[Unsigned.] "The Reality of Peace." NewRepublic4 (October 30, 1915):
322-23.
[Unsigned.] "Religion in Public Schools." New Republic 5 (November 13,
1915): 33-34.
"Sophronisba." New Republic 5 (November 13, 1915) : 41-43.
[Unsigned.] "American Heights." New Republic 5 (November 20, 1915):
Supp., 24. Review of Letters to a Friend by John Muir.
[Unsigned.] "Anna Howard Shaw." New Republic 5 (November 20, 1915):
Supp., 24. Review of The Story of a Pioneer by Anna Howard Shaw.
"Desire as Hero." New Republic 5 (November 20, 1915) : Supp., 5--6. Review
of The 'Genius ' by Theodore Dreiser.
"What Is College For?" New Republic 5 (December 4, 1915): 127-28.
Review of College Sons and College Fathers by Henry Seidel Canby and
Through College on Nothing a Year by Christian Gauss.
"The Basis of the Gary Plan of Teaching." New York Times, December 11,
1915, p . 12. Letter.
[Unsigned.] Review. "Diminuendo." NewRepublic5 (December 11, 1915):
153-55. Review of The Song of the Lark by Willa Cather.
The Gary Schools. Introduction by William Wirt. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1916.
Contents: "The Community Setting"; "The School Plant: Educating the
Whole Child"; "Work, Study, and Play"; "The School as a Community";
"Programs: The School as a Public Utility"; "Organization"; "Curricu-

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

229
!um: Leaming by Doing"; "Discipline: The Natural School"; "Criticisms
and Evaluations"; "Appendix."
"New York and the Gary School System." Education Administration and
Supervision 2 (1916) : 284-89.
[Edited.] Towards an Enduring Peace: A Symposium of Peace Proposals and Programs, 1914-1916. Introduction by Franklin N. Giddings. New York:
American Association for International Conciliation, 1916.
['Juvenis."] "The Architect." New Republic 5 (January 1, 1916): 222-23.
[Unsigned.] "The Portland School Survey." New Republic 5 (January 8,
1916): 238-39.
"The Cult of the Best." New Republic 5 (January 15, 1916): 275-77.
[Unsigned.] "The School Situation in New York. New Republic 6 (February 5, 1916) : 6-8.
[Unsigned.] "Politics Against the Schools." New Republic 6 (February 12,
1916): 32-33.
"Parents and Children." New Republic 6 (February 19, 1916) : 81-82.
Review of How to Know Your Child by Miriam Finn Scott.
[Unsigned.] "Real Estate and the City Plan." New Republic 6 (February 19,
1916): 60-61.
[Unsigned.] "House Keeping for Men." Atlantic Monthly 117 (March
1916): 430-32.
"Education in Taste." New Republic 6 (March 4, 1916): 122-24.
[Unsigned.] "Education for Work." NewRepublic6 (March 11, 1916):
145-46.
"The Price of Radicalism." NewRepublic6 (March 11, 1916): 161.
[Unsigned.] "Smoking." Atlantic Monthly 117 (April 1916): 573-75.
''Paul Elmer More." New Republic6 (April 1, 1916): 245-47. Review of Aristocracy and justice by Paul Elmer More.
"The Self-Conscious School." New Republic 6 (April 8, 1916): 260-61.
"Leaming to Write." New Republic6 (April 22, 1916): 326. Review of How
the French Boy Learns to Write by Rollo Walter Brown.
[Unsigned.] "Organized Labor on Education." New Republic 7 (May 6,
1916): 8-9.
[Unsigned.] "Guiding the City." New Republic 7 (May 13, 1916): 47-48.
Review of City Planning, edited by John Nolen.
"On Discussion." NewRepublic7 (May 27, 1916): 87-89.
"Continuation Schools." NewRepublic7 (June 10, 1916): 143-45.
"The World's Second Worse Failure." New Republic 7 (June 17, 1916):
177-78. Review of The American College (multiple authors): introduction by William H. Crawford.
"Trans-National America." Atlantic Monthly 118 (July 1916): 86-97.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPIN

230

"A Moral Equivalent for Universal Military Service." New Republic 7 (July
1, 1916): 217-19.
"Training for Public Service." New Republic 7 (July 8, 1916): 140-41.
[Unsigned.] "The Business Man in Office." NewRepublic7 (July 15, 1916):
267-68.
"Very Long and Sunny." New Republic 7 (July 15, 1916): 282-83.
"Education as Living." NewRepublic8 (August 5, 1916): 10-12.
["Max Coe."] "Making One's Own Contribution." New Republic 8 (August
26, 1916): 91-92.
"The Gary Public Schools." Scribner's 60 (September 1916): 371-80.
"Americanism." New Republic8 (September 23, 1916): 197. Review of
Straight America by Frances A. Kellor.
["Max Coe."] "Karen: A Portrait." New Republic 8 (September 23, 1916):
187-88.
"Heroics." New Republic 8 (October 7, 1916): 249. Review of Americanization by Royal Dixon.
"Perishable Books." New Republic 8 (October 14, 1916) : 258-59.
[Unsigned.] "The Will to Lynch." New Republic 8 (October 14, 1916):
261-62.
"What Is Exploitation?" New Republic9 (November 4, 1916): 12-14.
"The Jew and Trans-National America." Menorahjournal2 (December
1916): 277-84.
"Magic and Scorn." New Republic 9 (December 2, 1916): 130-31. Review
of Industrial Preparedness by C. N. Knoeppel and Inviting War to America
by Allen R. Benson.
"France of Yesterday." New Republic 9 (December 9, 1916): 156, 158.
Review of French Perspectives by Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant.
"Seeing It Through." Dial 61 (December 28, 1916): 563-65. Review of Mr.
Britling Sees It Through by H. G. Wells.
Education and Living. New York: Century Company, 1917.
Contents: Preface. "Education and Living"; "The Self-Conscious School";
"The Wasted Years"; "Puzzle Education"; "Learning Out of School"; "In
a Schoolroom"; "The Cult of the Best"; "Education in Taste"; "The Portland School Survey"; "What Is Experimental'Education?"; "The Organic
School"; "Communities for Children"; "Really Public Schools"; "Apprentices to the School"; "The Natural School;" "The Democratic School";
"The Trained Mind"; "Class and School"; "A Policy in Vocational Education"; "An Issue in Vocational Education"; "Organized Labor on Education"; "Education for Work"; "Continuation Schools"; "Who Owns the
Universities?"; "The Undergraduate"; Medievalism in the Colleges."
"Emerald Lake." New Republic9 (January 6, 1917): 267-68.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

231
"Extending the University." New Republic 9 (January 6, 1917): 259-60.
'Joseph Fels." New Republic 10 (February 3, 1917): 28-29. Review of Joseph
Fels: His Life-Work by Mary Fels.
[Unsigned.] "The Reply." New Republic 10 (February 10, 1917): 46-47.
Answer to "Interesting Schools" by Edith Hamilton.
"1917-American Rights-1798." NewRepublicl0 (February 17, 1917): 82.
Letter advertisement signed by Bourne, Max Eastman, Amos Pinchot,
and Winthrop Lane of the Committee for Democratic Control, in reply
to "American Rights League" by Agnes Repplier and Lyman Abbott.
[Unsigned.] "A Policy in Vocational Education." New Republic 10 (February 17, 1917): 63-65.
"New Ideals in Business." Dia/62 (February 22, 1917): 133-34. Review of
America and the New Epoch by Charles P. Steinmet and An Approach to
Business Problems by A. W. Shaw.
"Do the People Want War?" New Republic 10 (March 3, 1917): 145. Advertisement signed by Bourne, Max Eastman, Amos Pinchot, and
Winthrop Lane of the Committee for Democratic Control.
"The Charm of Distance." New Republic 10 (March 10, 1917): 170-73.
Review of The Emperor of Portugallia by Selma Lagerlof.
"The Inquisition at Columbia." New York Tribune, March 16, 1917. Letter.
"A Modem Mind." Dia/62 (March 22, 1917): 239-40. Review of Social Rule
by Elsie Clews Parsons.
"American Independence and the War." Seven Arts 1 (April 1917): Supp.,
1-9.
"The Puritan's Will to Power." Seven Arts 1 (April 1917): 631-37.
"Experimental Education." New Republic 10 (April 5, 1917): 345-47.
"A Stronghold of Obscurantism." Dial62 (April 5, 1917): 303-5. Review
of Problems of Secondary Education by David Snedden.
"An Epic of Labor." New Republic 10 (April 21, 1917): Supp., 8-10. Review
of Pelle the Conqueror: Daybreak by Martin Nexo.
"Two Amateur Philosophers." New Republic 10 (April 28, 1917): 383-84.
Review of The Amateur Philosophers by Carol H. Grabo and Philosophy:
An Autobiographical Fragment by Henrie Waste.
"International Dubieties." Dial 62 (May 3, 1917): 387-88. Review of League
to Enforce Peace by Robert Goldsmith and American World Policies by Walter E. Weyl.
"A Reverberation of War." New Republic 11 (May 17, 1917): 86-87. Review
of A Soldier of Life by Hugh de Selincourt.
"Ernest: or Parent for a Day." Atlantic Monthly 119 (June 1917): 778-86.
"The Vampire." Masses 9 (June 1917): 35-36. Review of Regi,ment of Women
by Clemence Dane.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

232
"The War and the Intellectuals." Seven Arts 2 (June 1917): 133-46.
"The Art of Theodore Dreiser." Dial62 (June 14, 1917) : 507-9.
"The Immanence of Dostoyevsky." Dial 62 (June 28, 1917): 24-25. Review
of The Eternal Husband by Fyodor Dostoyevsky.
"Below the Battle." Seven Arts 2 (July 1917): 270-77.
"The Collapse of American Strategy." Seven Arts 2 (August 1917): 409-24.
"Conspirators." Seven Arts 2 (August 1917): 528-30.
"Thinking at Seventy-Six. " NewRepublicl2 (August 15, 1917): 111-13.
Review of The New Reservation of Time by William Jewett Tucker.
"The Later Feminism. " Dial63 (August 16, 1917) : 103-4. Review of
Towards a Sane Feminism by William Meikle and Motherhood by C. Gascquoine Hartley.
"An American Humanist." Dial 63 (August 30, 1917): 148-50.
"A War Diary." Seven Arts 2 (September 1917): 535-47.
"Conscience and Intelligence in War." Dial63 (September 13, 1917): 19395.
"The Belgian Carthage." Dial 63 (October 1917): 343-44. Review of The
New Carthage by Georges Eekhoud.
"Twilight ofldols." Seven Arts 2 (October 1917) : 688-702.
"The American Adventure." New Republicl2 (October 20, 1917) : 333-34.
Review of A Son of the Middl,e Border by Hamlin Garland.
"Those Columbia Trustees." New Republic 12 (October 20, 1917): 328-29.
"Denatured Nietzsche." Dial 63 (October 25, 1917) : 389-91. Review of
The Will to Freedom by John Neville Figgis.
"Mr. Hillquitfor Mayor." NewRepublicl2 (October 27, 1917): 356-57. Letter by Bourne and others.
"Sociologic Fiction." New Republic 12 (October 27, 1917): 359-60. Review
of King Coal by Upton Sinclair.
"Gorky's Youth." New Republic 13 (November 3, 1917): 26-27. Review of
In the World by Maxim Gorky.
"The Idea ofa University." Dial63 (November 22, 1917): 509-10.
"H. L. Mencken." New Republic 13 (November 24, 1917): 102-3. Review
of A Book of Prefaces by H. L. Mencken.
"Mr. Huneker's Zoo." New Republic 13 (December 1, 1917): 130-31.
Review of Unicorns by James Huneker.
"The Industrial Revolution ." Dial63 (December 20, 1917) : 642. Review
of The Town Laborer, 1760-1832 by J. L. and Barbara Hammond.
[Unsigned.] Review. New Republic 13 (January 12, 1918) : 323. Review of
Applied Psychology by H . L. Hollingsworth and A. T. Poffenberger.
"A Primer of Revolutionary Idealism." Dial 64 (January 17, 1918): 69.
Review of Political Ideas by Bertrand Russell.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

233
[Unsigned.] Review. New Republic 13 (January 19, 1918): 355. Review of
Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education by H. S. Jennings et al.
[Unsigned.] Review. New Republic 13 (January 26, 1918): 387. Review of
Housemates by J. D. Beresford.
"Americans in the Making." New Republic 14 (February 2, 1918): 30-32.
Review of An American in the Making by M. E. Ravage and The Rise of
David Levinsky by Abraham Cahan.
"Quadrangles Paved with Good Intentions." Dial64 (February 14, 1918) :
151-52. Review of The Undergraduate and His College by Frederick P.
Keppel.
"The Guild Idyl." New Republic 14 (March 2, 1918): 151-52. Review of Old
World for New by Arthur J. Penty.
"Adventures in Miniature." New Republic 14 (March 9, 1918): 180-82.
Review of Persian Miniatures by H. G. Dwight.
"A Vanishing World of Gentility." Dial 64 (March 14, 1918): 234-35.
Review of These Many Years by Brander Matthews.
"Clipped Wings." Dial64 (April 11, 1918) : 358-59. Review of The House of
Conrad by Elias Tobenkin.
"Traps for the Unwary." Dial64 (March 28, 1918): 277-79.
"The Brevity School in Fiction." Dial64 (April 25, 1918) : 405-7. Review
of On the Stairs by Henry B. Fuller.
"Making Over the Body." New Republic 15 (May 4, 1918): 28-29. Review of
Mans Supreme Inheritance by F. Matthias Alexander.
"An Imagist Novel." Dial64 (May 9, 1918): 451-52. Review of Honeycomb
by Dorothy M. Richardson.
"Our Enemy Speaks." Dial 64 (May 23, 1918) : 486--87. Review of Men in
War by Andreas Latzko.
"Other Messiahs." New Republicl5 (May 25, 1918): 117. Letter.
"The Cult of Convention." Liberator 1 (June 1918) : 38-39. Review of On
Contemporary Literature by Stuart P. Sherman.
"Purpose and Flippancy." Dial 64 (June 6, 1918): 540-41. Review of His
Second Wife by Ernest Poole and The Boardman Family by Mary S. Watts.
[Unsigned.] "Oxford Ideas." New Republic 15 (June 15, 1918) : 214. Review
of The Oxford Stamp by Frank Aydelotte.
"Mr. Bennett Is Disturbed." Dial 65 (July 18, 1918): 72. Review of The Pretty
Lady by Arnold Bennett.
"The Retort Courteous." Poetry 12 (September 1918): 341-44. Letter with
Van Wyck Brooks.
"Two Scandinavian Novelists." Dial 65 (September 5, 1918) : 167-68.
Review of The Holy City by Selma Lagerlof and Marie Grubbe by Jens
Peter Jacobsen.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

234

"The Relegation of God." Dial65 (September 19, 1918): 215-16. Review
of Joan and Peter by H. G. Wells.
[Unsigned.] "Dostoyevsky Stories." New Repuhlicl6 (September 28, 1918):
267. Review of The Gambler by Fyodor Dostoyevsky.
"The Morality of Sacrifice." Dial65 (October 19, 1918) : 309-10. Review
of Three French Moralists by Edmund Gosse.
"From an Older Time." Dial 65 (November 2, 1918) : 363-65. Review of
Lovers of Louisiana by George Washington Cable.
"The Light Essay." Dial65 (November 16, 1918): 419-20. Review of Walking Stick Papers by Robert Cortes Holliday and The Merry-Go-Round by
Carl Van Vechten.
"A Mirror of the Middle West." Dial 65 (November 30, 1918): 480-82.
Review of The Valley of Democracy by Meredith Nicholson.
"Morals and Art from the West." Dial65 (December 14, 1918) : 556-57.
Review of In the Heart of a Fool by William Allen White and My Antonia
by Willa Cather.
"An Examination of Eminences." Dial65 (December 28, 1918) : 603-4.
Review of Eminent Victorians by Lytton Strachey.

Bourne's Posthumous Publications and Reprints
"The War and the Intellectuals." Mother Earth (June 1917). Reprint.
Untimely Papers. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919. Edited and with a foreword by James Oppenheim.
Four essays, previously published, and first publication of "Old Tyrannies"
(fragment) and 'The State" (fragment published in incorrect sequence).
[Translation.] Vagabonds of the Sea by Maurice Larrouy. New York: E. P.
Dutton, 1919.
"HistoryofaLiteraryRadical." Yal£Review8 (April 1919): 468-84.
History of a Literary Radical and Other Essays. Edited and with an introduction by Van Wyck Brooks. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1920.
Nineteen essays, previously published.
"An Autobiographical Chapter." Dial68 (January 1920): 1-21.
"The War and the Intellectuals" and "Randolph Bourne: A Letter to Van
Wyck Brooks." Twice-a-Year l (Fall-Winter 1938): 37-49, 50-55.
Letter of March 27, 1918.
"Randolph Bourne: Some Pre-War Letters (1912-1914)." Twice-a-Year2
(Spring-Summer 1939) : 79-102.
Thirteen letters, not all complete.
"Randolph Bourne: Letters (1913-1914) " and "Randolph Bourne: Diary

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

235
for 1901." Twice-a-Year5-6 (Fall-Winter 1940; Spring-Summer 1941):
79-88, 89-98.
Nine letters, not all complete.
"Randolph Bourne: Letters (1913-1916)." Twice-a-Year7 (Fall-Winter
1941): 76--90.
Ten letters, not all complete.
The History of a Literary Radical and Other Papers. Introduction by Van Wyck
Brooks. New York: S. A. Russell, 1956.
Nineteen essays, previously published.
War and the InteUectuals: Essays by Randolph S. Bourne, 1915-1919. Edited and
with an introduction by Carl Resek. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
Twenty-one essays, previously published.
The World of Randolph Bourne: An Anthol,ogy ofEssays and Letters. Edited and
with an introduction by Lillian Schlissel. New York: E. P. Dutton and
Company, 1965.
Twenty-four essays and four letters, previously published, and first publication of fourteen letters, not all complete.
The Gary Schools. Introduction by Adeline and Murray Levine, epilogue by
Abraham Flexner and Frank P. Backman. Cambridge: M.I.T Press, 1970.
The Radical Will: Randolph Bourne, Sekcted Writings, 1911-1918. Edited and
with an introduction by Olaf Hansen; preface by Christopher Lasch.
New York: Urizen Books, 1977.
Fifty-six essays and poems, previously published, and first publication
of "The Doctrine of the Rights of Man as Formulated by Thomas
Paine"; "The 'Scientific' Manager"; "Practice vs. Product"; "Law and
Order"; "The Disillusionment"; "The Artist in Wartime"; "Suffrage and
Josella"; "Chivalry and Sin"; "Pageantry and Social Art"; "A Sociological Poet"; "A Little Thing of Brunelleschi's"; "The Night Court."
The Letters of Randolph Bourne: A Comprehensive Edition. Edited and with
an introduction by Eric J. Sandeen. Troy: Whits ton Publishing Company, 1981.
Two hundred nineteen letters from manuscript collections and personal sources.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Manuscript CoUections
Van Wyck Brooks. Papers. Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

236

Theodore Dreiser. Papers. Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia.
John Erskine. Papers. Butler Library, Rare Books and Manuscript Collections, Columbia University, New York.
Waldo Frank. Papers. Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia.
James Oppenheim. Papers. Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York
Public Library.
Carl Zigrosser. Papers. Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia.

Unpublished Works
Bourke, Paul Francis. "Culture and the Status of Politics, 1909-1917: Studies in the Social Criticism of Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, Randolph Bourne, and Van Wyck Brooks." Ph.D. dissertation, University
ofWisconsin, 1967.
Broderick, Vincent. "Randolph Bourne." History Department thesis.
Princeton University, 1941.
Dunkel, William Paul. "Between Two Worlds: Max Eastman, Floyd Dell,
John Reed, Randolph Bourne and the Revolt Against the Genteel Tradition." Ph.D. dissertation. Lehigh University, 1976.
Feeney,JosephJ., S.J. "American Anti-War Writers of World War I: A Literary Study of Randolph Bourne, Harriet Monroe, Carl Sandburg,
John Dos Passos, E. E. Cummings, and Ernest Hemingway." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1971.
Harris, Mark. "Randolph Bourne: A Study in Immiscibility." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Minnesota, 1956.
Jones, Ann Margret. "Three American Responses to World War I: Wharton,
Empey, and Bourne." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1970.
Levine, Norman Sidney. "Randolph Bourne: His Thought and Its
Sources." Master's thesis. New York University, 1948.
Mosher, Michael A. "Is Hegelianism an Appropriate Form of Discipline
for a Romantic Mind in a Liberal State?" Paper presented at annual
meeting of American Political Science Association, New York, September 1981.
Rosenthal, Melvyn. "The American Writer and His Society: The Response
to Estrangement in the Works of Nathaniel Hawthorne, Randolph
Bourne, Edmund Wilson, Norman Mailer, and Saul Bellow." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Connecticut, 1968.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

237
Sacks, Clair. "The Seven Arts Critics: A Study of Cultural Nationalism in
America, 1910-1930." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1955.
Test, George Austin. "The Vital Connection: A Study of the New Republic
Magazine as a Literary Journal, 1914-1922." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1960.
Tompkins, Mary. "Randolph Bourne: Majority of One." Ph.D . dissertation. University of Utah, 1964.
True, Michael D. "The Social and Literary Criticism of Randolph Bourne:
A Study of His Development as a Writer." Ph.D . dissertation . Duke
University, 1964.

Published Works
Aaron, Daniel. Writers on the Left. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
_ _ _ . "American Prophet." New York Review of Books 25 (November 23,
1978): 36-40.
Abrahams, Edward. "Randolph Bourne on Feminism and Feminists." Historian 43 (May 1981): 365-77.
_ _ _ . The Lyrical Left: Randolph Bourne, Alfred Stieglitz, and the Origins of
Cultural Radicalism in America. Charlottesville: University Press of Vir-

ginia, 1986.
Adams, Henry. The Education of Henry Adams. With an introduction by D.
W. Brogan. Boston: Houghton Miffiin, 1961. First published 1918.
Adler, Alfred. Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler. Edited by Heinz L. Ansbacher and Rowena Ansbacher. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. First
published 1956.
Adorno, Theodor W. Prisms. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990. First published
1967.
Aldridge,John. After the Lost Generation: A Critical Study of the Writers of Two
Wars. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1951.
Arnold, Matthew. Culture and Anarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1995.
Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich. The Diawgic Imagination: Four Essays. Edited
by Michael Holquist, translated by Carl Emerson and Michael Holquist.
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.
Ballowe,James C. "The Last Puritan and the Failure in American Culture." American Quarterly 18 (Summer 1966): 123-35.
Barrow, Clyde W. Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and
the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894-1928. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

238
Beard, Charles A. American City Government: A Survey of Newer Tendencies.
New York: Arno Press, 1970. First published 1912.
Benda, Julien. La Traison des Clercs (The Treason of the Intellectuals).
Translated by Richard Aldington. Boston: Beacon, 1955.
Bender, Thomas. New York Intellect: A History of Intellectual Life in New York
City, from 1750 to the Beginnings of Our Own Time. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1987.
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The Puritan Origins of the American Self. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1975.
Bercovitch, Sacvan, ed. Reconstructing American Literary History. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986.
Beringause, A. F. "The Double Martyrdom of Randolph Bourne." Journal
of the History of Ideas 18 (October 1957): 594-603.
Berlowitz, Leslie, and Rick Beard, eds. Greenwich Village: Culture and Counterculture. New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1991.
Blake, Casey Nelson. "The Young Intellectuals and the Culture of Personality." American Literary History l (3) (Fall 1989): 510-34.
_ _ _ . Bewved Community: The Cultural Criticism of Randolph Bourne, Van
v\yck Brooks, Waldo Frank, and Lewis Mumford. Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press, 1990.
___ . " 'The Battle,"' Nation (February 25, 1991): 239-41.
_ _ _ . "'The Cosmopolitan Note': Randolph Bourne and the Challenge of 'Trans-national America.'" Culturefront (Winter 1995-1996):
25-28.
Bourke, Paul F. "The Social Critics and the End of American Innocence:
1907-1921." Journal of American Studies 3 (1969): 57-72.
___ . "The Status of Politics, 1909-1919: The New Republic, Randolph
Bourne and Van Wyck Brooks." Journal ofAmerican Studies 8(2) (August
1974): 171-202.
Branford, Victor. "RSB." Political Science Quarterly 30 (1915): 343-44.
Brantlinger, Patrick. Bread and Circuses. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1983.
Brittain, Vera. Chronicle of Youth. New York: Morrow, 1982.
Bromwich, David. "Literary Radicalism in America." Dissent (Winter
1985): 35-44.
Brooks, Van Wyck. The Wine of the Puritans. London: Sisley's, 1908.
_ _ _ . Americas Coming of Age. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1915.
_ _ _ . L etters and Leadership. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1918.
_ _ _ . "Introduction." In History of a L iterary Radical and Other Essays,
edited by Van Wyck Brooks. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1920. Also in
The History of a Literary Radical and Other Papers. New York: S. A. Russell,
1956.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

239
_ _ _ . "Randolph Bourne." Encydopedia of Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan, 1930.
_ _ _ . The Confident Years, 1885-1915. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952.
_ _ _ . "Randolph Bourne." In Fenollosa and His Circ/,e: With Other Essays
in Biography, 259-321. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1962.
_ _ _ . An Autobiography. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1965.
Brown, Milton W. American Painting from the Armory Show to the Depression.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.
_ _ _ . The Story of the Armory Show. New York: New York Graphic Society, 1963.
Bullert, Gary. The Politics ofjohn Dewey. Buffalo, N.Y: Prometheus Books,
1983.
Cantor, Milton. "The Radical Confrontation with Foreign Policy: War and
Revolution, 1914-1920." In Dissent: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism, ed. by Alfred F. Young, 217-49. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1968.
Carlson, Robert A. "Americanization as an Early Twentieth Century Adult
Education Movement." History ofEducation Quarterly 10 (Winter 1970) :
440-64.
Chafee, Zechariah,Jr. Free Speech in the United States. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1941.
Chamberlain,John. A Farewell to &form. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1965. First
published 1932.
Chase, Richard. "The Fate of the Avant-Garde." Partisan Review 24(3)
(Summer 1957): 363-75.
___ . "Radicalism Today." Partisan Review 24(1) (Winter 1975): 45-54.
Chomsky, Noam."The Responsibility of Intellectuals." In American Power
and the New Mandarins, 323-66. New York: Pantheon, 1969.
_ _ _ . "Intellectuals and the State (1977) ." In Towards a New Cold War:
Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There, 60-85. New York: Pantheon, 1982.
Clayton, Bruce. Forgotten Prophet: The Life of Randolph Bourne. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1984.
Cohen, Sol. Progressives and Urban School &form. New York: Teachers College of Columbia University, 1963.
Collins, Seward. "Criticism in America." Bookman (June 1930): 241-56,
353-64.
Commager, Henry Steele. The American Mind: An Interpretation of American
Thought and Character Since the 1880s. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950.
_ _ _ . The Search for a Usab/,e Past and Other Essays in Historiography. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

240
Conn, Peter. The Divided Mind: Ideology and Imagination in America,
1989-1917. Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1983.
Cooney, Terry. The Rise of the New York InteUectuals. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1986.
Cooperman, Stanley. World -War I and the American Novel. Baltimore:Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1967. First published 1970.
Cott, Nancy F. The Grounding of Modern Feminism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
Cowley, Malcolm. After the Genteel Tradition: American Writers Since 1910.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1937.
_ _ _ . Exil,e's Return: A Literary Odyssey of the 1920s. New York: Penguin,
1978. First published 1951.
Creel, George. How We Advertised America. New York: Harper, 1920.
Cremin, Lawrence. The Transformation of the School. New York: Vintage,
1961.
Croly, Herbert. The Promise ofAmerican Life. New York: Macmillan, 1909.
_ _ _ . Progressive Democracy. New York: Macmillan, 1914.
Curtis, Tom. "Bourne, Macdonald, Chomsky, and the Rhetoric of Resistance." Antioch Review 29 (Summer 1969): 245-52.
Dahlberg, Edward. "Randolph Bourne: In the Saddle of Rosinante." In
Can These Bones Live, 27-39. Rev. ed. New York: New Directions, 1960.
First published 1941.
_ _ _ . "Randolph Bourne." In Alms for Oblivion, 79-86. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1964.
Damico, Alfonso J. Individuality and Community: The Social and Political
Thought ofjohn Dewey. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1978.
Dearborn, Mary V. "Anzia Yezierska and the Making of an Ethnic American Self." In Inventing Ethnicity, edited by Werner Sollors, 105-23. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Dell, Floyd. "Randolph Bourne." New Republic 16 (January 4, 1919): 276.
Intell,ectual Vagabondage. New York: George H. Doran, 1926.
_ _ _ . Love in Greenwich Village. New York: George H. Doran, 1926.
_ _ _ . Homecoming. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1933.
Deutsch, Babbette. A Brittl,e Heaven. New York: Greenberg, 1926.
Dewey,John. Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan, 1916.
_ _ _ . The School and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916.
_ _ _ . Characters and Events. Edited by Joseph Ratner. New York: Henry
Holt, 1929.
Dewey,John, and Evelyn Dewey. Schools of Tomorrow. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1915.
Diggins,John Patrick. The American Left in the Twentieth Century. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

241
_ _ _ . 'John Dewey in Peace and War." American Scholar 50 (Spring
1981): 213-30.
_ _ _ . "The New Republic and Its Times, 1914-1984." NewRepublic191
(December 10, 1984): 23-73.
_ _ _ . "Republicanism and Progressivism." American Quarterly 84(4)
(Fall 1985): 572-98.
_ _ _ . The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge
and Authority. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Dos Passos,John. Nineteen-Nineteen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932.
Dreiser, Theodore. "Appearance and Reality." In American Spectator Year
Book, No. 11, 204-9. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1934.
DuBois, W. E. B. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: New American Library,
1969. First published 1903.
Eagan, Maurice Francis. "Five American Essayists." Yale Review 10 (October 1920): 186-89.
Eisenach, Eldon]. The Lost Promise of Progressivism. Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1994.
Erikson, Erik. Childhood and Society. 2d ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1963.
_ _ _ . Youth: Change and Challenge. New York: Basic Books, 1963.
_ _ _ . Identity, Youth, and Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton, 1968.
Erskine, John. The Merrwry of Certain Persons. Boston: J. P. Lippincott, 1947.
Featherstone,Joseph. "Foreword." Randolph Silliman Bourne: Education
Through Radical Eyes, by Thomas N. Walters. Kennebunkport, Maine:
Mercer House, 1982.
Feuer, Lewis S. "The Political Linguistics of 'Intellectual': 1898-1918."
Survey 16 (Winter 1971): 156-83.
Filler, Louis. Randolph Bourne. Washington, D.C.: American Council on
Public Affairs, 1943.
_ _ _ . Vanguards and FoUowers: Youth in the American Tradition. New York:
Transaction Books, 1995. First published 1978.
Forcey, Charles. Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1961.
Forum Exhibition Catalogue. Whitney Museum of American Art, 1983.
Fox, Richard Wightman. "Apostle of Personality." New York Times Book
Review,January 13, 1985, p. 12.
Frank, Waldo. Our America. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1919.
Discovery of America. New York: Charles Scribners, 1929.
_ _ _ . In the American jungl.e. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1937.
_ _ _ . Memoirs of Waldo Frank. Edited by Alan Trachtenberg. Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1973.
Freeman, Joseph. An American Testament: A Narrative of Rebels and Romantics. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1936.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPI-N

242
Fussell, Paul. The Great War and Modern Memory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
___ . "My War." In Penguin Book of Contemporary Essays, edited by Maureen Howard, 231-48. New York: Viking Press, 1985.
Gilbert,James Burkhart. Writers and Partisans: A History of Literary Radicalism in America. NewYork:John Wiley, 1968.
Gleason, Philip. 'The Melting Pot: Symbol of Fusion or Confusion?" American Quarterly 16 (Spring 1964): 20-46.
Gold, Michael. "America Needs a Critic." New Masses 1 (October 1926):
7-9.
Goldman, Eric. Rendezvous with Destiny. New York: Vintage, 1956.
Goldstein, Robert Justin. Political Repression in America, 1870-1970. New
York: Schenkman, 1978.
Colin, Steve. "The Paterson Strike Pageant: Success or Failure?" Socialist
Review69 (May-June 1983): 45-78.
_ _ _ . The Fragi1e Bridge: Paterson Silk Strike, 1913. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1988.
Gouldner, Alvin. The Future of Intel/,ectuals and the Rise of the New Class. New
York: Seabury Press, 1979.
Gramsci, Antonio. Se/,ections from the Prison Notebooks. Translated and edited
by Quentin Hoare and G. Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
Graves, Robert. Goodbye to All That. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1957.
Gregory, Alyse. The Day is Gone. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1948.
Gregory, Horace. "Salvos for Randolph Bourne." In Se/,ected Poems of Horace
Gregory. New York: Viking Press, 1951.
Greenstone, J. David. The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Gruber, Carol S. Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of the Higher
Learning in America. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1975.
Gunther, Gerald. "Learned Hand and the Origins of the Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History." Stanford Law
Review 27 (1975): 719-73.
Hansen, Olaf. "Affinity and Ambivalence." In The Radical Will: Randolph
Bourne, Se/,ected Writings, 1911-1918, edited byOlafHansen, 17-62. New
York: Urizen Books, 1977.
_ _ _ . Bewusstseinsformen literarischer Intelligenz: Bourne, Croly, Eastman,
Calverton, Gol,d. Stuttgart:]. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1977.
Heller, Erich. Thomas Mann: The Ironic German. South Bend, Ind.: Reg-

nery/ Gateway, 1958.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

243

_ _ _ . The Disinherited Mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1975.
_ _ _ . TheArtist's]oumey into the Interior and Other Essays. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
_ _ _ . The Importance of Nietzsche. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988.
Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism,
1860-1925. New Brunswick, NJ. : Rutgers University Press, 1955.
_ _ _ . "The Reorientation of American Culture in the 1890s." In Writing American History, 73-108. Bloomington : Indiana University Press,
1970.
_ _ _ . Send These to Me. New York: Atheneum, 1975.
Hilfer, Anthony Channel. The Revolt from the Village, 1915-1930: The Literary Attack on Small Town Provincialism. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969.
Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age ofEmpire, 1875-1914. New York: Pantheon, 1987.
Hoffman, Frederick]. The Twenties: American Writing in the Post War Decade.
New York: Viking Press, 1949. First published 1955.
Hoffman, Frederick]., Charles Allen, and Carolyn F. Ulrich. The Little
Magazine. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946.
Hofstadter, Richard. Age of Reform. New York: Vintage, 1955.
_ _ _ . Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1963.
_ _ _ . The Progressive Historians. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.
Hofstadter, Richard, and Walter P. Metzer. The Deve!,o,pment ofAcademic Freedom in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.
Hollinger, David A. In the American Province. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
Hoopes,James. "The Culture of Progressivism: Croly, Lippmann, Brooks,
Bourne, and the Idea of American Artistic Decadence." Clio 7 ( 1)
(1977): 91-111.
Horowitz, Helen L. Campus Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987.
Howe, Irving. "The Culture of Modernism." Commentary 44 (November
1967): 48-59.
World of Our Fathers. New York: Touchstone, 1976.
_ _ _ . Celebrations and Attacks. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1979.
Hughes, H. Stuart. Consciousness and Society. New York: Vintage, 1961. First
published 1958.
Huyssen, Andreas. After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodemism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

244

Hyman , Stanley E. The Armed Vision. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947.
Jacoby, Russell. The Last InteUectuals: American Culture in the Age of A cademe.
New York: Basic Books, 1987.
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Longmans,
Green, 1902.
_ _ _ . Essays in Pragmatism. Edited by Alburey Castell. New York:
H afner, 1948.
_ _ _ . Talks to Teachers. New York: W.W. Norton, 1958.
_ _ _ . Pragmatism and Other Essays. New York: Washington Square Press,
1963.
_ _ _ . The Moral Equivalent of War and Other Essays. Edited by John K.
Roth . New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Jencks, Christopher, and David Reisman. The Academic Revolution. Garden
City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1968.
Jessop, Bob. The Capitalist State. New York: New York University Press, 1982.
Jones, Margaret C. Heretics and Hellraisers: Women Contributors to "the
Masses," 1911-1917. Austin: University Press of Texas, 1993.
Joost, Nicholas. Scofield Thayer and the Dial-An Illustrated History. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964.
_ _ _ . Years of Transition: The Dial. Barre, Mass.: Barre Publishers, 1967.
_ _ _ . "Culture vs. Power: Randolph Bourne,John Dewey, and the
Dial. " Midwest Quarterly (April 1968) : 245-58.
Kalaidjian, Walter. American Culture Between the Wars: Revisionary Modernism
and Postmodern Critique. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Kallen, Horace. Culture and Democracy in the United States. New York: Arno,
1970. First published 1924.
Kaplan, Sidney. "Social Engineers as Saviors: Effects of World War I on Some
American Liberals." Journal of the History ofIdeas 17 (June 1956): 347-69.
Kazin, Alfred. On Native Grounds. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1982.
Kelly, Florence. "Randolph Bourne." Intercollegiate Socialist 6 (February-March 1919): 8.
Kennedy, David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Kerr, Clark. The Uses of the University. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1982.
Kirchwey, Freda. "Randolph Bourne." Nation 3 (December 1, 1920): 619.
Klein, Marcus. After Alienation. New York: World, 1964. First published 1962.
Kolko, Gabriel. The Triumph of Conservatism, 1900-1916. New York: Free
Press, 1977. First published 1963.
Kristeva,Julia. Nations Without Nationalism. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPI-N

245

Kristol, Irving. [Untitled], a review of Dangling Man, by Saul Bellow. Politics 1 (June 1944): 156.
LaMonte, Robert Rives. "The New Intellectuals." New Review (January
1914): 45-53.
Lasch, Christopher. The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.
_ _ _ . Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged. New York: Basic
Books, 1977.
_ _ _ . "Preface." In Radical Will: Randolph Bourne, Selected Writings,
1911-1918, edited by Olaf Hansen. New York: Urizen Books, 1977.
_ _ _ . The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing
Expectations. New York: W.W. Norton, 1979.
Lasch, Christopher, ed. The Social Thought ofJane Addams. Indianapolis:
Bobbs Merrill, 1965.
Laski, Harold. "The Liberalism of Randolph Bourne." Freeman 1 (May 19,
1920): 237-38.
Leach, William R. Land of Desire: Merchants, Power and the Rise of a New
American Culture. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.
Lears, T. J. Jackson. No Place of Grace. New York: Pantheon, 1981.
Lentriccia, Frank. Criticism and Social Change. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983.
Lerner, Max. "Randolph Bourne and Two Generations." In Ideas for the Ice
Age, 11~2. New York: Viking Press, 1941.
_ _ _ . "Introduction." Randolph Bourne, by Louis Filler. Washington,
D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943.
Leuchtenberg, William E. "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916." Mississippi
Valley Historical Review 39(3) (December 1952): 483-504.
_ _ _ . Perils of Prosperity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
_ _ _ . "Introduction." Drift and Mastery, by Walter Lippmann. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1961. First published 1914. Also
"Revised Introduction." Drift and Mastery. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
Levenberg, Diane. "Paul Rosenfeld and the Erotics of Art." Book Forum,
5(4) (1981): 525-33.
Levine, Daniel. "Randolph Bourne,John Dewey and the Legacy of Liberalism." Antioch Review 29 (Summer 1969): 234-44.
Levine, Murray, and Adeline Levine. "The Gary Schools: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Process of Change." California Elementary Administrator (Spring 1970).
Levy, David. Herbert Croly and the New Republic. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPI-N

246
Lind, Michael. The New American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth
American Revolution. New York: Free Press, 1995.
Lippmann, Walter. A Preface to Politics. New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1913.
_ _ _ . Drift and Mastery. New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1914.
Livingston, James. Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850-1940. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.
Luhan, Mabel Dodge. Intimate Memories. New York: Kraus Reprints, 1971.
First published 1933.
Lustig, R. Jeffrey. Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American Political Theory, 1890-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
Lynn, Kenneth S. "The Rebels of Greenwich Village." No. 8, Perspectives
in American History. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
Lyons, Paul. "Teaching the Sixties." Socialist Review 15(1) (January-February 1985): 71-91.
McClymer,John. War and Welfare: SocialEngineeringinAmerica, 1890-1925.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980.
MacDonald, Dwight. "War and the Intellectuals: Act IL" Partisan Review 6
(Spring 1939): 3-20.
___ . "Randolph Bourne." Politics 1 (March 1944): 35-36.
McNaught, Kenneth. "Socialism and the Progressives: Was Failure
Inevitable?" Dissent: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism,
edited by Alfred F. Young, 253-71. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1968.
McWilliams, Wilson Carey. The Idea ofFraternity in America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
Madison, Charles. "Randolph Bourne: The History of a Literary Radical."
In Critics and Crusaders: A Century ofAmerican Protest, 419-42. New York:
Henry Holt, 1947.
Mann, Thomas. Reflections of a Non-Political Man . New York: Frederick
Ungar, 1983. First published 1918.
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. Translated by Louis Wirth and
Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1936.
Marcell, David. Progress and Pragmatism: James, Dewey, Beard, and the American Idea of Progress. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974.
May, Henry F. The End ofAmerican Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our
Own Time, 1912-1917. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1959.
_ _ _ . Discontent of the InteUectuals. Berkeley Series in American History. New
York: Rand McNally, 1963.
Mayer, Arno. The Persistence of the Old Regime. New York: Pantheon, 1981.
Meltzer, Milton. Bread and Roses: The Struggl,e ofAmerican Labor, 1865-1915.
New York: Vintage, 1967.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

247
Merod,Jim. The Political Responsibility of the Critic. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1987.
Mills, C. Wright. "The Powerless People: The Role of the Intellectual in
Society." Politics l (April 1944): 68-74.
_ _ _ . The Sociologi,cal lmagi,nation. New York: Oxford University Press,
1958.
Monroe, Harriet. "Mr. Bourne on Traps." Poetry 12 (May 1918): 91-94.
_ _ _ . A Poet's Life. New York: Macmillan, 1938.
Moreau, John Adam. Randolph Bourne: Legend and Reality. Washington,
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966.
Morton, H. W. "Randolph Bourne vs. the State." Anarchy 31 (September
1963): 265-69.
Mumford, Lewis. "The Image ofRandolph Bourne." NewRepublic64 (September 24, 1930): 151-52.
_ _ _ . "The Corruption of Liberalism." New Republic 102 (April 29,
1940): 568-73.
Munson, Gorham. Awakening Twenties: A Memoir-History of the Literary
Period. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985.
Murphy, Paul L. World War I and the Origi,n of Civil Liberties in the United
States. New York: W.W. Norton, 1979.
Nashaw, David. Children of the City: At Work and at Play. Garden City, N.Y:
Anchor Press, 1985.
Nearing, Scott. The Making of a Radical: A Political Autobiography. New York:
Harper and Row, 1972.
Nelson, Cary. Repression and Recovery: Modern American Poetry and the Politics of Cultural Memory, 1910-1945. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1989.
Nelson, Raymond. Van Wyck Brooks: A Writer's Life. New York: E. P. Dutton,
1981.
Nietzsche, Friedrich W. The Use and Abuse of History. Translated by Adrian
Collins. Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press 1957. First published 1949.
_ _ _ . Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Modern Library, 1966.
_ _ _ . The Portable Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Penguin Books, 1968. First published 1954.
Noble, David W. "The New Republic and the Idea of Progress, 1914-20."
Mississippi Vall,ey Historical Review 38 ( 1951): 387-402.
_ _ _ . The Paradox of Progressive Thought. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
Nochlin, Linda. "The Paterson Pageant." Art in America 52 (May-June
1974): 67.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

248
Oppenhe im , James. "Foreword." In Untimely Papers, e dite d by James
Oppenheim. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919.
___ . "Randolph Bourne: Died December 22 [sic], 1918." Dial66 (January 11, 1919): 7.
_ _ _ . "Randolph Bourne: Died December 22 [sic], 1918." Liberator l
(February 1919) : 14-15 (different verses) .
_ _ _ . "The Story of the Seven Arts. " American Mercury 20 (June 1930) :
156-64.
Oppenheimer, Franz. The State. Translated by John M. Gitterman. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1923. First published 1914.
Parrington, Vernon. Main Currents in American Thought. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930. First published 1927.
Parsons, Elsie Clews. "A Pacifist Patriot." Dial68 (March 1920): 367-70.
Paul, Sherman. Randolph Bourne. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1966.
Peiss, Kathy. Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-oftheCentury New York. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.
Pells, Richard H . Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social
Thought in the Depression Years. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University
Press, 1987. First published 1973.
Peterson, H. C., and Gilbert C. Fite. opponents of War, 1917-1918. Seattle:
University of Washington, 1968. First published 1957.
Pitkin, Hannah. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
Porter, Carolyn. Seeing and Being. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1981.
Posnock, Ross. "The Politics of Nonidentity: A Genealogy." boundary 2
19(1) (Spring 1992): 34-68.
Preston, William, Jr. Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals,
1903-1933. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
Quandt,Jean B. From Small Town to the Great Community: The Social Thought
of Progressive Intellectuals. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
Reed,John. The Education ofjohn Reed: Selected Writings. New York: International, 1955.
Remarque, Erich Maria. All Quiet on the Western Front. Greenwich, Conn.:
Fawcett, 1968.
Resek, Carl. "Introduction." In War and the Intellectuals: Randolph S. Bourne,
Collected Essays, 1915-1919. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
___ . "Prodigal Sons and the Lyrical Left." Wilson Quarterly 11(1) (January 1987): 150-52.
Ricci, David M. The Tragedy of Political Science. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1984.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

249
Rideout, Walter. The Radical Novel in the United States, 1900-1954. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.
Rodgers, Daniel T. "In Search of Progressivism." Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982): 113-31.
Rogin, Michael. "In Defense of the New Left." Democracy3(4) (Fall 1983):
106--16.
_ _ _ . Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology.

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
_ _ _ . "The Great Mother Domesticated: Sexual Difference and Sexual Indifference in D. W. Griffith's Intolerance." Criticallnquiry 15
(Spring 1989): 510-55.
Roosevelt, Jinx. "Randolph Bourne: The Education of a Critic, an Interpretation." History of Education Quarterly 17 (3) (Fall 1977): 257-75.
Rosenfeld, Paul. "Randolph Bourne." In Port of New York: Essays on Fourteen American Moderns, 211-36. NewYork: Harcourt, Brace, 1924.
Rugg, Harold. Culture and Education. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1931.
Rutkoff, Peter M., and William B. Scott. New School: A History of the New
School for Social Research. New York: Free Press, 1986.
Ryan, Alan. John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism. New York:
W. W. Norton, 1995.
Salmagundi. (Spring-Summer 1986): Nos. 70-71. "Intellectuals."
Sandeen, EricJ. "Introduction." In The Letters of Randolph Bourne: A Comprehensive Edition, edited by EricJ. Sandeen. Troy, N.Y.: Whitston, 1981.
_ _ _ . "Bourne Again: The Correspondence Between Randolph
Bourne and Elsie Clews Parsons." American Literary History l (3) (Fall
1989): 489-509.
Santayana, George. The Letters of George Santayana. Edited by Daniel Cory.
New York: Scribners, 1955.
_ _ _ . The Genteel Tradition: Nine Essays. Edited by Douglas L. Wilson.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
Schapiro, Meyer. "Rebellion in Art." In America in Crisis, edited by Daniel
Aaron, 203-42. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.
Schieber, Harry N. The Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917-1921.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960.
Schlissel, Lillian. "Introduction." In The World of Randolph Bourne. New
York: E. P. Dutton, 1965.
Schutte, Ofelia. Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Scialabba, George. "Bourne in Flames." Voice Literary Supplement (February 1985): 6.
Sedgwick, Ellery. The Happy Profession. Boston: Little, Brown, 1946.
Seidelman, Raymond. Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the Amer-

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

250

ican Crisis, 1884-1984. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1985.
Seideman, David. The New Republic. New York: Praeger, 1986.
Shannon, David A. The Socialist Party of America. Chicago: Quadrangle,
1967.
Shapiro, Michael]. "Introduction: The Problem of Ideology: Locating
the Political Analyst/ Writer." In The Politics of Representation: Writing
Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis, 3-54. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
Shulte-Sasse, Linda. "Leni Riefenstahl's Feature Films and the Question
of the Fascist Aesthetic." Cultural Critique 18 (Spring 1991): 123-48.
Sillen, Samuel. "The Challenge of Randolph Bourne." Masses and Mainstream 6 (December 1953): 24-32.
Sklar, Martin. "Woodrow Wilson and the Political Economy of Modern
Liberalism." Studies on the Left I (3) (1960): 17-47.
Smith-Rosenberg, Carroll. Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian
America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.
Sochen,June. The New Woman in Greenwich Village, 1910-1920. New York:
Quadrangle Books, 1972.
Sollors, Werner. "Theory of American Ethnicity, Or: "? S Ethnic? /Ti and
American/Ti, de or United (W) States S SI and Theor?" American
Quarterly 33(3) (1981): 257-83.
_ _ _ . Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986.
_ _ _ . "A Critique of Pure Pluralism." In Reconstructing American Literary History, edited by Sacvan Bercovitch, 250-79. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1986.
Sollors, Werner, ed. "Introduction." In The Invention ofEthnicity. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989.
Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence. Translated by T. E. Hulme. New
York: Collier, 1961. First published 1908.
Spiller, Robert E., ed. Literary History of the United States, 3d ed. New York:
Macmillan, 1963.
Spingarn,J. E. Creative Criticism: Essay on the Unity of Genius and Taste. New
York: Henry Holt, 1917. First published 1911.
Stearns, Harold E. Liberalism in America: Its Origin, Its Temporary Collapse,
Its Future. New York: Boni Liveright, 1919.
Stearns, Harold E., ed. Civilization in the United States. New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1922.
Steele, Ronald. Walter Lippmann and the American Century. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1980.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

251
Stettner, Edward A. Shaping Modern Liberalism: Herbert Croly and Progressive
Thought. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993.
Strong, Tracy. Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975.
Strout, Cushing. "William James and the Twice-Born Sick Soul." Daedalus
117 (Summer 1968): 1062-82.
_ _ _ . The Veracious Imagination. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1981.
Strum, Philippa. Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism. Lawrence: University Press
ofKansas, 1993.
Sullivan, Mark. Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925. New York: Scribner's, 1926-1935.
Susman, Warren I. Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century. New York: Pantheon, 1985. First published
1973.
Symes, Lillian, and Travers Clement. Rebel America. New York: Harper and
Row, 1934.
Taylor, Frederick Winslow. The Principl.es of Scientific Management. New York:
W.W. Norton, 1967. First published 1911.
Teall, Dorothy. "Bourne into Myth." Bookman 75 (October 1932): 590-99.
Trachtenberg, Alan. "Introduction: The Genteel Tradition and Its Critics." In Critics of Culture: Literature and Society in the Early Twentieth Century, edited by Alan Trachtenberg, 3-13. NewYork:John Wiley and
Sons, 1976.
_ _ _ . Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age. New
York: Hill and Wang, 1982.
Trotter, Wilfred. Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. London: T. F. Unwin,
1920.
True, Michael D. "The Achievement of an American Literary Radical: A
Bibliography of Randolph Silliman Bourne (1889-1918)." Bull.etin of
the New York Public Library 69 (October 1965): 523-36.
Tuttleton,James W. "American Literary Radicalism in the Twenties." New
Criterion (March 1985): 16-30.
U ntermeyer, Louis. From Another World. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939.
Utley, Phillip Lee. "Radical Youth: Generational Conflict in the Anfang
Movement, 1912-January 1914." History of Education Quarterly 19(2)
(Summer 1979): 207-28.
Van Doren, Carl. Three Worlds. New York: Harper, 1936.
Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory of the Leisure Class. Edited by Max Lerner.
New York: Mentor, 1953. First published 1899.
Vitelli,James R. Randolph Bourne. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1981.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPIN

252
Walters, Thomas N. Randolph Silliman Bourne: Education Through Radical
Eyes. Kennebunkport, Maine: Mercer House Press, 1982.
Walzer, Michael. "The War and Randolph Bourne." In The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century,
45-63. New York: Basic Books, 1988.
Wasserstrom, William. The Times of the Dial. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963.
Wasserstrom, William. ed. A Dial Miscellany. Syracuse, N.Y. : Syracuse University Press, 1963.
Weinberg, Arthur, and Lila Weinberg, eds. The Muckrakers. New York: G. P.
Putnam, 1964. First published 1961.
Weinstein,James. The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968.
Weinstein, Michael. The Wilderness and the City. Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1982.
_ _ _ . "The Dark Night of the Liberal Spirit and the Dawn of the Savage." Canadian journal of Political and Social Theory 12(1-2) (1988):
165-79.
Wertheim, Arthur Frank. The New York Littl,e Renaissance: Iconoclasm, Modernism, and Nationalism in American Culture, 1908-1917. New York: New
York University Press, 1976.
West, Cornel. The American Evasion ofPhi!,osophy: A Genea/,ogy of Pragmatism.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
Westbrook, Robert B. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Weyl, Walter. The New Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1964 . First
published 1912.
White, Hayden. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century
Europe. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
Whitman, Walt. Leaves of Grass. Edited by Malcolm Cowley. New York: Penguin, 1959. First published 1885.
Wiebe, Robert H . The Search for Order, 1877-1920. New York: Hill and
Wang, 1967.
Wohl, Robert. The Generation of 1914. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1979.
Wolin, Sheldon S. "The New Conservatives." New York Review of Books, February 5, 1976, pp. 6-11.
Zigrosser, Carl. "Randolph Bourne and the Gary Schools." Modern School
6(4) (October 1917): 155- 57.
_ __ . My Own Shall Come to Me. Philadelphia: Casa Laura, 1971.
A World of Art and Museums. Philadelphia: Art Alliance Press,
1974.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

253
Zizek, Slavoj. "Eastern Europe's Republics of Gilead." In Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, edited by Chantal
Mouffe, 193-207. New York: Verso Press, 1992.
_ _ _ . "Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology." In Mapping Ideology,
edited by Slavoj Zizek, 1-33. New York: Verso Press, 1994.

This page intentionally left blank

INDEX

Aaron, Daniel, 4 7
Abstractness, 55, 170
Absurdity, 50
Academic freedom, 87
Action,94,95
Activism, 16, 61, 82, 166
Activist, 7, 69
Adams, Henry, 68
Addams,Jane, 18, 22, 61, 63, 69, 71, 88
Adorno, Theodor, 44
Aestheticism, 158
Alienated self, 48, 169
Alienation, 33, 66, 88, 133
Alien raids (1919-1920), 139
Aliens, 125, 132
American identity, 122-23, 125-26,
127, 136,206(n9)
Americanism, 117, 122, 136-37, 139
Americanization, 1, 8, 119, 122,
126-27, 135,136,139
American political culture, 4, 10-11
American political thought, 6
American Union Against Militarism,
35
"American Use for German Ideals"
(Bourne), 150
Analogy, 47
Anarchists, 18, 42, 125, 126

Anderson, Sherwood, 13
Anglo-conformity, 127-28, 135, 136,
209(n23)
Anhedonia, 32, 33, 49, 69
Anthony, Katherine, 81
Anthropology, 109, 125
Antiformalism, 15
Antin, Mary, 128
Antistatism political theory, 8
Apollonianism, 4, 7, 8, 24, 54, 60, 61,
164
Armory Show (1913), 12, 124,
207(nll)
Arnold, Matthew, 124, 147, 149,
207(nl3)
Art,8, 11, 12,69, 138,144,145,148,
149-53, 158
as collective process, 152-53
new, 163
"Artist in Wartime, The" (Bourne), 155
Artzybachev, Mikhail, 163
Asians, 128
Assimilation, 119, 126, 127, 128-29,
134-35
Atlantic Monthly, 25, 34, 35, 156
Autobiography, 36. See also Bourne,
Randolph, autobiographical essays
Avant-garde, 156

255

INDEX

256

Babbitt, Irving, 148, 149
Bakhtin, M. M., 45, 52
Baldwin, Roger, 35
Balzac, Honore de, 161
Barrett, Halsey (uncle), 29
Beard, Charles A., 14, 33, 34, 116,
207(nl3)
Belgian poets, 159
"Beloved communities," 8, 33, 77, 109,
125,137,139,144,151,168,172
Beloved Community: The Cultural Criticism of Randolph Bourne (Blake) , 6

"Below the battle," 5, 6, 9, 56, 91-92,
109, 173-74, 222(n15)
Benda,Julien, 108
Bender, Thomas, 87, 167
Benet, Stephen Vincent, 13
Bentley, Arthur, 126
Bercovitch, Sacvan, 7, 23
Bergson, Henri, 5, 15, 59, 64, 69, 71, 80
Berkman, Alexander, 36
Birnbaum, Norman, 6
Birth control, 12
Blake, Casey Nelson, 5-6, 140, 144,
167,158,169,173
Blossom, Elizabeth, 26
Boardman, Helen, 81
Boar's Head (student literary society),
34
Boas, Franz, 33, 184(n40), 207(nl3)
Bohemians, 10, 11, 35
Boston, 11, 12, 123
Bourke, Paul F., 143
Bourne, Charles Rogers (father) , 26,
29,31
Bourne, Randolph (1886-1918)
on architecture, 150-51, 216(n21)
autobiographical essays, 7, 19-20,
21-25, 27,41, 165
autobiographical novel, 36
biographies, 166, 167
birth, 26
as book reviewer, 34, 36, 53-54,
184(n40)
as Calvinist, 27, 28, 30-31, 32

childhood, 21, 28, 29
at Columbia University, 33-34, 124,
148
on Confidential List of Aliens and
Suspects: List A, 35, 36
as cultural radical, 19-20, 41 , 43,
45,56, 61-62,66,83, 147-48, 166,
188(n9)
cultural theory, 8, 17-18, 40, 82,
124-25, 130, 137-41, 143, 146-49,
154-56, 164,207(nl3),217(n25)
(see also "Trans-national" American culture; Zionism/ Zionists)
death, 36
and Dewey, 33, 34, 36, 59, 89-90,
91,102, 106-7, 198(nll)
as divided self, 32-33
on education, 22, 35, 36, 41, 61, 72,
73-78
essay prize, 34
in Europe (1913-1914), 34, 57,
124,150
on feminism, 60, 80-84
fiancee,36
and government surveillance, 36,
122
grandmother, 29, 183(nl 7)
grassroots approach, 6, 34
ideas, 1, 3-4,5, 7-8,37,38-39,43,
44,59-60,61, 79,80, 114,171,174
ideas, critiques of, 6, 77, 91-92,
142-45, 147-48, 150, 166-69,
217(nn25,26)
influences on, 5, 7, 8, 24, 31 , 32, 41,
69, 75,131,137,165
jobs,29-30,34
as literary critic, 3, 8-9, 21, 152,
157-64
literary theory, 8, 41, 155-57
in literature, 2
master's thesis, 34, 184(n40),
213(n63)
music, 30
myth of, 2-4, 8, 24, 165, 166, 167
at New Republic, 34-35, 36, 58, 77

INDEX

257
on Nietzsche, 16, 164, 174
parents, 26, 27, 29, 31
physical disability, 7, 22-23, 26-27,
166,169,170
on political involvement, 44, 82,
143
on religion, 78, 79
self-education, 22, 24
self-identity, 4, 19-20, 21, 23-25,
27-28, 33, 36-37, 123-24 (see also
"Below the battle")
sisters, 27
as socialist, 34, 63
as syndicalist, 34
as translator, 36
and trans-valuation, 7-8, 26, 51, 78,
133-34, 163
on war, 1-2, 5, 8, 35-36, 56, 85, 87,
100,104, 106, 111-13, 116-17,
119, 121, 169-70
on war and intellectuals, 85-86,
88-92,98-99, 100-102, 106-7,
110-11
writing out of print, 3
writings,3,5, 7,35-36,89, 166
writing style, 47
on youth, 57, 58, 66--68, 69--70, 78,
82-83, 85 ( see also Generationalism)
Bourne, Sarah Barrett (mother), 26,
27,29
Brancusi, Constantin, 12
Brandeis, Louis, 131, 2ll(n38)
Brecht, Bertolt, 162
Breines, Winni, 140
Brooks, Van Wyck, 13, 22, 143, 145,
146,157, 158,165,170
Buckle, Thomas, 31
Bureaucrac~ 1,9, 17, 73,80,87, 123
Burke, Edmond, 20
Burleson, Albert Sidney, 121
Butler,Judith, 13
Butler, Nicholas Murray, 77
Cafes, 44
Camel, 170

Capitalism, 65, 72, 96, 113, 136, 168.
See also Corporate capitalist
order
Cather, Willa, 9, 161
Catholics, 126
Cattell, William, 87
Centralized state power, 1, 59, 60, 87
Chicago, 11 , 12, 13
Christian conversion, 24, 27, 32, 41
Churchill, Winston, 163
Cities, 137-38
Citizenship, 8, 131 , 168, 211 (n43)
City planning, 34, 150-51
Civic art, 150
Civil Club, 35
Civil liberties, 121, 126
Civil society, 111, 127
Class identity, 48, 62, 65, 100, 108
Class power, 88
Class struggle, 43
Cole, G. D. H., 16
Colorado, 160
Columbia Monthly, 34
Columbia University, 33-34, 77-78,
87,109,124,163
Comer, Cornelia A. P., 66
Committee for Democratic Control,
35, 112
Communitarianism, 137, 153, 167
Congo, The (Lindsay), 158
"Conscience and Compulsion"
(Dewey), 98
Consciousness, 4 7
Consumer culture, 17, 84, 140
Contradiction, 4, 5, 44-45
andiron~48,52, 157
and pragmatism, 118
Cornell, Esther, 36
Corporate capitalist order, 1, 7, 17, 19,
30, 73,80, 170, 177(nll)
Cosmopolitanism, 123, 131 , 134, 139,
167
Cox, Kenyon, 12
Creative skepticism, 169, 173
Creel, George, 35, 121

INDEX

258
Creel Committee on Public Information , 2, 35
Crevecoeur, Hector St.John , 128
Crime and Punishment (Dostoyevsky) ,
161
Critical dialogues, 157
Critical inquiry, 61
Critical theory, 48
Criticism , limits of, 44, 55
Croly, Herbert, 13, 92, 93, 99,
204(n70)
Cuba, 93
Cultural adventure, 61 , 82
Cultural materialism, 144
"Cultural 'Modernists,'" 22, 155,
164
Cultural nationalists/ nationalism, 6,
13, 158,207(nl3)
Cultural pluralism, 122, 123, 127,
129-31, 139,205(n8)
Cultural renaissance, 1
Culture, 121, 124, 143, 164, 207(nl3)
highbrow and lowbrow, 143, 144,
153, 154-55, 160
See also "Trans-national" American
culture
"Culture of feeling," 1
"Culture of personality,'' 37. See also
Personality
Cynicism, 52
Dance, 12
Dell, Floyd, 12, 13, 69
Democracy, 51 , 94, 97, 137, 167
and art, 153-54, 164
as civic religion, 14
industrial, 114
radical, 42, 43, 57
social, 43
"Democracy versus the Melting Pot"
(Kallen), 129
Democratic restructuring, 96
Democratic socialism, 5, 13, 16, 75,
193(n55)
Democratic truth, 51

Dewey,John, 33, 34, 35, 36, 59,
l 98(n 11)
biography, 167
and education , 35, 73, 75, 76
on intellectuals, 108
pragmatism, 2, 5, 8, 76, 88, 102,
105-6
and war, 89, 95-98, 102, 199(nl2)
Dial, 35, 36, 89, 158, 198(nll)
Dialectic, 52
Dickens, Charles, 161
Diggins,John P., 15
Dionysianism, 4, 7, 8, 24, 54, 55, 61 ,
82, 84, 138, 153, 162, 164,169
Dissent, 1, 33, 35, 120, 139, 141, 167,
173
Dodge, Mabel, 11
Dos Passos,John, 2, 3
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, 9, 22, 145, 161
"Do the People Want War?" (advertisement), 112
Dove, Arthur, 11
Dreiser, Theodore, 9, 13, 16, 26, 145,
166
works reviewed by Bourne, 53-54,
159-60, 161
Dreyfus, Alfred, 107
Drift and Mastery (Lippmann), 59, 70,
71 , 72, 80
..
Dual citizenship, 131, 211 (n43)
DuBois, W. E. B. , 96, 211 (n43)
Duchamp, Marcel, 12
Duncan, Isadora, 12
Eastman, Crystal, 35, 69, 81 , 112
Eastman, Max, 11, 12, 13, 16, 35, 69,
112
Economic determinism, 14
Economy, 72-73
centralized, 6
and war policies, 1
Education, 1, 5, 22, 35, 71 , 100
and conformism, 77
democratic, 75, 76, 77
experimental, 69

INDEX

259

reform, 6, 7, 61, 72 , 74-75, 77,
104
self-, 22
vocational, 61
working class, 11
Education as Living (Bourne), 77
Eisenach, Eldon, 13, 14, 18
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 20, 23, 26
Empirical evidence, 15
Ethnicity, 127, 209(n25)
Ethnic loyalties, 11 7, 119
European 1914 generation
(1880-1910),65-66
European renaissance (1910), 159
Exclusion, 19
Experience, 15, 67
Experimentation, 58, 59, 61, 69, 70,
78,88, 105
Expertise,6,59,60,61, 73,80,87, 107
Ezekiel, 21, 33
Failure,30-31
Far East, 93
Featherstone,Joseph, 73
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 139
"Federation of cultures," 1
Feminism, 5, 7, 10, 11, 60, 80-84
radical, 35
See also Patchin Place
Ferrer Center (New York City), 69
Fitz-Randolph, Edward, 26
Forcey, Charles, 143, 167
"For Radicals" (Bourne), 57
Foucault, Michel, 69, 91, 101
"Fragment of the State" (Bourne),
36
France, 34, 114
Frank, Waldo, 13, 22, 69, 147, 166
Freedom, 70, 72, 78,87, 105,108
Free love, 12
Freud, Sigmund, 71
Freudianism, 11, 169
Friere, Paolo, 75
Frost, Robert, 13, 36, 120
Furth (Germany), 151

Gallery 291, 69
Garment workers' strike (1912)
pageant (1913), 12
Garrison, William Lloyd, 26
Gary school system, 36, 76-77
Genealogy, 13
General William Booth Enters into Heaven
(Lindsay), 158
Generationalism, 7, 18-20, 22, 23, 59,
62-68 , 70, 72-73, 147, 165
defined,62
Genius, The (Dreiser), 159
George, Henry, 31
German music banned, 121
Germany, 34, 150-51
Gibran, Kahlil, 13
Gilroy, Paul, 40
Goffman, Erving, 38
Gold, Michael, 3
Goldman, Emma, 12, 36
Gorky, Maxim, 161
Government concept, 114-15
Gramsci, Antonio, 5, 62, 113, 114
Grant, Madison, 128
Greenstone,J. David, 177(nll)
Greenwich Village (New York City),
11, 28, 69
Gregory, Alyse, 57, 58, 81
Habermas,Jurgen, 90
Hall, G. Stanley, 66
"Handicapped, The: By One of
Them" (Bourne), 22-23
Hansen, Olaf, 50
Hartley, Marsden, 11
Hegel, G. W. F., 48, 115, 130,
207(nl3)
Herder,Johann, 207(nl3)
Heretics, 35
Higham,John, 16, 209(n23)
"History ofa Literary Radical"
(Bourne),22,41, 163
· Hobbes, Thomas, 20
Hofstadter, Richard, 77
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 14, 31

INDEX

260
Hoopes,James, 67
Hoosier Holiday, A (Dreiser), 159
Hoover, ]. Edgar, 139
Hopkins, Mary Alden, 81
Horkheimer, Max, 91
Howe, Irving, 130
Hull House (Chicago), 61
Humanism , 148, 149
Idealism, 5, 15, 46, 47
"new," 37
Illiteracy, 43
Imagism, 11, 34, 145, 158-59
Immigrants/ immigration, 1, 5, 7, 8,
10, 11 , 12,41,59, 74,119,122,
123,125,133
attitudes toward, 135, 139-40
eastern and southern European,
125-26
and schools, 77
and war preparation, 122
Individualism, 65, 75, 108, 109, 167
Industrialization, 87, 114
Industrial Workers of the World
(IWW),42, 114,117
Influenza epidemic (1918), 36
Institutionalism, 15, 76,108, 112-13, 116
Instrumentalism, 2, 8, 34, 59, 60, 88,
91,99, 102
wartime, 103, 105, 167
Intellectuals
and independence, 106-8
and institutional politics, 6-7, 80
Jewish, 132
leadership, 43-44, 55-56, 157
malcontented ( see "Below the battle")
and politics, 108, 142-43
progressive, 14, 85
use of term, 107, 108
See also Bourne, Randolph, on war
and intellectuals
Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS),
34
Internationalism, 10, 11, 13, 93, 132,
139,163

Intervention , 88, 89, 94-95
Iron~42,44, 45,46-47,48-52, 165,
173
and contradiction, 48, 52
as dionysian, 55
Lukacs on, 53
and parody, 52
and radicalism , 56
Irony, Solidarity and Commitment
(Rorty), 90
lrrationalism, 5
Irwin, Elizabeth, 81
Ishmael, 21, 27, 32, 123
ISS (Intercollegiate Socialist Society),
34
Italy, 34
IWW. See Industrial Workers of the
World
James, William, 1, 2, 5, 15-16, 32,
43-44,45,58,59,64,69, 73,80,
88,89, 103, 107-8, 118,137,174
Jefferson, Thomas, 207(nl3)
'Jew and Trans-National America,
The" (Bourne), 120
Jews, 126,130, 131-33, 136
Jordan, Winthrop, 35, 112
Judicial system, 69
Justice, U.S. Department of, 89
Kallen, Horace Meyer, 129-30, 131,
133,137
Kandinsky, Wassily, 12
Kant, Immanuel, 73
Kaplan, Sidney, 167
Kazin, Alfred, 16
Kellor, Frances, 128
King Coal (Sinclair), 160
Knowledge and Human Interests (Habermas), 90
Kriegel, Annie, 65
Labor conditions, 11, 61, 69
Labor radicalism, 11, 34, 42
Labor-saving devices, 60, 84

INDEX

261
Lacan ,Jacques, 6, 125
Lage rlof, Selma, 161
Lasch , Christopher, 143, 166----67,
163-69, 170
Laski , Harold, 167
Lauroy, Maurice , 36
Law, 14
Lawrence, D. H ., 13, 80
Lehmbruck, Wilhelm, 12
Lerner, Max, 166, 167
Leuchtenberg, William E., 93
Levine, Daniel, 105
Liberal Club, 35
Liberalism, 1, 5, 6, 109, 110, 123, 135,
167, 168-69, l 77(nll)
alternatives, 5, 6
corporate, 106,139, 165, 167
progressive, 6, 94
and war, 87, 90, 106
Lichtenhof (Germany), 151
"Life oflrony, The" (Bourne) , 42,
46----51,55
Lindsay, Vachel, 13, 158
Lion, 9, 170, 174
Lippmann, Walter, 11 , 16, 18, 22, 63
and education, 71
and feminism, 60, 83-84
as New R.epublic editor, 13, 99
and science, 8, 17, 72, 80
as socialist, 69, 70
and war, 1, 59, 92, 99
Literary societies, 44
Literature, 13, 69, 144, 145, 156----64
highbrow and lowbrow, 143,
214(n2)
"Little magazines," 12-13, 69
Little rebellion, 10-11, 13, 14-20
Little School House, 69
Little theaters, 69
London,Jack, 16
Lowell, Amy, 13, 158-59, 166
Lower East Side (New York City), 69
Loyalty Leagues, 121
Luhan, Mabel Dodge. See Dodge,
Mabel

Lukacs, Georg, 53
Lustig, R.Jeffrey, 177(nll)
Mciver, Robert, 129
MacWilliams, Wilson Carey, 167
Madison,James, 129
Madison (Wis.), 11 , 123
Madison Square Garden (New York
City), 12
Maeterlinck, Maurice, 80
Malconte nts. See "Below the battle"
Management, 17, 61, 71 , 73, 96
Mann , Thomas, 45, 47, 54, 56
Mannheim, Karl, 62, 63, 108
Marcuse, Herbert, 4, 48
Marx, Karl, 48, 132
Marxists, 3
Masses, 6, 12-13, 35, 43, 89, 121
Materialism, 158
Matisse, Henri, 12
Matthews, Brander, 33
May, Henry F., 23, 124
Melting pot, 8, 127, 212(n48). See also
Assimilation
Mencken, H . L., 13, 52
Mentre, Francois, 62
Middle class, 17, 18, 115-16, 121-22
institutions, 22, 73
intellectuals, 42-43
radicalism, 42, 43
values, 24, 70, 168
women, 60
youth, 88
Military, 87
"Military-industrial" dynasties, 113
Mills, C. Wright, 58, 91, 105
Milwaukee (Wis.), 11, 123
Miners strike (1913-1914), 160
Mitchell, Lucy Claire, 11
Modernist, 4, 8, 11, 16, 22, 151, 155,
156
Modernity,44, 48, 109,150,151
Monroe, Harriet, 13, 156
"Moral democrat," 54
Moral man, 24

INDEX

262
More, Paul Elmer, 148, 149
Mother Earth (anarchist paper) , 36
Multiculturalism , 41, 135
Mumford, Lewis, 5, 142,144,145, 170
Munich (Germany) , 151
Music (contemporary), 141
My Antonia (Cather) , 161
Nash , Laura L. , 64
Nation, 156
Nationalism, 6, 8, 14, 122, 123, 134
New, 93
See also American identity; Americanization
"National-popular" language, 5
Nation concept, 114-15
Nativism, 123, 126, 129, 208(nl9)
Navy Department, U .S., 35
New Jersey, 12
New Left, 3, 168
"New radicals," 166-67, 168
New &public, 6, 13, 34-35, 36, 58, 77,
107,143,145
advertisement of Committee for
Democratic Control, 112
World War I support, 35, 89, 92-93,
94-95,99,200(n26)
"New Revolution, The" (Bourne) , 114
New Woman, 16, 41, 55, 58, 60, 81 ,
82,83, 123
New York City, 10-11, 12, 123, 138
immigrants, 125
schools, 74-75, 76-77, 192(n51)
New York Times, 34
Nexo, Martin, 161
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 3, 4, 13, 15, 16,
40,41,69, 71,164,174
aesthetic impulse, 165, 173
art and politics, 54, 151
autonomous individual, 172
on culture (seeApollonianism;
Dionysianism)
ideal of modem age, 47,107
and irony, 47, 50
romanticism, 5

on self, 24, 109, 130
and the spirit, metamorphoses of,
9,170, 174
and war, 102
Nihilism, 55
"1917-American Rights-1789" (advertisement) , 112
Norris, Frank, 16
Norton, Anne, 69
O'Keeffe, Georgia, 11
"Old Tyrannies" (Bourne) , 172
Old World in the New, The: The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American Peop!,e (Ross) ,

129
O'Neill, Eugene, 13
"On the Jewish Question" (Marx),
132-33
Oppenheim,James, 13, 26, 37, 69,
147,166
Ortega y Gasset,Jose, 62, 63
"Our Cultural Humility" (Bourne), 124
Pacifism, 94, 95, 96-97
Palmer, A. Mitchell, 139
Parental authority, 65
Park, Robert, 129
Passing of the Great Race, The, or, the
Racial Basis ofEuropean History

(Grant), 128
Patchin Place (feminist eating club) ,
28
Pater, Walter, 158
Paterson Pageant (1913), 12,138
Patriarchal order, 22, 58, 69, 80-81
Patriotism, 87, 92, 121, 126
Paul, Sherman, 80
Payne, Thomas, 34
Peirce, Charles, 47, 88
Perkins, Frances, 81
Personality, 37-41, 57, 66, 110
and social structure, 46
"Personal point of view," 1, 19, 44, 59,
69,88, 103,158,170

INDEX

263

"Personal politics," 3, 168
Personal relations, 7, 82
Philolexian (student literary society) ,
34
"Philosophy of Handicap , The"
(Bourne ) , 25-26
Photo-Secession Gallery (New York
City) , 11
Pinchot, Amos, 35,95, 112
Pitkin , Hannah Fenichel, 20
Plato, 45-46
Pluralism, 137
"Plura-verse," 137
Poetry, 11 , 80, 145, 156, 158, 159
Poetry, 13, 154-55, 156
Political action, 61
Political radicalism, 3
Politics, 5-6, 44, 108, 114, 137, 142,
168,169,171
Bourne 's "below the battle" position , 5, 6, 9, 109, 112
cultural, 140, 144, 145, 146
elite, 146
institutional, 6, 76, 171
liberal, 1, 93, 143, 145 (see also Liberalism)
pragmatism in, 58, 118
prefigurative, 140-41, 144, 171-72
radical, 121
reformist, 138
and war, 121
Poole, Ernest, 160
Popular culture, 16. See also Culture,
highbrow and lowbrow
Portland (Oreg.), 11
Positivism, 15, 79
Posnock, Ross, 44, 91 , 92, 109, 112,
169
Post-modernism, 4, 8-9, 44, 169,
177(n9)
Post-scientific ideology, 80, 91 , 118
Potok, Chaim, 132
Poulantzas, Nicos, 113
Poverty, 43, 59
Pragmatic progressives, 6, 88, 106, 124

Pragmatism, 2, 7, 15, 51 , 58, 59, 72,
76, 80, 101-6
bureaucratic, 103, 105
defined, 88
and militarism , 88, 89 , 90-91 ,
94-95, 106, 118
Prefa ce to Politics, A (Lippmann), 70,
80
Pre-war generation, 23, 59-85
Princeton University, 29, 34
"Problem of Generations"
(Mannheim) , 62
Process of Government (Bentley), 127
Producer culture, 17
Progress, 61
Progress and Poverty (George), 31
Progressive party, 93
Progressives, 6, 10, 42, 63
Progressivism , 6, 8, 13, 59, 61
Bourne 's alternative to, 61 , 84, 168
and cities, 138
and education, 76-77, 101
failure of, 14, 18, 88, 168
and imperialism, 17, 93-94
Proletarian art and literature, 3
Promise of American Life (Croly), 93
Propertied class, 116, 117
Protestant church, 22, 24, 29
Protestant ethic, 33
Protestantism, 66
Provincetown Players, 11
Psychology, 80, 168, 169
Public culture, 44
Puritanism, 17, 23, 29, 31 , 65, 127,
159, 165
Race riot's (1919) , 139-40
Radical critic, 158
Radicalism, 54, 56, 91. See also Bourne,
Randolph, as cultural radical;
Democracy, radical; Labor radicalism ; "New radicals"
Radio, 121
Rationality, 1, 4, 15, 177(nll)
Ravitch, Diane, 74

INDEX

264
Red scare ( 1920s), 11 7
Reed,John, 13, 16
Reflections of a Non-Political Man
(Mann), 45, 54
Religion, 78, 79
Representative, 20, 23, 69-70
Republic, The (Plato), 45
Resek, Carl, 14 7
Robinson,James Harvey, 14, 95
Rodman, Henrietta, 69
Rogin, Michael Paul, 7, 18, 68, 125
Rolland, Romaine, 13, 107, 108, 161
Romain,Jules, 159
Romanticism, 5
Roosevelt, Theodore, 16, 93, 126, 128
Rorty, Richard, 90
Rosenfeld, Paul, 13
Ross, E. A., 71, 128, 129
Rouault, Georges, 12
Rousseau,Jean:Jacques, 48, 73, 114,
115, 149
Royce,Josiah, 8, 137
Russell, Bertrand, 13, 16
Russia, 42
Sandburg, Carl, 13
San Francisco, 11
Santo Domingo, 93
Sartre,Jean Paul, 108
Science, 6, 8, 17, 47, 57, 59, 60, 71, 72,
78,80,87, 107
Scrubwomen policy, 61
Sedgwick, Ellery, 25, 26, 27
Sedition,35, 118,121,122
Sedition Act (1918), 89
Self, 24, 41, 130, 109-10, 133
Self-masking, 47, 186(n8)
Settlement houses, 69
Seven Arts, 6, 13, 35, 36, 43, 89,
120-21, 142,147, 153,207(nl3)
Shaw, G. B., 5, 66
Sherman, Stuart, 149
Shorey, Paul, 149
Sin, 23, 24, 41
Sinclair, Upton, 160, 162

Sister Carrie (Dreiser), 159
Slater, Philip E., 28
Sleepy Hollow Congregational
Church, 26
Social change, 18, 19, 43, 102, 114. See
also Experimentation
Social control, 1, 8, 61, 70, 71-72, 73,
96,118,168, 177(nll)
Social injustice, 24, 31, 43
Social interaction, 46, 55
"Socialist Industrial Democracy," 114
Socialist mayor, 69
Socialist realism, 41, 148, 162
Socialists, 10, 11 , 13, 15, 16, 26, 34, 42,
63,69, 126,158
Social patron, 153-54, 155, 164
Social realists, 156
Social reconstruction, 99, 104-6, 140
Social reform, 8, 10, 11, 59, 60, 61,
104,150
democratic, 61
Social science, 61
Social transformation, 48, 63, 75-76
Social welfare agencies, 69
"Sociological Poet, A" (Bourne), 159
Socrates, 46, 47
Sollors, Werner, 127, 135
Sorel, Georges, 5, 15, 44, 69, 71
South America, 93
Spanish American War (1898), 94
Spinal tuberculosis, 26
Spingarn,Joel, 148, 216(nl5)
"State, The" (Bourne), 112-13,
114-15
State system, 112-17, 121-22, 123,
166, 204(n70). See also Centralized state power
Stearns, Harold, 13
Stettner, Edward, 92
Stieglitz, Alfred, 11 , 69
Straight, Willard D., 93
Strand, Paul, 169
Student activists ( 1960s) , 3
Stuttgart (Germany) Theater, 151
Subjectivity, 15

INDEX

265
Suburbanization, 34, 213(n63)
Suffrage rights, 11, 58, 82
"Suicide of Criticism, The" (Bourne),
148
Susman, Warren I. , 37
Syndicalists, 15, 34, 114
Taft, William Howard, 93
Tammany Hall , 77
Technocrat, 59, 72
Technology, 1, 17, 59, 87
Thackeray, William, 161
Theater, 11-12, 69, 138, 144
"Third space," 6
Thomas, Norman, 36
Thompson, E. P., 152, 207(nl3)
Thorndike, Edward, 33, 184(n40)
Tilman, Rick, 105
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 207(nl3)
Tolstoy, Leo, 161
Trachtenberg, Alan, 43
Transition, 17
"Trans-national" American culture, 1,
43,119,120,122, 123-25,
131-37
and cities, 137-39
and politics, 137
Trans-valuation. See under Bourne,
Randolph
Treitschke, Heinrich von, 87
Trollope, Anthony, 161
Truth, 102, 174
Twain, Mark, 161
Twentieth-century revolution, 10-14
Twice-a-Year, 166
"Twilight of Idols" (Bourne) , 86-87,
102,142
"Two Generations, The" (Bourne),
25,34,66
Ulm (Germany), 151
Unintegrated self, 133, 165, 169
Universities, 43, 44, 65, 121
University ofJena (Germany), 151
Urban growth, 41

Urban poor, 7, 11 , 69, 74, 88, 124
U.S.A. (Dos Passos) , 2
Vagabonds at Sea (Lauroy), 36
Varieties of Religious Experience, The

(James) , 32
Veblen, Thorstein, 15, 132
Victorianism, 7, 8, 14, 59, 79, 160, 168
Vigilantism, 121
Vitalism, 59
Wald, Alan , 135
Wallas, Graham, 5, 16
Walzer, Michael, 170
"War and the Intellectuals" (Bourne),
36
"War Diary, A" (Bourne), 10, 142, 165,
205(n80)
War Issues Course, 121 , 163
War preparedness, 5, 11, 19, 35, 59,
88,121,123, 126,200(n26)
Wartime economy, 96, 113, 116
Washington Square Players (New York
City), 11, 153
Weber, Max, 11
Wells, H . G., 160
Westbrook, Robert, 167
Westwood, Elizabeth, 81
Wey!, Walter, 13, 92
"What Is Exploitation?" (Bourne), 30
White, Morton, 14
White, William Allen, 161
Whitman, Walt, 5, 16, 60, 64, 66, 80,
154
Williams, Raymond, 152, 207(nl3)
Wilson, Woodrow, 1, 35, 69, 93, 94, 95,
99,121, 126-27, 128, 145,
204(n70)
Wine of the Puritans, The (Brooks), 143
Winterrowd, Prudence, 21, 184(n37)
Wohl, Robert, 63, 65
Wolin, Sheldon, 167
Women 's health education, 12
Women's Peace Party, 35
Working class, 18, 73, 167

INDEX

266
World War I, 1, 19, 34, 92 , 114
armistice , 36
and referendum , 112
supporters, 1-2, 65, 87, 89
U.S. entry (1917), 99
See also Bourne, Randolph , on war;
Pre-war generation; War preparedness
Yates,John Butler, 1, 13
Young Americans, 167, 168
Younger generation, 65, 66
Young India, 13

Young Ireland, 13
Young Italy, 13
Youth, 64-65, 66, 88, 189(n24) . See
also Bourne , Randolph, on youth
"Youth" (Bourne), 57
Youth and Life (Bourne) , 58, 68, 72
Youth rebellion, 7-8, 16, 18-19, 64
Zigrosser, Carl, 69
Zionism/ Zionists, 120, 126, 131-32
Zizek, Slavoj, 136
Zola, Emile, 160, 161

In the "little rebellion" that swept New York's Greenwich Village before World War I, few
figures stood out more than Randolph Bourne. Hunchbacked and caped-the "little sparrowlike man" of Dos Passos' U.S.A.-Bourne was an essayist and critic most remembered today
for his opposition to U.S. military involvement in Europe and his assertion tliat "war is the
health of the state." A frequent contributor to The New Republic, he died in 1918 at the age
of thirty-two, arguing that a "military-industrial" complex would continue to shape the
policies of the modern liberal state.
"The extraordinary importance and resonance of Randolph Bourne is brilliantly revealed in
tl1is reading of him as living and thinking at tl1e opening of American modernity. By getting
closer than any other critic to the historical Bourne, Leslie Vaughan capmres the complexity
and creativity of his inheritance of progressive rationality and embrace ofNietzschean desire.
More clearly and powerfully than anyone else, she elaborates and supports his redefinition
of the political, of its relation to the aesthetic, and of the relation of the intellecmal to
democratic politics. This outstanding book makes Bourne available in a fresh way for our
own conversations about liberalism, multiculturalism, and democracy."-Thomas Bender,
author of New York Intellect: A Histoiy ofIntellectual Life in New York City from 1750 to the
Beginnings of Our Own Time
"By stressing Bourne's autobiographical writings, his focus on generational politics, and his
call for the creation of a new democratic (and ironic) personality to supplant the liberal ideal
of character, Vaughan extends the location of American political thought into the complex
(and dangerous) terrain of culture and spirit. As a self-styled marginal and outcast, Bourne's
cultural-political vision is a timely reminder that issues of identity and inclusion have long
been just beneath the surface of American political discourse. By recovering and synthesizing
this vision, Vaughan does both Bourne and contemporary political thinking a notable
service."- EldonJ. Eisenach, autl10r of The Lost Promise of Progressivism
"An important contribution to the smdy of modern American political thought. Vaughan's
excellent grasp of the workings of psychosocial dynamics at the dawn of the twentieth
cenmry, combined with her lucid exposition of the connections and tensions among American
liberalism, multiculturalism, aesthetics, and democracy, make her book valuable to both a
general audience and specialists in the discipline."- American Political Science Review
Leslie J. Vaughan is visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of
Minnesota, Duluth. She teaches and writes in the areas of American political thought, law,
and culture.
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